

Evidence and figures documenting the human rights situation and crimes committed by the coalition countries of aggression against Yemen during (10) years

2015 - 2025



AND WHEN YEMEN IS QUESTIONED!

Second Edition

2026 - 1448



المركز اليمني لحقوق الإنسان
Yemen Center for Human Rights



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Cover photo:

A civilian aircraft engulfed in flames at Sana'a International Airport after being targeted by the coalition of aggression - 4 May 2015

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Translation: World Gate for Languages and Translation Services



{ وَلَا تَحْسَبَنَّ اللَّهَ غَافِلًا عَمَّا يَعْمَلُ الظَّالِمُونَ }

صدق الله العلي العظيم
سورة إبراهيم: 42

In the name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful.

{Do not think [O Prophet] that Allah is unaware of what the oppressors do}
[Ibrahim 14:42]

This is the word of truth from Almighty Allah.

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Two children on the ruins of the sports stadium in Ibb Governorate after it was bombed by the Saudi-led coalition – 12 April 2015
Photographer: Fadhl Al-Amdi

Introduction of the Second Edition

The second edition of 'And When Yemen Is Questioned!' represents an important milestone in the human-rights and legal documentation of the ongoing crime of aggression against Yemen. This aggression has continued for more than a decade since Saudi Arabia announced from Washington the launch of its aggression against the Republic of Yemen on 26 March 2015. It also documents the crimes and violations committed against the Yemeni people by coalition forces led by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States. These crimes were committed with the complicity, collusion, and participation of international actors, foremost among them the United Nations Security Council. While the first edition documented eight years of killing, blockade, and destruction, this second edition continues to document the crimes and violations committed over ten years of aggression. It also reaffirms that these crimes are ongoing and documented and that their perpetrators must not be allowed to escape accountability. Indeed, these crimes are not subject to a statute of limitations.

The coalition launched its aggression against Yemen after the Yemeni people had succeeded in preserving their state despite the crises and foreign interventions that had taken place between 2011 and 2014. Despite all of that, the Yemeni people remained committed to the foundations of their state, their right to self-determination, and resistance to aggression and occupation under revolutionary leadership emerging from among the people. Accordingly, under international norms and laws, it is the Yemeni people, together with their revolutionary and political leadership and their government in the capital, Sana'a, who represent the legitimate authority. It is not represented by the nominal, unconstitutional, and non-revolutionary leadership appointed by the parties and states waging aggression against Yemen. This unconstitutional leadership, along with its government, has been based in Riyadh since the return of the elected and resigned president, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi—who was reinstated as president—and even after his subsequent removal and replacement by a presidential council. The council represented a new form of authority, loyal to the states waging aggression, and it was established in violation of the constitution, without elections or a popular mandate.

Saudi Arabia futilely attempts to evade its criminal and historical responsibility for the aggression against the Republic of Yemen, the blockade imposed on its people, and the violation of its sovereignty. Moreover, it seeks to recast itself from an aggressor into a mediator and deny what has become known to the world through well-documented crimes witnessed by the world—including those it has itself acknowledged and even openly boasted about in the media and in statements, documents, and reports issued by international investigative committees documented at the United Nations. The Centre lays bare all of this in this report and in its previous reports and studies, most notably its study 'The Security Council and the Aggression against Yemen: Airstrikes and Resolutions'. These reveal the contradictions in Saudi Arabia's official

discourse as it attempts to mislead and deny crimes that the world has witnessed over a period of twelve years, which claimed the lives of more than 60,000 civilians, according to official statistics. Of these, the Centre documented more than 45,000 martyrs and wounded individuals in just ten years, in addition to the destruction of infrastructure, the targeting of the national economy, starvation, and the comprehensive blockade. Indeed, this blockade had devastating humanitarian consequences and catastrophic economic effects, further exacerbating the suffering of the Yemeni people. Preliminary official statistics indicate that the economic losses and damage resulting from the aggression and blockade have exceeded one trillion US dollars.

The second edition of this report establishes that the crimes and violations committed in Yemen by the Saudi-led coalition constitute the crime of aggression as defined by the United Nations General Assembly in 1974 and under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. It also establishes that the blockade imposed on Yemen is intended to break the resolve of the Yemeni people and starve them, constitutes collective punishment prohibited under the Geneva Conventions, and amounts to a form of the crime of aggression. It further highlights the responsibility of the states involved in this aggression for violating the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states and for violating the United Nations Charter. Article 2(4) thereof stipulates, 'All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.'

In this edition, Yemen Centre for Human Rights has made particular efforts to update the data and figures in accordance with recent field reports and to reorder the evidence chronologically, providing a clearer picture of the course and escalation of the crimes. Since 2023, a period of de-escalation had been under way—de-escalation that Saudi Arabia definitively violated by bombing Sana'a Airport on 13 July 2026—which explains why some figures relating to casualties and destruction remain unchanged from those given in the first edition, while other figures have been updated on the basis of new reports from the relevant authorities. The report also drew on local economic experts to provide a specialised assessment of the catastrophic economic effects left in the wake of the aggression and blockade.

The complicity of international actors, foremost among them the Security Council—which has become a tool in the hands of the United States—has encouraged hostile practices around the world rather than adherence to peaceful means of resolving conflicts. The United States has consequently targeted numerous countries, continuing its aggressive and colonialist approach. It began by violating international norms and laws that protect states and their leaders from direct aggression and directly targeted the President of the Supreme Political Council Saleh Ali Al-Sammad on 19 April 2018, resulting in his death along with his companions. The United States, particularly under the presidency of Donald Trump, has continued to

engage in aggression and attacks against independent, sovereign states that are members of the United Nations, including the killing of their leaders, as in the aggression against the Islamic Republic and the killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and a number of state leaders, and as happened in Venezuela, where the United States carried out an attack and captured the head of state, Hugo Chávez, and his wife.

Such violations of international laws, norms, and conventions have encouraged states with colonial ambitions to become complicit in the crimes being committed by the aggressors. The United States, the United Kingdom, and a number of other states launched a new aggression against Yemen under the name 'Operation Prosperity Guardian' (January 2024 – January 2025). The United States also launched another aggression under the name 'Operation Rough Rider' (March – May 2025). Furthermore, the Zionist entity carried out another aggression in 2025, accompanied by grave violations, including the targeting of the prime minister and the ministers, who were killed in an Israeli airstrike on the site of their meeting. Numerous coalitions were also formed to target the Yemeni people, all of which resulted in hundreds of casualties—the Centre will document them in forthcoming reports, Allah willing—in addition to violations of the agreements signed concerning captives and detainees and delays in implementing them. All of the above adds new dimensions to the international community's responsibility to confront these violations and confirms that these crimes fall within the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, as crimes of aggression, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide. All of these happened not because of any crime committed by the Yemeni people, but because of a religious, humanitarian, human-rights, and legal position that they and their leadership adopted in support of their brothers in Palestine, in accordance with the requirement under international laws and conventions to suppress any aggression and confront any act of genocide.

Reissuing this report at this time constitutes a renewed call to the international community, the United Nations, and all human-rights and humanitarian organisations to assume their legal and moral responsibilities in confronting these crimes, to work towards achieving justice and securing redress for the victims, and to prevent perpetrators from escaping punishment. It is also an affirmation that, despite all the aggression and blockade it has endured, Yemen will remain committed to its legitimate right to life, freedom, dignity, and sovereignty, in accordance with the principles of justice, international law, and international humanitarian law. And Allah prevails in His command. He (the Almighty) has said, {'But if they intend to deceive you, then Allah is certainly sufficient for you. He is the One Who supported you with His help and with the believers'}[Al-Anfal 8:62].

Head of Yemen Centre for Human Rights

Esmail Mohammed Al-Mutawakel



المركز اليمني لحقوق الإنسان
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Introduction of the First Edition

Just a few months separate us from completing nine years since the Saudi-led coalition launched its aggression and blockade against the Yemeni people. It has taken the peoples and governments of the world nine years to grasp the reality of the war crimes committed by the coalition forces in Yemen. The coalition forces have killed and injured more than 44,000 Yemeni civilians for 9 years. For nine years, these criminal forces have killed and wounded nearly 9,000 children and 7,000 women, and destroyed tens of thousands of homes, shops, institutions, and factories. An unlawful 9-year blockade by air, land, and sea has been designed to starve Yemenis and force them to accept the occupation of their land. This blockade has claimed the lives of thousands of patients who died as a result of suffering, and it has collapsed the economy of an independent, sovereign state, once threatened by a US ambassador who boasted he would make its currency worth less than the ink printed on it. These nine years bear witness to one of the most heinous crimes in modern history—premeditated and sustained by twenty-one aggressor states allied against a people defending their most basic of rights. The world needed nine years to recognise, understand, and acknowledge that Yemen has been wronged and that its lands are occupied and its peoples' rights are violated by its neighbours and by major world powers. The world needed nine years to learn that the Yemeni people have courageously and patiently stood firm, defending their right to life, freedom, dignity, and independence—rights enshrined in every regulation and every law. It took the coalition of aggression nine years to yield to the will of an unconquerable people, not because of their military strength or material means, but because the truth is with them, because Allah is with them, and because they believed in the truthfulness of Allah's promise and so earned victory. Allah (the Almighty) says, {'*And Allah will surely grant victory to those who support Him*'}[Al-Hajj 22:40], and {'*Give good news to those who patiently endure*'}[Al-Baqarah 2:155].

In the face of all this, Yemen Centre for Human Rights has sought to reveal the realities of the aggression against Yemen and to highlight the enormity of the international system's complicity, including that of the United Nations and the Security Council. The Centre has issued numerous reports and studies on the subject, the latest being '*The Security Council and the Aggression Against Yemen: Airstrikes and Resolutions*', which refuted and dismantled every justification advanced for the aggression against Yemen in the light of the rules and charters of international law.

Now the world has recognised the injustice that Yemen suffers and seen the determination of the Yemeni leadership and people to uphold and defend human rights—whether in Yemen or anywhere across the globe—through their brave and principled positions in defence of oppressed peoples, including the wronged Palestinian people. Despite the circumstances of war and blockade they face, the Yemeni people

could not stand idle in the face of the heinous crimes committed against the Palestinian people, acting in accordance with the principles of Islam, which preserve human dignity and rights. Thus, Yemen has been the only state to go beyond words of condemnation and censure to take a responsible and practical stance aimed at halting Israeli aggression against the Palestinian people, in a manner fully consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Meanwhile, the rest of the world did not take any action in the face of genocidal Zionist crimes that have claimed the lives of tens of thousands of Palestinians—a stance to the one taken by the countries of the world throughout nine years of aggression against the Yemeni people. The only difference is that many of those same states played a direct and active military role in the aggression against Yemen.

In its commitment to documenting crimes of aggression and to safeguarding the Yemeni people's right to justice and accountability, Yemen Centre for Human Rights is honoured to present this report, entitled '*And When Yemen Is Questioned!*'. It is the fruit of the Centre's work and efforts since the beginning of the aggression on 26 March 2015. Throughout these years of aggression and blockade, the Centre's dedicated staff have spared no effort, working tirelessly day and night in continuous monitoring and field investigations, often at great personal risk, to reveal the truth to the world. They have prepared reports and studies and organised events, symposia, and campaigns calling for an end to this unjust aggression. These diligent and commendable voluntary efforts by the men and women of the Centre to defend human rights have been driven purely by their loyalty to the religious, humanitarian, and national values with which they were raised, and by their deep sense of responsibility towards their country, their people, and their just cause. Together with many other human rights defenders in Yemen and beyond, their work—by Allah's grace and support—has helped mobilise global opinion against the aggression and placed pressure on the coalition countries to halt their aggression.

Finally, a word of gratitude and appreciation must be extended to all those unsung heroes. No matter what we say, we can never repay them for what they have done. To them, and to all the free voices who have stood with Yemen, Yemen Centre for Human Rights—and indeed the entire Yemeni people—offer their deepest thanks and recognition. Words of gratitude will always fall short of expressing the depth of our appreciation for them and for everyone who has cooperated with the Centre throughout its journey of human rights and struggle during these long years of aggression. We pray to Allah (the Almighty) to accept this work from them and from us, and to guide us always to that which earns His good pleasure.

Yemen Centre for Human Rights

Yemen Centre for Human Rights is an independent civil rights organisation established in 2009. It carries permit number (932) issued by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour. It is an obtainer of the Honourary Shield of Pioneers of Humanitarian Work in 2016, and it has participated in a number of international fora on human rights. Since the beginning of its establishment, the Centre has focused on advocating, evaluating, and following up human rights issues. Moreover, it has conducted many humanitarian and human rights activities and organised a range of human rights and legal events aimed at promoting human rights work and programmes aimed at raising awareness of the concepts of international humanitarian law and human rights issues, especially issues related to women's and children's rights. The centre also provides activists with training in human rights monitoring, documentation, and specialised report-writing, and that is in collaboration with governments and international human rights organisations.

Yemen Centre for Human Rights was at the forefront in standing up against violations against Yemenis of all segments, and in the sensitive stages in which many remained silent, especially those that accompanied the Sa'dah wars and the popular protests in February 2011, and the revolution of 21 September 2014, until it assumed its full responsibilities from the first day of the aggression on 26 March 2015. At that time, it led the human rights work by contributing to the establishment and management of the Civil Coalition for Monitoring the Aggression Crimes, working on training field monitoring teams, and participating in preparing the reports of the Civil Coalition. The centre independently prepared periodic, annual, and qualitative reports on the coalition's most serious crimes and implemented the civil damage survey project in the city of Sa'dah. All of that is in addition to its special interest in crimes that affected children, the issuance of special reports for most of the crimes committed by the coalition of aggression against children (such as the Dhahyan Bus massacre), and the issuance of the first report of its kind in September 2020 on the crimes of aggression against Yemeni children during five years of war, entitled '*Childhood with Colour of Blood and Smell of Death*', which was launched in the presence of the then-Minister of Human Rights, along with many child victims and their families.

Yemen Centre launched the Legal Assistance Project, where it received many cases that the families of the victims of the aggression demand to file lawsuits against the coalition of aggression; the Centre, having completed the files with the competent authorities at home and legal offices abroad, is currently in the process of raising these files. The Centre also took the initiative to train and qualify judges and prosecutors on international humanitarian law and its use in cases brought against the coalition.

Yemen Centre has produced significant legal publications, most notably a study entitled '*The Security Council and the Aggression on Yemen: Airstrikes and Resolutions*'. This is a legal study that examines the Security Council's stance on Yemen from 1947 to 2021. It documents violations of international law in the Security Council's handling of the Yemen file and its threat to the international order and global peace and security. It was published by the Centre in February 2022 and translated into multiple languages. Then it was distributed to members of the United Nations and of the Security Council. The report '*And When Yemen Is Questioned!*' presents evidence and statistics documenting the human rights situation and the crimes committed by the coalition countries in their aggression against Yemen (2015–2023). Its first edition was published at the end of 2023.



المركز اليمني لحقوق الإنسان
Yemen Center for Human Rights

Terms

- **The Centre / Yemen Centre:** [Yemen Centre for Human Rights](#)
- **[The Supreme Political Council](#):** It is the presidential Council whose establishment was approved by the Yemeni Parliament, and it was formed as a result of the political agreement between the Ansar Allah component, the General People's Congress, and their allies.
- **The Government / Sana'a Government:** This government is [the National Salvation Government](#) headed by Dr Abdulaziz bin Habtoor. It was formed in the Capital Sana'a, pursuant to [Resolution 56 \(2016\) issued by the President of the Supreme Political Council](#). It was followed by the Government of Change and Construction, headed by Mr Ahmed Ghaleb Al-Rahawi, which was formed under [Resolution 12 \(1446 AH\) by the President of the Supreme Political Council](#).
- **[The Security Council](#) / the Council:** It is one of the most important organs of the United Nations and bears the main responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. It has 15 members, and each member has one vote. Among the 15 members, ten are non-permanent members, while five are permanent members and have the right to reject any decision taken by the Council with the so-called 'veto'.
- **The coalition / the coalition of aggression:** That is the countries participating militarily and logistically in the aggression against Yemen. It is led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The coalition comprised more than 21 countries: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Sudan, Malaysia, Senegal, Jordan, Somalia, Morocco, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Canada, the Solomon Islands, Mauritania, Pakistan, and the Zionist entity.
- **Hadi:** He is Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, who was appointed President of the Republic of Yemen based on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative. His term according to the GCC Initiative expired on February 20, 2014, and he submitted his resignation on 22 January 2015.

- **The Hadi government:** This government is the one whose head, Khaled Bahah, submitted his resignation on 22 January 2015, prior to Hadi's resignation. Bahah was assigned to form a mini-government in Riyadh on 12 April 2015. After that, several governments abroad were headed by personalities loyal to Hadi, and all of these governments supported the aggression against Yemen, which started in March 2015. Although the heads of these governments and all their members reside outside the Republic of Yemen, the United Nations treats them as the legitimate government.
- **The government loyal to the coalition of aggression:** This refers to the successive governments formed after 26 March 2015 in Aden and the occupied governorates under the supervision of the coalition countries of aggression.
- **Peace and National Partnership Agreement:** It is an agreement signed on 21 September 2014 between all parties and political and national components in Yemen.

Methodology

- [Yemen Centre for Human Rights](#) prepared this report documenting the aggression against Yemen and its crimes through an investigative and analytical methodology aimed at establishing the crime of aggression—the mother of all crimes—committed by the coalition of aggression, led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, against Yemen since 26 March 2015. The report builds upon a previous study titled '*The Security Council and the Aggression on Yemen: Airstrikes and Resolutions*'.
- The report covers a ten-year period from March 2015 to March 2025.
- The report presented evidence that demonstrates the elements of the crime of aggression, as defined by the United Nations in its Resolution 3314.
- The report relied on Yemen Centre's database for statistics and crimes, which the Centre monitored and documented throughout the duration of the aggression. It also relied on the statistics of some official authorities in Yemen.
- In some sections, the report relied on reports from official Yemeni media, as well as reports from the countries of the coalition.
- The report adopts a chronological approach to documenting events and crimes.
- The report included evidence of crimes, along with data and figures from international and global organisations, including United Nations agencies.



المركز اليمني لحقوق الإنسان
Yemen Center for Human Rights

A photograph of a young child with dark, curly hair, wearing a light-colored long-sleeved shirt, standing in the foreground. The child is looking towards a large, multi-story building that has been severely damaged. The building's structure is exposed, with many windows missing and debris scattered around. The child is holding a piece of wood in their right hand. The scene is set in a war-torn area, likely Sa'dah Governorate.

Summary

A child looks at what remains of his home, which was destroyed by coalition warplanes in Sa'dah Governorate.

On 26 March 2015, following the first airstrikes on a residential neighbourhood in the capital, Sana'a, a coalition of aggression against Yemen was announced in Washington—a coalition comprising more than 21 countries, led by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Sudan, America, Israel, Britain, and others. These opening strikes were followed by hundreds of thousands of air, land, and naval attacks carried out by these countries against the Yemeni state and its people without prior warning.

Over the past ten years, since the crime of aggression was committed by the coalition countries against Yemen, numerous acts and practices have occurred, and they fall under the most serious crimes as classified by international humanitarian law treaties. Some examples of these are crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes, which have resulted in thousands of civilian casualties, both killed and wounded. The countries of the coalition repeatedly and extensively targeted civilians in public markets, mosques, and venues designated for social events, such as weddings, funerals, and other social events. Some of these attacks resulted in horrific massacres, representing some of the most brutal examples of mass killings. Prohibited weapons were also used in a number of these attacks against civilians. The coalition countries repeatedly employed banned weapons and munitions, causing severe damage and intense suffering. Furthermore, the blockade imposed by the countries of the coalition on Yemen led to devastating economic losses, which worsened the humanitarian situation and affected all segments of Yemeni society.

Throughout these ten years, Yemen Centre for Human Rights has carried out daily monitoring and documentation of the crimes of the aggression through its field monitoring teams. These teams confirmed that the deliberate targeting of civilians and their gatherings was a repeated and systematic practice by the countries of the coalition. Reports from the monitoring teams revealed that the coalition committed the crime of aggression and intentional killings as defined in national laws, as well as acts of genocide referenced in various conventions and international humanitarian law treaties. This was evidenced by the documented statistics and detailed accounts included in these reports, particularly concerning the civilian victims—most of whom were women and children.

The second edition of *'And When Yemen Is Questioned!'* is a report that represents the culmination of the efforts of Yemen Centre for Human Rights since the onset of the aggression. With figures and evidence, it documents the humanitarian situation resulting from the crimes committed by the coalition countries against Yemen during the period from March 2015 to March 2025. This aggression resulted in 45,270 civilian casualties, 18,458 of whom were killed and 26,812 were wounded. According to official statistics issued by the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, the number of civilian casualties reached 59,346, including 24,126 killed and 35,220 injured. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Health and Environment reported

50,479 civilian casualties, including 15,885 killed and 34,549 injured. In addition, approximately 1.5 million people died as a result of the blockade and the lack of access to essential services.

The coalition's aggression was accompanied by a comprehensive blockade of Yemen, resulting in severe humanitarian repercussions and catastrophic consequences for the Yemeni population. The coalition did not limit itself to direct bombardment and the killing of civilians with bombs, missiles, and bullets; it also intensified the starvation and killing of civilians through comprehensive blockade and by preventing essential goods from entering Yemen. The blockade also had severe economic consequences, inflicting substantial losses that further compounded the suffering of the Yemeni people.

According to statistics from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Investment, the aggression and blockade caused economic damage and losses amounting to approximately \$1.1 trillion. These included losses of \$82.5 billion in the industrial sector and \$111.13 billion in the foreign trade sector. Losses in the oil and minerals sector amounted to \$57 billion, while those in the agriculture and livestock sector reached \$111 billion. The transport sector—air, land, and sea—sustained losses of \$23.2 billion, while losses in the electricity, energy, and water sector reached \$28.2 billion. The water and sanitation sector sustained losses of \$800 million, while the tourism, antiquities, and cultural sector incurred losses of \$11 billion. Meanwhile, cumulative losses in economic output exceeded \$645 billion.


The figures and information obtained by the Centre regarding the victims of serious crimes are the result of efforts carried out under significant challenges and obstacles faced by monitoring teams and specialists during the processes of data collection and analysis. These difficulties prevented access to the full and accurate figures and statistics, which—according to available evidence and indicators—are believed to be far greater than what has been recorded and documented over the past years.

In its first part, the report provides a description of the crime of aggression against Yemen, highlighting the clear violation of Yemeni state sovereignty. The Yemeni people had managed to preserve that sovereignty through sensitive phases in the country's history, despite the negative response of the UN Security Council and the United Nations towards the crime. In the second part, the report presents documented examples and evidence of some horrific crimes that amount to the most serious crimes, along with the economic and humanitarian impacts that are unprecedented in human history. The report also includes a chapter on the humanitarian truce, which lasted six months under UN auspices, from 2 April to 2 October 2022.

The report concludes with a set of recommendations issued by Yemen Centre for Human Rights, directed to several parties: the Secretary-General of the United Nations and its General Assembly, the leaders of UN member states, the Supreme Political Council and the Yemeni government, the free people of the world (including leaders and activists), and local civil society organisations. The Centre expresses its hope that these recommendations will be acted upon and implemented on the ground to end the suffering of the Yemeni people, which is caused by the aggression and blockade.


Important Numbers and Statistics


Victims of the Crimes and Violations Committed by the Coalition of Aggression against Yemen over 10 Years According to Preliminary Statistics from Yemen Centre for Human Rights



Official statistics issued by the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights indicate that the number of civilian victims stood at 59,346, including 24,126 killed and 35,220 injured.

Infographic Showing the Number of Civil Casualties by Year







A general view of Sa'dah Governorate during the airstrikes on the vicinity of the Imam Al-Hadi Mosque.

Part One

The Aggression against the Modern Yemeni State

Chapter One: The Yemeni People Preserve Their State

First: The Concept of the State and Its Definition

All documents that address the concept of the state revolve around defining the form or political organisation of the modern state and around how it is represented by a specific central authority that exercises political powers and the legitimate use of executive force within the borders of a defined territorial jurisdiction. There is no explicit text in international law that clearly defines the state.

The [Montevideo Convention](#) on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933⁽¹⁾ established specific criteria for defining a state. It evaluated each of these criteria individually and assessed their adequacy for acquiring legal statehood. This convention states that, *'The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.'* The criteria set forth by the Montevideo Convention are closely interconnected, with each element complementing the others. A government cannot exist without a defined territory or political and legal authorities granted by the people through a constitution (or basic law). The constitution also defines the sovereignty of the state both within its territorial boundaries and beyond them through the conduct of diplomatic relations, membership of international organisations, the conclusion of treaties, and participation in international events on behalf of the state's people.

However, the United Nations has affirmed that the term 'state' is not dependent on recognition or on being a member of the United Nations. UN General Assembly Resolution [3314 \(XXIX\) of 1974](#) provided a definition of what is meant by the term 'state', as Article 1 (which defines aggression) reads, *'In this Definition the term "state": (a) is used without prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether a state is a member of the United Nations; (b) includes the concept of a "group of states" where appropriate.'*

The principles of public international law affirm that the right to self-determination is a protected right of peoples and nations and that the legitimacy of a state derives from its ability to exercise the right of self-determination on behalf of its people. Therefore, states enjoy sovereign rights towards one another at the international level, while at the national or domestic level, states bear obligations towards their populations.

¹ The Montevideo Convention is a convention that was concluded in Montevideo, Uruguay, on 26 December 1933, during the Seventh International Conference of American States. The convention codifies the declarative theory of statehood as an accepted part of customary international law.

[The United Nations Charter](#) (1945) affirmed that the fundamental foundation of the international order is the people, not governments or specific state institutions. The preamble of the Charter begins with the phrase '*We the Peoples of the United Nations*', and it sets forth a series of objectives primarily aimed at evaluating the legitimacy of states as international legal persons. This legitimacy is based on the nature of the relationship between the government and its people(s) and the extent to which the state protects its population and future generations, upholds human dignity and the rights of all individuals, improves their standard of living, and respects the principles of international law.

[Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties \(1969\)](#) affirms the sovereign equality and independence of all states, under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties can be maintained, as well as the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, such as the principles of the equal rights, self-determination of peoples, non-interference in the domestic affairs of states, the prohibition of the threat or use of force, and universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.

As for [the Yemeni Constitution](#), it clearly defines who represents authority and the state. Article 4 says, '*The people are the owners and source of authority.*'

Second: The Yemeni People Have Successfully Preserved the State against Every Attempt to Overthrow It

The wisdom of the people of Yemen (the land of faith and wisdom was clearly demonstrated during the difficult and pivotal stages of Yemen's modern history. Preserving the pillars of the state was a common goal agreed upon by all parties. The vigilant and conscious people of Yemen have been and will always be the guarantee of the country's stability. Their strong commitment to the rule of the constitution and law, their support for state institutions, their encouragement of those institutions to continue functioning even during critical periods of political conflict, and the exceptional ability of leaders (not only government officials but also the country's cultural, social, and religious elites) to engage in dialogue and build internal and external relationships contributed greatly to maintaining the cohesion of the state and its continued ability to protect its identity, culture, and territory against conspiracies and aggression. Alongside this wisdom, Yemenis have shown remarkable patience and tolerance, which emboldened certain dictatorial military leaders to resort to repression and the suppression of freedoms in order to strengthen their power following bloody coups. The regime of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh was the longest-lasting, yet it began to unravel when he started using the military in internal wars against his own people, such as the 1994 war against the southern governorates (despite backing from Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Cooperation Council states, and the United States) and the six wars in Sa'dah Governorate (which led to thousands of civilian casualties and signaled the approaching end of his rule, as the people rejected the continuation of his crimes—crimes from which neither the United Nations nor the international community managed to protect them).

A. The Events of the 2011 Revolution

As the people started to protest in 2011, community leaders from various factions chose to support the youth in their peaceful revolution and to join their sit-ins without resorting to arms, while firmly rejecting any form of security breakdown in the governorates. Many governors, heads of local councils, tribal leaders, and influential community figures coordinated among themselves to implement measures that would maintain public order and protect state institutions, allowing them to continue providing essential services to citizens as much as possible. They worked to contain and de-escalate any acts of violence or unrest through popular means and fill any security vacuum with community committees. Meanwhile, they maintained communication and support for the central government and encouraged it to side with the people. This innovative approach, led by Yemenis themselves, was particularly evident in the governorates of Sa'dah,

Dhamar, Al-Hudaydah, Hajjah, Hadramawt, and Shabwah. The Yemeni people also resisted attempts to drag the revolution into violence by holding firmly to peaceful protests. They succeeded in bringing about the removal of the regime's leadership while preserving the state's core institutions, thereby keeping the foundations of the Yemeni state intact.

B. Attempts to Derail the Revolution and the Beginning of Open Saudi Intervention

In February 2012, with the approval of then-Vice President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi and the backing of Saudi Arabia, the commander of the First Armoured Division (Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar), along with the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Islah Party)—affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood—managed to derail the revolution and reproduce the former regime. This was achieved by dispersing the protest camps. In their final stages, these camps witnessed the very forces that had claimed to protect the revolution open fire on peaceful protesters, killing and injuring hundreds of young demonstrators and forcibly ending the movement. Despite these efforts, these forces failed to suppress the growing popular momentum demanding the establishment of a just and civil state and requesting that leaders of grassroots movements be supported as they have become stronger examples of these movements are Ansar Allah and the Southern Movement (Al-Hirak). In response, Saudi Arabia and the United States had no other choice but to introduce what became known as the GCC Initiative, attempting to convince the Yemeni people and the international community that it is a genuine path towards a real change and compromise that could fulfil some of the revolution's demands. However, the Yemeni people were determined to continue their revolution until they resolve to uproot all pillars of the former system, which remained loyal to Saudi Arabia and the United States.

The Saudi and American intervention was not surprising, as Yemen had experienced blatant interference in its affairs and direct hegemony by the United States for decades. US influence reached the point of killing Yemeni citizens without judicial rulings, often using Al-Qaeda as a pretext. The USA also deployed its military and security forces in Yemen, established an embassy office inside the Prime Minister's headquarter, took control of the National Security Agency, and had the US ambassador in Yemen meet with government officials and tribal leaders to give them directives.

Since its establishment, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has played the most dominant role in exercising hegemony over the Yemeni people, controlling the decisions of successive Yemeni governments, and committing crimes against the country. Moreover, it had dominated various presidents, participated in the assassination of some (such as President Ibrahim Al-Hamdi), and supported others, like President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Saudi Arabia also established what became known as the '*Special Committee*', tasked with recruiting certain Yemeni leaders—from the president down to the smallest tribal chief or political figure.

The Yemeni people faced the challenge of attempts to derail the revolution and strip them of their right to self-determination, as they were holding firmly to the revolution's demands and supporting a peaceful transfer of power. During this period, the Yemeni people preserved their state, maintaining all of its fundamental pillars.

C. The Phase of the GCC Initiative

The initiative originally came from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), of which Yemen is not a member. It did not originate from the Arab League or the United Nations, both of which Yemen is a signatory member. This raised the question of why these two organisations remained mere spectators to the situation in Yemen without launching any initiative to assist its people, although such an action is among the rights of membership, especially for a country that was a founding member of both.

In its explicit text, the GCC Initiative affirmed that the Gulf Cooperation Council, the European Union, and the United States would serve only as observers and witnesses and that they would support any decisions made by the Yemeni people. The initiative did not grant these parties the authority to interfere in the people's choices. In fact, its preamble emphasised that it aimed to ensure a smooth and peaceful transfer of power, sparing Yemen from chaos and violence through national consensus.

The GCC Initiative itself was in violation of the Yemeni Constitution, as it granted Ali Abdullah Saleh full immunity from legal and judicial prosecution. This immunity also extended to all those who had worked with him during his 33-year rule. This is a decision unprecedented in human history, as it blatantly disregarded the Yemeni Constitution, all international treaties, and the fundamental principles of justice.

Moreover, the implementation mechanism of the GCC Initiative contradicted the articles of the initiative itself and its core text, particularly regarding the constitutional right of the Yemeni citizen to elect their pres-

ident through elections. The fifth point of the initiative states, '*The President by appointment shall call for presidential elections within 60 days in accordance with the Constitution.*' However, the implementation mechanism effectively stripped the Yemeni people of their right to elect a new president by announcing Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi as the sole candidate and compelling Parliament and political parties to endorse this. This was a violation of the Constitution—although in the paragraph, it stipulated elections be held '*in accordance with the Constitution*'. Nevertheless, Article 108 (d) of the Yemeni Constitution clearly states that presidential elections must be competitive, with no fewer than two candidates. Nonetheless, it has come to everyone's knowledge that the elections were announced and conducted with only one candidate, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, making it more of a referendum than a genuine election. As such, the process violated both the Constitution and the GCC Initiative itself and constitutes a blatant interference in Yemen's affairs by the GCC states through the imposition of a president not elected by the people. This procedure also constitutes a violation of United Nations General Assembly Resolution [36/103](#), dated 9 December 1981, which states in Article I:

1. *No State or group of States has the right to intervene or interfere in any form or for any reason whatsoever in the internal and external affairs of other States.*
2. *The principle of non-intervention and non-interference in the internal and external affairs of States comprehends the following rights and duties:*
 - a) *Sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national unity and security of all States, as well as national identity and cultural heritage of their peoples;*
 - b) *The sovereign and inalienable right of a State freely to determine its own political, economic, cultural, and social systems, to develop its international relations, and to exercise permanent sovereignty over its natural resources, in accordance with the will of its people, without outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion, or threat in any form whatsoever.*

The Yemeni people faced the challenge of foreign interference in their internal affairs and the exclusion of popular components in the GCC Initiative with patience. They dealt positively with it and with the National Reconciliation Government that stemmed from the initiative, and they supported peaceful solutions. They successfully imposed the goals of the revolution and the aspirations of the people in the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference.

D. The Period of the National Dialogue Conference (2013-2014-)

The parties and factions that had not signed the GCC Initiative (especially those parties that had expressed reservations about the GCC intervention in the Yemeni people's right to self-determination) agreed to participate in the National Dialogue in order to prioritise the country's interests and to end the bloodshed.

As usual, the parties and factions preserved the general structure and stability of the state. They engaged positively with the National Consensus Government formed by the unelected president, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, and headed by Mohammed Basindawa. Independent Yemeni factions also agreed to join the National Dialogue, which began on 18 March 2013, and participated constructively in the various events and committees of the National Dialogue Conference. They lent the dialogue a tone of seriousness and responsibility, contributing to the issuance of important outcomes with strategic significance for building a modern Yemeni state—one that is civil, sovereign, committed to development, and respectful of human rights.

During the National Dialogue Conference, numerous security and military officials were targeted, as well as certain groups (such as the Ansar Allah movement, whose members were targeted through a series of assassinations that claimed the lives of its intellectual and political figures who were members of the Dialogue Conference). These acts were part of an attempt to pressure the group into abandoning its rejection of the federalisation project. Among those assassinated was Dr Abdulkarim Jadbani, a member of parliament and representative of Ansar Allah in the National Dialogue Conference, who was killed in the Capital Sana'a on 22 November 2013. On 21 January 2014, gunmen also assassinated Professor Ahmed Sharaf Addin, another representative of Ansar Allah in the conference and a member of the Guarantees Committee, through which he sought to resolve disputes arising from the insistence of some factions, along with President Hadi, on imposing the six-region federalisation plan as part of the dialogue outcomes, even though this idea lacked consensus.

These attempts to derail the conference and push the parties towards conflict failed due to the Yemeni people's patience and their aspiration for a civil state, which allowed them to overcome such conspiracies. This led to the announcement of the National Dialogue Conference Outcomes Document, which represented a unique national consensus. In doing so, Yemenis overcame the challenge of undermining the dialogue, succeeded in establishing its outcomes as a reference for the coming phases, and preserved their state with all its essential pillars intact.

E. The Period of Declaring the Revolution's Completion

In September 2014, the anger of the people escalated after the government announced a new price rise in fuel, which had been unavailable in markets for several months. The country's economic situation continued to deteriorate; the government failed to adhere to good governance practices; security chaos was growing with an increase in terrorist attacks claimed by ISIL and Al-Qaeda and with dozens of security and military officials being assassinated in incidents the authorities were unable to prevent; and the presidency and government insisted on taking further political and economic escalation measures, relying on GCC and US support. As a result of all of that, peaceful protests began to re-emerge, but this time in the form of sit-ins on the outskirts of the Capital Sana'a. Once again, the wisdom of the Yemeni people was evident, as factions and tribes sought to avoid bloodshed and clashes with military forces. They remained committed to preserving the structure of the state while exerting pressure on the government to meet the people's demands, the most important of which were the implementation of the National Dialogue Conference outcomes, halting attempts to impose the six-region federalisation plan (seen as a division of the country), combating corruption, stabilising the currency, and lowering prices, especially for fuel.

Amid the intransigence of the authorities, people continued to protest, and demands escalated for the cancellation of the fuel price rise and the replacement of the government. The movement evolved into a peaceful popular revolution that surrounded the Capital Sana'a. In a televised speech, the leader of the revolution, Al-Sayyid Abdul Malik Badruddin Al-Houthi, announced the revolutionaries' demands and called on officials in Sana'a to side with the people. This paved the way for a new phase of the revolution, marked by the entry into the capital, which was accompanied by limited clashes with forces loyal to Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar, commander of the First Armoured Division—the only military force that resisted the revolutionaries. The clashes lasted no more than three days, after which the revolutionaries took full control of the Capital Sana'a on 21 September 2014. Subsequently, all army units joined the revolution, followed by the governorates, one after another. Thus, Yemenis responded to policies of starvation and security chaos by completing their peaceful revolution. They succeeded in containing the government and bringing the military to their side, preserving the state with all its essential pillars intact.

F. Peace and Partnership Agreement

The Prime Minister of the National Reconciliation Government hastily announced his resignation on 21 September 2014. In response, the leader of the revolution, Al-Sayyid Abdul Malik Badruddin Al-Houthi, called on all factions and political components to attend a reconciliation meeting the following day. During the meeting, the components were surprised when the Ansar Allah movement presented a new national agreement proposal, later known as the Peace and Partnership Agreement. The aim of the agreement was to peacefully resolve the Yemeni crisis; establish genuine partnership among all parties, factions, and components; and fill any constitutional or governmental vacuum by retaining President Hadi and granting him the authority to form a technocratic government, with sovereign ministries under his supervision. The agreement reaffirmed the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference and aimed to push for their implementation. It also called for the cancellation of the fuel price increase and the six-region federalisation plan. Additionally, it emphasised the completion of the agreed-upon steps, such as drafting the constitution, holding a referendum on it, and conducting presidential and then parliamentary elections. The Peace and Partnership Agreement was signed in the presence and under the sponsorship of the United Nations through its envoy to Yemen, Jamal Benomar.

The world was surprised by the Peace and Partnership Agreement, as no one expected the victorious revolutionaries to make such concessions, especially to their rivals. The United Nations and the Security Council had no choice but to endorse the agreement, as they found no grounds to object to it. Several resolutions and statements were subsequently issued by the Security Council to affirm the Peace and Partnership Agreement as a reference and to urge all Yemeni parties to implement it, as stated in UN Security Council Resolution [2201 \(2015\)](#), dated 15 February 2015, particularly in Articles 4 and 5. These articles state:

4- Strongly calls upon all parties, in particular the Houthis, to abide by the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism, the outcomes of the comprehensive National Dialogue conference, and the Peace and National Partnership Agreement and its security annex, which provide for a Yemeni-led democratic transition;

5- Urges all parties, in particular the Houthis, to accelerate inclusive United Nations-brokered negotiations, to continue the political transition in order to reach a consensus solution in accordance with the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism, the outcomes of the comprehensive National Dialogue conference, and the Peace and National Partnership Agreement and its security annex, and to implement it.

The Yemeni people confronted attempts to condemn their revolution through the Peace and Partnership Agreement, which was endorsed by the UN Security Council. They succeeded in containing the rival parties and forming a technocratic government. The Yemeni people preserved their state with all its essential pillars intact.

G. The Coup against the Peace and Partnership Agreement

All Yemeni parties began implementing the Peace and Partnership Agreement with the support and oversight of the revolutionary leadership and under the supervision of the United Nations. This included reaching consensus-based, confidence-building solutions and mechanisms, such as the formation of the National Competency Government headed by Khaled Bahah on 7 November 2014, the establishment of the Constitution Drafting Committee and the Guarantees Committee, and the dismantling of protest camps. To promote calm, advance the peace process, and reassure all parties, the leadership of Ansar Allah—the leader of the revolution and the victorious party—made the decision not to participate in the government and to forgo their share in favour of the southern governorates. Subsequently, new rounds of dialogue and negotiations between the political components began so as to agree on the future structure of the state, particularly the Presidential Council. The overall situation in the Republic of Yemen saw relative improvement, especially in terms of security, with operations targeting cells affiliated with Al-Qaeda and ISIL. However, the UAE came up with the most dangerous move aimed at derail the GCC Initiative, the National Dialogue Conference outcomes, and the Peace and Partnership Agreement. The leadership and government of the UAE directly intervened to prevent the Yemeni people from adopting a new consensus-based constitution. The UAE succeeded in pressuring the presidency to relocate the Constitution Drafting Committee to Abu Dhabi in October 2014, where Emirati officials attended the committee's sessions.

The UAE's intervention in the drafting of Yemen's new constitution marked the beginning of an escalating pattern of violations against the Yemeni people's rights and the sovereignty of their land. Disagreements began to emerge among Yemeni factions over the outcomes produced by the Constitution Drafting Committee, as the UAE exerted pressure on the committee to adopt constitutional provisions that had not been agreed upon during the National Dialogue Conference. Among the most controversial issues was the number and geographic distribution of federal regions—proposals that failed to adhere to any clear criteria or national interests. This provided a logical basis for many national components to reject those outcomes, reaffirm their commitment to previously agreed-upon decisions, and demand that externally dictated outcomes (those conflicting with the country's supreme national interests) should not be announced.

After the Constitution Drafting Committee had returned from Abu Dhabi to Sana'a, the leadership of the Ansar Allah movement attempted to warn President Hadi of the dangers of taking any unilateral steps to adopt the draft constitution, particularly after the inclusion of the six-region federalisation project. However, external pressures pushed the unelected president to hastily bypass the principles and outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference and announce the adoption of the new constitution based on an unagreed-upon draft. This made major national components reject this action and withdraw from the draft submission session. Examples of these national components include the General People's Congress, the Southern Movement, and Ansar Allah.

On 17 January 2015, the Revolutionary Committees announced the detention of the Director of the Presidential Office, Ahmed Bin Mubarak, citing his insistence (along with President Hadi) on adopting the unagreed-upon draft constitution. Evidence was published showing his coordination with Hadi and foreign powers to pass the constitution. Cooperating with UN Envoy Jamal Benomar and coordinating with the unelected President Hadi and with the leaders of other components and parties, the revolutionary leadership quickly moved to contain the situation. They agreed to return the draft constitution for further discussion among the national components and to adopt only what was mutually agreed upon. Accordingly, Ahmed Bin Mubarak was released, and it was agreed to resume dialogue sessions to reach a final agreement on the structure of the state and the new presidential council. The crisis was thus temporarily resolved with wisdom and without bloodshed.

On 22 January 2015, the prime minister of the Technocratic Government, Khaled Bahah, submitted his resignation to the unelected President Hadi, without the approval of the government. Hadi, in turn, after accepting the Prime Minister's resignation, submitted his own resignation to the Parliament. This was seen as a clear agreement aimed at pushing Yemen into a phase of constitutional and governmental vacuum, placing the revolutionaries in a critical position due to the potential consequences of that decision, including the collapse of state institutions, security breakdown, and the creation of a state of chaos that would be difficult to control.

The leadership of the revolution and the UN envoy attempted to contain the situation by tasking Bahah's government as a caretaker government. Many ministers responded positively, yet both Hadi and Bahah insisted on their resignation, in an apparent attempt to push the country into a constitutional, governmental, and political vacuum. A public deadline was given to the political forces to reach an agreement that would pull the country out of this vacuum. However, the deadline passed without any agreement due to

the intransigence of the Islah Party, which supported Hadi and Bahah's agenda of maintaining the vacuum as a means of pressuring the revolutionaries. As a result, Ansar Allah and their allies, with the support of the Popular Committees, issued the Constitutional Declaration as an attempt to save the country from this vacuum and to save the state institutions from disintegration.

On 6 February 2015, the Constitutional Declaration was issued from inside the Republican Palace and in the presence of significant political, tribal, and military figures (including ministers from Bahah's government, such as the Ministers of Defence and Interior Affairs). Its preamble stated that it came after the political components that believed in the 11th of February and 21st of September revolutions exerted tremendous efforts to contain the situation and convince all the political components of the principle of peace and partnership to rescue the nation from the vacuum left by the sudden and unjustified resignations of the President and the government. The preamble added that these efforts, however, were met with obstruction, rejection, and a shirking of national responsibility, as some components persisted in their opportunistic approach and disregard for the national interest.

The Constitutional Declaration, consisting of fifteen articles, stipulated the formation of a National Council and a Presidential Council, and it granted the Revolutionary Committee the authority to take all necessary measures to protect the sovereignty of the nation, ensure its security and stability, and safeguard the rights and freedoms of its citizens.

The Constitutional Declaration stated that the country's foreign policy was based on the principles of good neighbourliness, non-interference, and the adoption of peaceful means for resolving disputes. It also affirmed that the Supreme Revolutionary Committee represented the revolution and was represented by the revolutionary committees across the country.

Thus, the attempt to plunge Yemen into a constitutional, governmental, or political vacuum failed and lasted for less than two weeks, until the popular components and revolutionary committees were able to fill the presidential and governmental vacuum and save the state from collapse.

The Revolutionary Committee began carrying out its duties alongside the caretaker government and the ministers who had rejected Bahah's resignation. It succeeded in reactivating state institutions, the judiciary, security forces, the army, and the Central Bank. Moreover, it was able to give salaries out across both

northern and southern governorates. It also managed to expel ISIL and Al-Qaeda from their strongholds in several governorates. The United Nations was eventually compelled to deal with the new reality, and an agreement was reached with the political parties and components to resume dialogue. The Revolutionary Committee offered assurances and guarantees under UN supervision, and a new round of negotiations began at the Mövenpick Hotel in Sana'a with the participation of representatives from all political parties and components.

Indeed, the Yemeni people confronted the plot to bring down the state and the resignations of the president and the prime minister through the constitutional declaration and the formation of a presidential council and a government. They succeeded in saving state institutions from collapse and reactivating them through the government and the popular committees, preserving the state with all its fundamental pillars intact.

H. The Onset of the Full-Scale Aggression against Yemen

On 18 March 2015, journalist and human rights defender Abdul Karim Al-Khaiwani was assassinated in front of his home in the Capital Sana'a. The assassination was a tragic event given Al-Khaiwani's symbolic role as a voice for freedom, human rights, struggle, and revolution. It was also a calculated move by the forces behind his killing, as he was a globally recognised voice and his presence would have disrupted many of the aggression plans that were already being prepared.

As negotiations were nearing their conclusion regarding the structure of the state and as parties and factions were close to agreeing on a presidential council and a new constitution, foreign intelligence agencies facilitated the escape of the resigned president, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, to Aden. From there, he retracted his resignation and began mobilising military forces in an attempt to drag Yemen into a civil war. That happened with declared support from GCC states and the USA. In response, the armed forces (comprising army units that had joined the revolution) moved to counter this scheme and to reassert the state's sovereignty over the southern governorates. They successfully advanced towards Aden. At that point, the unelected, resigned president managed to flee once again—this time to Saudi Arabia. After that, Saudi Arabia announced from Washington the launch of a military operation by a coalition of several countries, with US support, under the name Operation Decisive Storm, without any authorisation or mandate from the United Nations. The one who made the announcement was the then-Saudi ambassador to the United States Adel Al-Jubeir. The coalition, led by Saudi Arabia, began aerial bombardment targeting the Capital Sana'a and various other Yemeni governorates. This started at 1:00 am on 26 March 2015. This marked

the beginning of a series of war crimes and acts of mass killing that affected all Yemenis, resulting in thousands of deaths and injuries. This was to subjugate the Yemeni people and pave the way for a ground invasion and occupation of Yemeni territory under the pretext of responding to a request by the resigned president who fled to Riyadh, in order to eliminate who they called the '*Houthis*' (the Ansar Allah component) and to reinstate Hadi's rule over Yemen.

On 16 April, the UN envoy Jamal Benomar submitted his resignation from his position as an envoy representing the Secretary-General in Yemen. In a later interview, he stated that a political agreement was imminent just before the start of the military operations against Yemen, which contributed to the hardening of positions among the conflicting parties. The Wall Street Journal quoted Jamal Benomar saying that the military operation in Yemen had complicated the political process in the country.

The Yemeni people confronted the crimes committed by the coalition of aggression, including the crime of aggression itself, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, the occupation of parts of the country, and the blockade imposed on the population. This happened through uniting parties and components and through establishing the Supreme Political Council to lead the country and form a National Salvation Government. Despite the ongoing war, they succeeded in resisting the aggression while simultaneously preserving, rebuilding, and developing the institutions of the state. Hence, the Yemeni people maintained their state with all its essential pillars intact.



Chapter Two: The Aggression against Yemen According to International Resolutions

First: Intervention in Yemeni Affairs Is a Crime under United Nations Resolutions

It is important to emphasise that all matters related to the Yemeni state (its pillars and its decisions concerning its people and authorities, including the structure and system of the state, the management of its resources, the utilisation of its wealth, and its policies in dealing with various internal entities and external relations) are purely internal Yemeni affairs. These matters are to be determined solely by the Yemeni people, who have the right to self-determination in accordance with the constitution and international law. No foreign country or external party has the right to interfere in Yemen's internal or external affairs under any circumstances.

The Yemeni Constitution affirms the independence and sovereignty of the Republic over its territory. Article One states that the Republic of Yemen is an independent, sovereign Arab and Islamic state. It is a unified entity that shall not be divided or have any part of it relinquished. The Yemeni people are an integral part of the Arab and Islamic nation.

The United Nations Charter affirms in Article 2 that, '*The Organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members.*' The UN General Assembly also recognises the right of all states to their sovereignty and political independence, territorial integrity, national unity, security, identity, and cultural heritage. This is mentioned in [Resolution \(36/103\)](https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/36/103), titled '*Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States*'⁽²⁾. Article II of the declaration emphasises that the principle of non-intervention and non-interference in the internal and external affairs of states comprehends fundamental rights, most notably:

- a) *Sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national unity, and security of all States, as well as national identity and cultural heritage of their peoples;*

² <https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/36/103>

- b) The sovereign and inalienable right of a State freely to determine its own political, economic, cultural, and social systems, to develop its international relations, and to exercise permanent sovereignty over its natural resources, in accordance with the will of its people, without outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion, or threat in any form whatsoever.*

This article links those rights to the will of the people, as stated in paragraph (b), also affirming that the exercise of those rights must be free from any form of external interference or threat.

On the other hand, in the same resolution, the United Nations affirms several principles and obligations for states to ensure the rights of weaker nations. These are summarised in Article I, which states, '*No State or group of States has the right to intervene or interfere in any form or for any reason whatsoever in the internal and external affairs of other States.*' The resolution further outlines actions that constitute interference in the affairs of other states, and in paragraph 2 of Article II, it emphasises that member states must refrain from such actions. These are listed as essential obligations, including:

- (a) The duty of States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any form whatsoever to violate the existing internationally recognised boundaries of another State, to disrupt the political, social or economic order of other States, to overthrow or change the political system of another State or its Government, to cause tension between or among States or to deprive peoples of their national identity and cultural heritage;*
- (b) The duty of a State to ensure that its territory is not used in any manner which would violate the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, and national unity or disrupt the political, economic, and social stability of another State; this obligation applies also to States entrusted with responsibility for territories yet to attain self-determination and national independence;*
- (c) The duty of a State to refrain from armed intervention, subversion, military occupation, or any other form of intervention and interference, overt or covert, directed at another State or group of States, or any act of military, political, or economic interference in the internal affairs of another State, including acts of reprisal involving the use of force;*
- (d) The duty of a State to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples under colonial domination or foreign occupation of their right to self-determination, freedom, and independence;*

- (e) *The duty of a State to refrain from any action or attempt in whatever form or under whatever pretext to destabilise or to undermine the stability of another State or of any of its institutions;*
- (f) *The duty of a State to refrain from the promotion, encouragement, or support, direct or indirect, of rebellious or secessionist activities within other States, under any pretext whatsoever, or any action which seeks to disrupt the unity or to undermine or subvert the political order of other States;*
- (g) *The duty of a State to prevent on its territory the training, financing, and recruitment of mercenaries, or the sending of such mercenaries into the territory of another State, and to deny facilities, including financing, for the equipping and transit of mercenaries;*
- (h) *The duty of a State to refrain from concluding agreements with other States designed to intervene or interfere in the internal and external affairs of third States;*
- (i) *The duty of States to refrain from any measure which would lead to the strengthening of existing military blocs or the creation or strengthening of new military alliances, interlocking arrangements, the deployment of interventionist forces or military bases and other related military installations conceived in the context of great-Power confrontation;*
- (j) *The duty of a State to abstain from any defamatory campaign, vilification, or hostile propaganda for the purpose of intervening or interfering in the internal affairs of other States;*
- (k) *The duty of a State, in the conduct of its international relations in the economic, social, technical, and trade fields, to refrain from measures which would constitute interference or intervention in the internal or external affairs of another State, thus preventing it from determining freely its political, economic, and social development; this includes, inter alia, the duty of a State not to use its external economic assistance programme or adopt any multilateral or unilateral economic reprisal or blockade and to prevent the use of transnational and multinational corporations under its jurisdiction and control as instruments of political pressure or coercion against another State, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations;*
- (l) *The duty of a State to refrain from the exploitation and the distortion of human rights issues as a means of interference in the internal affairs of States, of exerting pressure on other States or creating distrust and disorder within and among States or groups of States;*

- (m) The duty of a State to refrain from using terrorist practices as state policy against another State or against peoples under colonial domination, foreign occupation, or racist regimes and to prevent any assistance to or use of or tolerance of terrorist groups, saboteurs, or subversive agents against third States;*
- (n) The duty of a State to refrain from organising, training, financing, and arming political and ethnic groups on their territories or the territories of other States for the purpose of creating subversion, disorder, or unrest in other countries;*
- (o) The duty of a State to refrain from any economic, political, or military activity in the territory of another State without its consent.*

The aforementioned articles of the Yemeni Constitution, the UN Charter, and the resolutions of the United Nations, the fact that the Yemeni people's protests and the victory of the Yemeni revolution remained all along under the control and wisdom of the people and never extended beyond Yemen's borders, the respect of the Yemeni people (including all national components) for their existing relationships with neighbouring countries, the absence of any aggression or interference by Yemen in the affairs of any other state even after the onset of military aggression against it, and the fact that Yemen continued for forty days to call on the neighbouring coalition states and the international community to end the aggression before resorting to legitimate self-defence and retaliation against coalition attacks—all of this clearly demonstrates the illegality of any interference in Yemen's internal and external affairs by the coalition states and their supporters. Furthermore, upon careful reflection on the obligations set forth in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 36/103 and comparing them to the actions committed by the coalition led by Saudi Arabia and its supporters, it becomes evident that these states have openly violated all those obligations. These violations range from the imposition of the GCC Initiative and its implementation mechanism, despite their contradiction with the Yemeni Constitution, to military intervention and ground occupation (as detailed in the previous chapter for reference). The acts falling under the category of military aggression can be classified under international law in the following section.

Second: Aggression in the UN Charter and Resolutions

All divine religions, international charters, and international laws have prohibited the crime of aggression, as it is the crime that can lead to the commission of all other crimes. It is also prohibited due to the catastrophic consequences it brings upon nations, which include the loss of innocent civilian lives, the violation of national sovereignty, the confiscation of rights, the destruction of civilisations, and the erasure of cultural identities. Allah (the Almighty) says, {*'And cooperate in righteousness and piety, but do not cooperate in sin and aggression'*}[Al-Ma'idah 5:2].

Therefore, it was imperative for the United Nations to declare in its Charter that among its primary purposes and principles is—in addition to the obligation of all its members to refrain from acts of aggression—the obligation of all its members to take the necessary measures to suppress acts of aggression. This is clearly stated in Article 1 of the UN Charter, which outlines the purposes of the United Nations, which says, *'1- To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.'* Article 2 of the Charter affirms that, *'All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.'*

The debate over the definition of aggression grew intense and opinions varied until the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution [3314 \(XXIX\)](#) of 1974, which stated in Article 1 of the annex on the Definition of Aggression, *'Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.'* The General Assembly included in the same article a very important explanatory note regarding the meaning of 'state'. The note says, *'In this Definition, the term "state": (a) is used without prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether a state is a member of the United Nations; (b) includes the concept of a "group of states" where appropriate.'* Through the definition of 'state' in the article on the definition of aggression, it becomes clear that the act of aggression is considered a crime under United Nations resolutions, whether it is committed by a member state against another member of the United Nations, or by a member state against a state that is not yet a member or has not been officially recognised.

In both cases, the definition clearly applies to the military operations announced by the Saudi-led coalition against Yemen. These operations had openly declared objectives, including interference in the internal af-

fairs of the Republic of Yemen by attempting to reinstate an unelected president who had fled the country after he and his government had resigned. At the time of his escape, he held no legitimate authority over the government, the people, or the territory. Another stated objective was the elimination of the Ansar Allah component—referred to as ‘Houthis’ by the coalition—and the declaration of the entire Sa’dah Governorate as a military zone.

Given that state elements are provided for the leadership of the revolution and the Supreme Political Council as they effectively exercise all three branches of power in accordance with an existing constitution and legal framework and as they maintain control over the majority of governorates with popular support, they are the only entities that can affirm their representation of the state. As a result, the term ‘state’ applies to the Republic of Yemen as represented by its government, people, and territorial authority within its own borders, not in Riyadh. Therefore, the use of military force against Yemen’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence (even though the United Nations refers to it as a ‘*de facto authority*’) is a clear and declared aggression.

The intervention by the Saudi-led coalition of aggression in Yemen’s internal affairs, the use of military force to strip the country of its sovereignty and occupy its territory, targeting civilians and state infrastructure, imposing a blockade, the recruitment of mercenaries, and the continuous acts classified as war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, as well as the catastrophic impact of this aggression on the Yemeni people after ten years since the military operations began—all of these constitute actions that fall under the definition of ‘acts of aggression’ as outlined in United Nations General Assembly Resolution [3314](#) in all its paragraphs and provisions. Article 3 of the resolution states the following:

Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and in accordance with the provisions of Article 2, qualify as an act of aggression:

- (a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof;*
- (b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;*
- (c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State;*
- (d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State;*

- (e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;
- (f) *The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State;*
- (g) *The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.*

Third: The Invalidity of the Justifications of the Aggression

Saudi Arabia announced numerous objectives for its aggression against Yemen, which was carried out under the operations named '*Decisive Storm*' and '*Restoring Hope*'. These objectives were declared by its King, Crown Prince, Minister of Defence, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the spokesperson for the coalition, as well as in official statements from the countries participating in and supporting the coalition.

At dawn on 26 March 2015, Saudi Arabia's then-ambassador to the United States, Adel Al-Jubeir, announced that the Kingdom, along with a coalition of several countries, had launched a military operation in Yemen in response to a direct request from the '*legitimate Yemeni government*'. He added, '*In a letter, dated 24 March 2015, President Hadi requested, based on the principle of self-defence, enshrined in Article 51 of the UM Charter, as well as in the Arab League charter's collective defence mechanism, a request for immediate support – by all means necessary – including military intervention to protect Yemen and its people from the continued Houthi aggression and to support it in fighting Al-Qaeda and ISIL.*' He also said, '*Based on the appeal from President Hadi, and based on the Kingdom's responsibility to Yemen and its people, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, along with its allies within the GCC and outside the GCC, launched military operations in support of the people of Yemen and their legitimate government.*'

Saudi then-Defence Minister Mohammed bin Salman also stated that his country's forces aimed to uproot the forces of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and Ansar Allah from Yemen '*within a few days*', were it not for his concern about human casualties on both sides, according to his claims. In a televised interview conducted on 2 May 2017, bin Salman said that the Kingdom '*will eliminate the Iran-aligned fighters in Yemen*'.

When reviewing the main objectives of Operation Decisive Storm, they can be refuted as follows:

a. **Responding to the Request of President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi and His Government to Protect the Yemeni People and the Legitimate Government from the Coup Plotters and Houthi Militias**

- 1- The claim of responding to Hadi's letter dated 24 March 2015 actually indicates prior planning and a criminal agreement among the coalition countries well before that date to commit the act of aggression against Yemen. It is not plausible that the planning and preparation for a war carried out by a coalition of several countries involving their armies and air forces and targeting an entire nation with support from the USA and some Western countries could be arranged and launched within less than 48 hours.
- 2- The claim of responding to and protecting the so-called '*legitimate government*' and supporting its return contradicts the fact that this very government had officially resigned. Indeed, its Prime Minister submitted his resignation to Hadi, who accepted it and then resigned himself. Moreover, Bahah's government never officially withdrew its resignation. Instead, a smaller government-in-exile was announced from within Saudi Arabia on 12 April 2015 (weeks after the aggression had already begun) following Bahah's own arrival in Riyadh. New ministers were appointed to this government because many ministers from the resigned government had remained in Sana'a and continued managing their ministries under the directive of the Supreme Revolutionary Committee, which tasked them with acting as a caretaker government.
- 3- The claim of protecting the Yemeni people based on Hadi's request is a false one, as there was no popular mandate from the people calling for such protection. On the contrary, the Yemeni people were openly demanding the fulfilment of the revolution's goals and the preservation of the country's sovereignty and independence in public squares across the country.

b. **Assisting in the Fight against Al-Qaeda and ISIL**

It is well known and publicly acknowledged that both ISIL and Al-Qaeda have declared hostility towards the Ansar Allah component and have targeted it with terrorist operations and bombings of its mosques, killing many of its leaders and members. Moreover, it was the armed forces and popular committees affiliated with the Sana'a-based government that confronted Al-Qaeda and expelled it from the governorates and areas it had taken control of.

c. **Military Intervention Based on the Principles of Self-Defence as Outlined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and the Collective Defence Mechanism of the Charter of the League of Arab States**

No hostile action was ever taken by the leadership of the revolution, the Supreme Revolutionary Committee, or the Ansar Allah component against any of Yemen's neighbouring countries. In addition, no neighbouring state or any other country had previously claimed to have been subjected to aggression or any other action that would justify invoking the right to self-defence under the UN Charter or the Charter of the Arab League. On the contrary, the UN Charter explicitly prohibits the use of military force to resolve disputes. Article 2 of the UN Charter states that, 'All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.'

d. **Uprooting the Forces of Saleh and the Houthis and Eliminating Iran-Aligned Elements**

Here, the Saudi then-Defence Minister openly acknowledged that the coalition, led by his country, had launched a full-scale aggression against Yemen and was determined to continue committing acts of genocide by targeting segments of the Yemeni population that reject Saudi and foreign interference in the country's affairs. This bloody approach was further confirmed when the coalition leadership declared the entire Sa'dah Governorate a military zone, effectively endorsing the targeting of millions of Yemenis with acts of genocide. As for relations with Iran, it is an internal matter to be decided by the Yemeni people themselves, who have clearly expressed their rejection of any form of hegemony, whether from Saudi Arabia or Iran.

e. **Supporting Yemen's Stability, Independence, Sovereignty, and Territorial Integrity**

The forces of the coalition of aggression, particularly those of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, violated Yemen's land, airspace, and territorial waters, occupying several of its governorates, looting its resources, violating the rights of its citizens, and causing the death and injury of hundreds of thousands of Yemenis.

This report, along with others issued by the United Nations and various humanitarian and human rights organisations, is filled with evidence and documentation of the horrific crimes committed by the coalition of



The impact of an airstrike by the coalition of aggression on a mosque and civilian homes in Al-Hunoud Market in Al-Hawak District, Al-Hudaydah Governorate — 21 September 2016.

Chapter Three: The Crime of Aggression (Practices and Evidence)

The Saudi-led coalition of aggression committed acts and practices that constitute all the actions defined by the United Nations General Assembly as meeting the criteria of an act of aggression under its definition of the crime of aggression⁽³⁾. These actions included military attacks and assaults on the state of Yemen and its sovereignty, bombing of all its resources, the killing of its people, and the imposition of blockades on its seaports and airports, along with the closure of its land crossings. The coalition also attacked Yemen's land, naval, and air forces, as well as its commercial marine and air fleets. In addition, it invaded Yemeni territory, occupied several governorates and islands, exploited and looted the country's natural resources, recruited mercenaries from various countries, supported armed extremist groups (such as ISIL and Al-Qaeda), while facilitating the expansion of their presence. Moreover, the coalition established numerous secret prisons in which it, along with its mercenaries, carried out severe forms of torture and degrading treatment against captives and detainees⁽⁴⁾.

3 UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) in 1974, which provides the definition of aggression states in Article 3:

Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall subject to and in accordance with the provisions of Article 2, qualify as an act of aggression:

- (a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof;*
- (b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;*
- (c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State;*
- (d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State;*
- (e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;*
- (f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State;*
- (g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.*

4 The crime of aggression is recognised as a crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The definitions and conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction over this crime were adopted by consensus on 11 June 2010 at the Kampala Review Conference by the States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

First: Bombing Yemeni Territory (Land, Sea, and Air)

The military operations launched by the Saudi-led coalition of aggression began suddenly and treacherously: without any prior warning or indication that the same countries sponsoring a peace initiative would, overnight, turn into nations declaring war and carrying out unexpected and treacherous acts of aggression. Just 48 hours before the operations, Riyadh was hosting the United Nations envoy to Yemen, Jamal Benomar, and had assured him of the importance of political solutions to the Yemeni crisis, as he stated in an interview with Al Jazeera on 24 March 2021⁽⁵⁾. This act of treachery added another layer of horror and criminality to the aggression. The military assault by the countries of the Saudi-led coalition was a tragic shock to the Yemeni people, as it began with intense aerial bombardment of cities, villages, and residential neighbourhoods at 1:00 am on Thursday, 26 March 2015. These countries left a criminal mark that night as they killed dozens of innocent victims with the first airstrike targeting the residential neighbourhood of Bani Hawat, north of the Capital Sana'a. The victims of that attack were over 70 civilians: 29 dead and 42 wounded, most of them children.

Directly after the treacherous attack and aerial bombardment on Yemen, the then-Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the United States, Adel Al-Jubeir, held a press conference in the US capital, Washington, D. C. , during which he announced the launch of military operations on Yemeni territory under the name 'Operation Decisive Storm'. He confirmed that the operation would continue as part of a coalition of several countries led by Saudi Arabia and supported by the United States⁽⁶⁾. Official statements about the military operation soon followed, including a declaration by the Gulf Cooperation Council and remarks by the coalition's spokesperson, Ahmed Asiri, in a press conference on the evening of Thursday, 26 March 2015. He admitted to the excessive force used by the coalition on the first night, stating that a large number of fighter jets had participated in the operation, with Saudi aircraft at the forefront in significant numbers, and that it had achieved its objectives within the first 15 minutes. He added that the operation continued until it had completed its initially designated targets.

In addition to the airstrikes and missiles launched by warships deployed in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, Saudi artillery and ground forces began shelling Yemeni towns and villages located along the northern border strip of Yemen. This bombardment led to the displacement of residents from dozens of border villages within the first few days of the military operation and resulted in the deaths of dozens of civilians, particularly those living in the border districts of Sa'dah Governorate, including the villages of Monabbih, Razih, Kitaf, and Shada'a. The attacks also targeted the border districts of Harad and Midi in Hajjah Governorate, as well as the Al-Tuwal border crossing, which connects Yemen with Saudi Arabia. This crossing was completely closed on 28 April 2015, after being repeatedly struck by Saudi artillery and air raids.

On 8 May 2015, the coalition of aggression declared the governorate of Sa'dah a military zone, considering

5 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DPuLu0vFiZY> at 34:18

6 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bBF84XCImUQ>

all its human and material resources as military targets⁽⁷⁾. This declaration constituted a war crime aimed at forcibly displacing the governorate's residents, serving as a prelude to an even more heinous crime: genocide. The coalition carried out its threat, fulfilling all elements of the crime of genocide by launching dozens of airstrikes and attacks that targeted civilians in the governorate with various types of weapons, indiscriminately striking both military and civilian sites. On that day and the following two days, more than 40 people were killed, and over 50 civilians (including women and children) were injured.

Over the course of ten years, the coalition of aggression continued committing the most serious crimes in various forms against Yemen, in a manner unprecedented in modern history since World War II. During this period, Yemen and its people were the victims of relentless aerial, ground, and naval attacks. According to a statement issued on 19 March 2023 by Brigadier Yahya Saree, the official spokesperson of the Yemeni Armed Forces, the number of airstrikes reached more than 274,302, the majority of which targeted civilians, towns, villages, homes, mosques, markets, and both public and private infrastructure⁽⁸⁾. These tragic crimes were carried out by a coalition of over 18 countries involved in attacking Yemen and the Yemenis by air, land, and sea. That is in addition to other states that supported the coalition by supplying weapons and providing political and media backing.

According to a report issued by [Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre \(YEMAC\)](#) in 2025, entitled 'The Reality and Nature of the Use of Aerial Bombs and Missiles in Yemen', the coalition countries of aggression have, over the past ten years, used a wide variety of destructive bombs and missiles, including thermobaric, neutron, and phosphorus bombs, as well as other forms of weaponry and munitions. They have also randomly employed numerous internationally prohibited weapons, most of which were manufactured in the United States, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Italy, Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, and other countries. The range of explosive weapons and munitions dropped from the air on Yemen includes the Mark 80 series of general-purpose bombs, massive bunker-buster bombs, thermobaric and neutron bombs, and the Paveway series of precision-guided bombs—including Paveway II (GBU-12 and GBU-16), Paveway III (GBU-24), and Paveway IV. It also comprises Joint Direct Attack Munitions (GBU-31 JDAM and GBU-39) bombs, along with British-made Paveway IV and Paveway II aerial bombs and missiles, and Italian-manufactured aircraft munitions and bombs. Furthermore, weapons and munitions from France, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Australia, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Pakistan, Canada, and other countries have also been used.

Evidence of the bombing crimes committed against Yemeni territory was documented by the Panel of Experts appointed by the UN Security Council in its reports issued between 2015 and 2023⁽⁹⁾.

7 Report of the UN Security Council Panel of Experts on Yemen for the year 2015, [S/2018/192](#)

8 <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3229674.htm>

9 [The Security Council and the Aggression on Yemen: Airstrikes & Resolutions](#), an analytic study issued by Yemen Centre for Human Rights in 2022, pages 107-123.

- **Forty Days – Aggression and Crimes without Response**

The countries of the coalition of aggression continued their aerial, ground, and naval attacks, committing hundreds of crimes against civilians and targeting Yemen's infrastructure and defence capabilities. During the first forty days of the aggression, Yemen Centre documented 208 incidents in which the coalition targeted civilians and public and private civilian facilities. These attacks resulted in 5,720 civilian casualties, including 1,584 killed individuals. It is important to note that these figures represent only what the Centre was able to document, for actual numbers are believed to be even higher.

Civilian Casualties during the Period from 26 March– 4 May 2015

Dead				Wounded			
Children	Women	Men	Total	Children	Women	Men	Total
289	250	1045	1584	585	661	2890	4136

Second: The Comprehensive Blockade

According to the definition of the crime of aggression found in various United Nations documents, including Article 3, paragraph 3 of UN General Assembly Resolution [3314](#) (December 1974), the blockade of the ports or coasts of a state by the armed forces of another state constitutes an act of aggression. This is precisely what the coalition countries have done since 26 March 2015, in an effort to starve the civilian population by imposing a comprehensive blockade on all land crossings, seaports, and airports of the Republic of Yemen. Through this blockade, the coalition has succeeded in preventing the entry of a wide range of essential goods and imports that the population needs to survive. To achieve this objective, the coalition countries implemented various measures, ranging from obstructing the entry of ships carrying commercial goods, such as food, medicine, medical supplies, petroleum derivatives, natural gas, and other essential services and needs, to hindering the delivery of humanitarian aid and relief assistance intended for the Yemeni people, even though these goods and aid are humanitarian in nature and intended for civilian use. Through these practices, the coalition countries have committed the crime of deliberately starving civilians, in blatant disregard of international human rights conventions, customary international humanitarian law, and international humanitarian law⁽¹⁰⁾.

On 9 August 2016, the coalition of aggression closed the airspace surrounding Sana'a⁽¹¹⁾ and imposed a total blockade on Sana'a International Airport. This closure prevented thousands of Yemenis from accessing medical treatment abroad. The air blockade further tightened restrictions on the import of goods into the country and severely limited civilians' ability to enter or leave northern Yemen. These actions constitute a clear violation of Article 41 of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits the imposition of an air blockade without a resolution from the UN Security Council⁽¹²⁾.

¹⁰ [https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/3314\(XXIX\)](https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/3314(XXIX)), the UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (December 1974)

Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court reads, 'War crimes: The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes. For the purpose of this Statute, "war crimes" means: (b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts: (xxv) Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions.' **Article 54 of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol 1 of 1977)** states, '1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited. 2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove, or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.'

¹¹ <https://www.nrc.no/arabic/news/2021/Ar-thousands-of-critically-ill-patients-stranded-with-sanaa-airport-closure/>

¹² **Article 41 of the UN Charter** reads, 'The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed forces are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other

On 6 November 2017, the coalition of aggression imposed a total blockade on Yemen⁽¹³⁾, preventing all humanitarian aid and commercial goods (including food and fuel) from entering the country. This action had a catastrophic impact on the civilian population. In response, there were increasing warnings about the imposed restrictions and the catastrophic consequences that could result from the continued arbitrary measures carried out by the Saudi-led coalition, particularly the ongoing obstruction and prevention of fuel and petroleum product shipments from entering the country.

The UN Security Council Panel of Experts could not ignore the blockade imposed on Yemen, even as it overlooked hundreds of massacres and crimes against the Yemeni people. Indeed, the Panel presented evidence on the blockade in most of its reports, stressing the fact that Yemen is facing a blockade imposed by the Saudi-led coalition forces, which prevented the entry of humanitarian aid and commercial goods into Yemen. And the most important evidence of this is what was stipulated in paragraph 188 of the [S/2018/594](#) report of the Expert Panel, *'The Saudi Arabia-led coalition continued to obstruct the entry of humanitarian and commercial goods to Yemen by: (a) continuing the blockade on the Sana'a airport to commercial flights; (b) imposing gradual restrictions on civilian items entering Yemen through the Red Sea ports; and (c) through severe restrictions on the imports of commercial and humanitarian goods. During the latter period, over 750,600 tons of commercial and humanitarian goods were diverted from Yemen or their entry to the country delayed'*⁽¹⁴⁾.

- **The Blockade Is a Crime of Aggression that the United Nations Has Failed to Stop**

In June 2017, the UN Security Council issued a statement expressing deep concern over the devastating humanitarian impact of the *'conflict'*. It called on all parties to allow unimpeded access for humanitarian supplies and to facilitate the entry of essential imports, including food, fuel, and medical supplies. In its statement, the Security Council described the risk of famine in Yemen as the world's largest food insecurity emergency⁽¹⁵⁾.

On the other hand, various United Nations bodies issued numerous bulletins and reports stating that the continued closure of Sana'a Airport and other air and sea restrictions constitute violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law. These actions were deemed unlawful and described as practices that may amount to international crimes⁽¹⁶⁾.

means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.'

That is to say, a ban may not be imposed without a Security Council resolution. Among the consequences of such a ban are depriving a country's air force of its sovereignty over its own airspace, giving other forces the freedom to operate in that airspace at the expense of the land's rightful owner, and causing severe harm to economic activity and the freedom of air transport.

¹³ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/07/yemen-coalition-blockade-imperils-civilians>

¹⁴ [The Security Council and the Aggression on Yemen: Airstrikes & Resolutions](#), page 134

¹⁵ <https://docs.un.org/en/S/PRST/2017/7>

¹⁶ Report [A/HRC/42/17](#) by the Group of Eminent Experts appointed by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights

After ten years, the unlawful blockade remains in place, and the United Nations has been unable to compel the coalition to reverse its arbitrary violations of Security Council resolutions on Yemen or to mitigate the humanitarian catastrophe resulting from the systematic and widespread blockade imposed on the country. The primary objective of the blockade has essentially become what is stated in paragraph (190) of the Panel of Experts' report [S/2018/594](#), submitted to the UN Security Council, which states, '*The blockade is essentially using the threat of starvation as a bargaining tool and an instrument of war.*' In fact, no prohibited imports were found in violation of international resolutions on Yemen⁽¹⁷⁾.

- **The Imposition of the Blockade on Yemen Constitutes a Violation of UN Security Council Resolution 2216**

Since the beginning of their operations in Yemen, the coalition countries, led by Saudi Arabia, have consistently violated United Nations Security Council Resolution [2216](#), issued on 14 April 2015. The resolution called for the imposition of measures to prohibit the supply of weapons and military equipment to specific individuals. It also urged all Member States, particularly neighbouring countries, to implement these measures within their territories in accordance with their national legislation and consistent with international law, especially the law of the sea and international civil aviation agreements.

Resolution [2216](#) outlines the enforcement mechanism in paragraphs 15, 16, and 17, granting states the right to inspect all cargo to Yemen, but only within their own territories, including their seaports and airports, not within Yemeni territory. The resolution permits such inspections when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains prohibited items. Furthermore, it authorises Member States to take appropriate action regarding any prohibited items discovered within their territories. The inspecting state is required to submit an initial written report on the inspection and its results, followed by a subsequent written report containing relevant details within 30 days⁽¹⁸⁾.

These are the enforcement mechanisms and safeguards established by the Security Council for implementing the limited arms embargo measures. It is therefore clear that the sanctions imposed were specifically designed to prohibit the supply of certain categories of weapons to designated individuals and to allow the inspection of shipments only when passing through other countries, not within Yemeni territory. The prohibition did not target Yemen as a state, nor did it apply to national entities. Moreover, it did not in-

states in paragraph 53, '*Access restrictions imposed on Yemen by the coalition, including the de facto naval blockade and the closure of Sana'a International Airport, drastically limited imports and impeded the delivery of relief supplies, thereby significantly contributing to the deterioration of the economy in Yemen. The Group of Experts previously established that these measures had a disproportionate impact on the civilian population, in violation of international humanitarian law. Moreover, such measures, in particular the coalition's total blockade of Yemen that followed the ballistic missile fired by the Houthis into Saudi Arabia in November 2017, may amount to a collective punishment, which is prohibited by international humanitarian law.*'

17 Panel of Experts' Report [S/2018/594](#) (January 2018), paragraphs 188, 189, 190.

18 [https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2216%20\(2015\)](https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2216%20(2015))

clude petroleum products, commercial goods, or any other categories not explicitly mentioned in the resolution. In other words, these measures merely amount to limited embargo measures, not a comprehensive or partial military blockade. Furthermore, the Security Council has not authorised any such measures in any of its resolutions related to the situation in Yemen.

- **The Blockade and the Destruction and Closure of Air, Sea, and Land Ports of Entry**

When the aggression against Yemen began on 26 March 2015, one of the first actions taken by the coalition was to close Yemeni airspace and impose a land and naval blockade on the country's ports and border crossings.

Initial estimates of damages and losses in Yemen's land, sea, and air transport sectors exceeded \$13 billion from the beginning of the aggression until March 2023. Approximately \$7 billion in damages affected the air transport sector, mainly the Civil Aviation and Meteorology Authority, its various departments, and the two airlines: Yemenia and Al-Saeeda Airlines. Around \$5.6 billion in damages affected the maritime transport sector, represented by the Yemen Red Sea Ports Corporation and the General Authority for Maritime Affairs. The Land Transport Regulatory Authority and the Public Road Transport Corporation, which represent the land transport sector, suffered damages and losses amounting to over \$890 million⁽¹⁹⁾. The Human Rights Watch report titled '[Yemen: Coalition Blockade Imperils Civilians](https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/07/yemen-coalition-blockade-imperils-civilians)' clarified that the coalition's blockade and closure of seaports, airports, and border crossings are causing a humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen. The report explained that, '*The Saudi-led coalition's broad restrictions on aid and essential goods to Yemen's civilian population are worsening the country's humanitarian catastrophe*⁽²⁰⁾.'

A. Sana'a Airport

Sana'a International Airport has been a target of airstrikes by the coalition forces since the very first strike on 26 March 2015. From that time until early 2022, the airport was subjected to near-daily attacks by coalition aircraft under the pretext of alleged military use. This systematic targeting culminated in the announcement of the airport's removal from protected status in December 2021⁽²¹⁾. This marks a clear vio-

19 <https://www.mot.gov.ye/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/8%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-.pdf>

20 <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/07/yemen-coalition-blockade-imperils-civilians>

21 <https://www.independentarabia.com/node/287526/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%82%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%A1->

lation of [the UN Charter](#), [the Chicago Convention](#), and [international humanitarian law](#), all of which prohibit attacks on civilian infrastructure, such as airports.

On 9 August 2016, the coalition countries imposed a ban on air traffic at Sana'a International Airport; they only allowed humanitarian flights operated by the United Nations and other international organisations⁽²²⁾. This ban was used by the coalition as a means of exerting pressure on the government in Sana'a and as a form of collective punishment against the Yemeni people as a whole. The airport is the main lifeline of the Republic of Yemen and the only viable route for travellers, given its central location among the most populous Yemeni governorates. The closure of the airport and the continued enforcement of that closure constitute a clear violation of international and humanitarian norms, a flagrant breach of all treaties and conventions, and a direct contradiction of UN Security Council Resolution [2451](#) (December 2018)⁽²³⁾, which called for the reopening and operation of the airport for both commercial and humanitarian flights. However, the Security Council could not compel the coalition countries to lift the ban.

These actions by the coalition countries against Sana'a International Airport have resulted in a major humanitarian crisis, particularly affecting patients in urgent need of medical treatment abroad. According to estimates by the Ministry of Public Health and Population in Sana'a, around 100,000 Yemeni patients suffer annually from serious or life-threatening conditions. In addition, airstrikes by the coalition have left many injured individuals who need advanced medical procedures not available inside the country. Beyond patients and wounded individuals, there are also large numbers of Yemeni expatriates who are stranded abroad and wish to return home. However, due to the security situation, they are unable to use airports and border crossings controlled by occupation forces or their mercenaries. Many who have attempted to travel through those areas have been subjected to banditry, robbery, abduction, arbitrary arrest, torture, and even murder. There are many examples of this; one well-known case is that of Yemeni youth Abdulmalik Al-Sanabani, who returned to Yemen via Aden Airport in September 2021 after ten years in the United States. While en route to Sana'a and passing through the Tur Al Bahah checkpoint in Lahij Governorate (which is under the control of coalition-aligned militias), he was detained, robbed, abducted, tortured, and ultimately killed by members of that checkpoint. This incident shocked Yemenis both at home and abroad and sparked widespread condemnation and outrage⁽²⁴⁾.

[%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%87](#)

22 <https://www.nrc.no/arabic/news/2021/Ar-thousands-of-critically-ill-patients-stranded-with-sanaa-airport-closure>

23 [https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2451\(2018\)](https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2451(2018))

24 <https://ychr.org/statement/sfycfh/1074/>

B. Al-Hudaydah Seaport

The Port of Al-Hudaydah, the ports of Al-Mokha, and the port of As-Salif on the Red Sea serve as a key pillar of the national economy due to their central location relative to Yemen's densely populated northern and central governorates, which together are home to approximately 70% of the country's population. With the onset of the aggression in March 2015, the importance of these ports significantly increased, as they became the primary and only lifeline for the entry of essential supplies, including food, medicine, construction materials, fuel, petroleum derivatives, and humanitarian and relief assistance.

In mid-August 2015, the Port of Al-Hudaydah was subjected to direct aerial bombardment, resulting in severe damage to its buildings, warehouses, container terminal, and berths, in addition to indirect losses sustained by the port. The port was repeatedly targeted over the following years of the aggression, in clear violation of international laws and conventions that prohibit the deliberate targeting of economic infrastructure, including commercial seaports.

This systematic targeting of the Port of Al-Hudaydah further tightened the economic blockade on the Yemeni people by preventing the entry of essential supplies, such as food, medicine, petroleum products, and humanitarian aid, among other necessities.

C. Harad and Alab Border Crossings

Yemen shares a land border with Saudi Arabia that includes several commercial crossings, among which is the Harad crossing in Hajjah Governorate (which is considered one of the largest) and the Alab crossing in Sa'dah Governorate. These two crossings once played a vital role in facilitating trade movement of various goods between the two countries.

At the onset of the aggression in 2015, Saudi authorities closed the border crossings and targeted them with hundreds of airstrikes and artillery shelling. This resulted in the killing and injuring of dozens of civilians, the mass displacement of residents from areas near the crossings, the closure of the markets connected to them, and the complete halt of commercial activity through these crossings.

- **Blockade Is Collective Punishment and Deliberate Starvation**

The continuity of imposition of the unlawful, comprehensive blockade on Yemen is one of those deliberate starvation practices that international humanitarian law (IHL) classifies as a crime, for which the perpetrators must be held accountable and prevented from evading punishment. These practices have become measures aimed at depriving Yemenis of essential imports and restricting their freedom of movement. They have also significantly contributed to the collapse of Yemen's economy, brought all vital services necessary for citizens' survival and wellbeing to a standstill, and exacerbated the humanitarian crisis to its worst levels⁽²⁵⁾.

Numerous reports and statements issued by UN, international, and local organisations and bodies tasked with monitoring and evaluating the humanitarian situation in Yemen have regarded these practices as a form of collective punishment as they impose living conditions intended to inflict severe suffering on civilians. This policy is criminalised under international law in general and under IHL in particular, considering it both a war crime and an act of genocide. As a result of this policy, for ten years of complete isolation, Yemenis have endured tragic conditions across every aspect of daily life, from living standards and health-care to the economy.

On 11 March 2021, the World Food Programme confirmed that *'Over 16 million people now face crisis levels of hunger or worse. These aren't just numbers. These are real people. And we are headed straight towards the biggest famine in modern history. It is hell on earth in many places in Yemen right now'*⁽²⁶⁾.

- **Deprivation of Fuel Is Deprivation of Life**

Yemen has repeatedly endured crippling fuel crises throughout the years of the aggression, reaching a peak in February and March 2022. This was one of the worst crises of petroleum derivatives, delivering severe shocks to both the economy and social situation. Numerous service sectors—particularly those reliant on fuel imports, such as hospitals, power stations, water networks, and public transport—were severely affected and brought to an almost complete standstill due to the lack of fuel, becoming incapable of maintaining their services. Consequently, this crisis directly and dramatically exacerbated the suffering of the Yemeni people.

²⁵ The blockade (along with the use of military siege as a method of warfare), the attacks that target essential supplies for the people's survival, and the obstacles preventing the delivery of all aid—deprive civilians of basic necessities amid an unprecedented humanitarian crisis (from the summary report on the human-rights in Yemen issued by the Human Rights Council at its 42nd session in September).

²⁶ / <https://www.wfp.org/news/yemen-heading-toward-biggest-famine-modern-history-wfp-chief-warns-un-security-council>

As a result of the continued detention of fuel vessels by the coalition of aggression, the oil sector has continued to incur substantial daily losses and financial penalties. This situation has inflicted enormous damage on the national economy and imposed unbearable hardship on the people.

The shortage of fuel caused over 2,200 filling stations to cease operations due to their petroleum stocks being exhausted. These stations amount to 70% of all operating stations in Sana'a and other parts of northern Yemen. Moreover, about 3,500 tankers were immobilised due to the continued detention of oil derivative ships and the ban on their entry into the port of Al-Hudaydah.

Institutions responsible for the oil sector, with Yemen Petroleum Company at the forefront, have intensified their appeals for immediate intervention by the international community and urgent solutions to rescue people from this life-threatening crisis, which has deprived them of their essential needs. Moreover, the company specifically called on the United Nations to take serious action and fulfil its responsibility in response to the coalition countries' persistence in preventing the entry of oil derivatives and fuel tankers.

Yemen Centre for Human Rights has continued to monitor and document developments in the crisis and its repercussions on the overall humanitarian situation from various angles. It has arrived at the following findings:

- First, the banning of fuel imports and the ongoing detention of oil vessels constitute a blatant violation of all relevant international conventions, norms, and resolutions, leaving no justification for the international community to remain silent.
- Second, the persistence of these measures has inflicted economic damage across various service sectors—above all, healthcare—thereby depriving millions of people of the essential services these sectors provide.
- Third, the continued detention of fuel vessels is no longer merely a tactic to achieve political objectives or secure military gains; in fact, it has become an act that deprives civilians of their most basic rights, threatens their lives, and denies them access to the resources necessary to supply food for their families.
- Fourth, the references contained in United Nations reports and bulletins regarding the potential risks arising from the coalition countries' continued prevention and detention of

fuel vessels have become unacceptable in the light of the severe deterioration across all aspects of the humanitarian situation experienced by the population. This deterioration results from the near-total absence of petroleum derivatives and their catastrophic impacts, which have become a tragic reality worsening by the day. In such circumstances, it is expected of the United Nations to assume its responsibilities and work towards lifting the blockade and allowing the entry of fuel vessels and commercial ships into the port of Al-Hudaydah.

- **Death on the Road in Pursuit of Treatment**

Thousands of Yemeni patients have died as a result of the continued closure of Sana'a International Airport. Some resigned themselves to waiting for death, while others attempted to travel via one of the crossings controlled by the Saudi-led Coalition and died en route as they were unable to endure the hardships of the journey. The child Shawqi Al-Ibara was among those who died while seeking treatment abroad. He passed away on the Sana'a-Ibb road as he made his way to Aden Airport, after having waited two full years for the medical airbridge. He was registered by the Medical Committee alongside his brother Maher who has cancer in his right eye after the disease spread there following the removal of his left eye; Maher too was awaiting that airbridge. The humanitarian airbridge was established as a medical corridor under an agreement signed in September 2018 between Yemen's Foreign Ministry in Sana'a and the United Nations, intended to alleviate the suffering of patients who need treatment abroad but are prevented by the coalition from travelling through Sana'a International Airport⁽²⁷⁾. Dr Muthahar Al-Darwish, Chair of the Supreme Medical Committee, stated that more than 22,000 patients had received approval from the Committee to travel abroad since 2018, but 131 of them died in 2021 alone because they were unable to travel. He also clarified that only 28 patients benefited from the airbridge, having been flown to Jordan in 2020. After that, its operation was suspended until the United Nations cancelled it in August 2021, under the pretext of lack of financial support⁽²⁸⁾.

27 <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news508295.htm>

28 <https://althawrah.ye/archives/724712>

Third: Invasion and Occupation of Yemeni Territories

Since mid-July 2015, the coalition countries of aggression have launched extensive ground invasions of Yemeni territory, backed by naval and air support. The invasion began via maritime routes, reinforced by hundreds of armoured vehicles and tanks supplied by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. As a result, the coalition countries seized Aden Governorate and several other southern governorates: Lahij, Al-Dhale', Shabwah, and Abyan. Those forces halted their advance at the borders of Taiz and Al-Bayda. Meanwhile, other coalition troops advanced from the Saudi border with Yemen and succeeded in conquering and occupying large parts of the governorates of Ma'rib and Al-Jawf, as well as parts of Sa'dah and Hajjah.

For 10 years, it has become abundantly clear that the objectives of several countries leading the coalition against Yemen involve the occupation of parts of Yemeni land and the seizure of its strategic resources — acts squarely falling under the crime of aggression. Their conduct has echoed colonial practices of the last century, particularly when Saudi Arabia and the UAE occupied several Yemeni governorates and islands and exploited their resources using substantial capabilities. They initiated administering those governorates and focused their efforts on complete control, especially over those areas that possess several vital resources and strategic assets, such as Aden, Shabwah, Ma'rib, Hadramawt, Socotra, and Mayyun. The purpose of doing so is to exploit the resources and capabilities of those areas that have oil and gas fields, ports, archaeological sites, or strategically significant locations.

Since 2015, the UAE, as one of the coalition countries, has occupied and established full control over Aden, Shabwah, and Hadramawt and committed numerous crimes and rights violations against local residents. In October 2019, the UAE's General Command of the Armed Forces announced a final troop withdrawal from Aden, handing authority to Saudi forces, as reported by the official news agency⁽²⁹⁾. Yet this claim was purely cosmetic: The UAE had already recruited local mercenary units—the so-called '*Security Belts Forces*' and '*Elite Forces*'—which have effectively taken control of Aden, Shabwah, and Hadramawt, and they continue to receive funding and directives from the UAE.

A few months later, specifically on 9 February 2020, the UAE announced its second withdrawal from Yemen in a ceremony it described as a celebration of the '*return of its forces participating in the Yemen war*'. At that time, it disclosed figures illustrating the scale of its involvement: over 15,000 personnel from its Land Forces, Presidential Guard, and Special Operations Units across various Yemeni cities and governorates; more than 50 naval vessels; and upwards of 3,000 combat sailors who carried out over 1,000 sea

²⁹ <http://www.wam.ae/ar/details/1395302798763>

missions, transporting millions of tonnes of weapons, ammunition, and equipment. The UAE also revealed it had recruited, trained, and equipped over 200,000 individuals in the territories under its control⁽³⁰⁾.

Despite these two announcements, the UAE continues to occupy Socotra Island in its entirety, treating it as an Emirati protectorate or settlement and exploiting all its resources. Numerous reports have documented attempts to erase the islanders' identity by issuing them documentation akin to dependency certificates for the UAE. These practices, alongside Saudi actions on the island, were laid bare in a statement by Sheikh 'Isa Salim bin Yaqut, the senior tribal leader of Socotra, in September 2020. He highlighted demographic changes designed to undermine the indigenous population, the destruction of the island's unique environment, and the introduction of an Israeli presence⁽³¹⁾.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has expanded and annexed large tracts of Yemeni land, particularly in the governorates of Al-Mahrah and Hadramawt, as well as parts of Ma'rib, Al-Jawf, Hajjah, and Sa'dah. Saudi Arabia removed the concrete pillars that had been erected as border markers between it and the Republic of Yemen in the Empty Quarter Desert, adjacent to the Yemeni Al-Kharkheer camp, under the terms of the Treaty of Jeddah (2000). It then transported those pillars roughly 700 kilometres to the '*Shibah Triangle*' on the Omani border and re-set them within Hadramawt Governorate, 60 kilometres from their original site, thereby cutting off 42,000 square kilometres of Yemeni territory⁽³²⁾.

- Occupation and Gross Violations

During the opening months of the aggression against Yemen in 2015, the coalition countries—specifically Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—sought to occupy Yemeni governorates, islands, and other strategic areas, including those that had not witnessed armed conflict or hosted any military engagements throughout the years of the aggression. These countries brought in mercenaries via various international companies and also recruited local mercenary units. They constantly stoked local disputes and opened new fronts for fighting in many areas to justify their intervention in these areas, assert dominance over them, and plunder their resources.

A series of human rights reports issued by Nidaa Al-karama Centre for Rights and Development—a centre specialising in monitoring violations in the southern governorates—revealed alarming data on the crimes and abuses committed by the coalition of aggression and its local collaborators in those governorates between 2019 and 2024. The most prominent findings are as follows:

30 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LfBIUxQqGaU>

31 <https://almawqeaapost.net/news/53482>

32 <https://www.alalam.ir/news/3091841/>

From 2019

Assassination Attempts in Southern Governorates

Until 2024



 Total	 Victim Killed	 Victim Survived	 Year
679	307	372	2020 - 2019
166	84	82	2023
188	122	66	2024

Source: Nidaa Al-Karama Centre for Rights and Development

From 2019

Executions, Slaughter, and Direct Killings in Southern Governorates

Until 2024

344



Intentional Killings, Executions, Bombings,
and Run-over Incidents

129

2024



Executions, Run-over Incidents,
and Direct Killings

105

2023



Executions, Slaughter, and Direct Killings

110

2020 - 2019

Source: Nidaa Al-Karama Centre for Rights and Development

Bodies Found in Southern Governorates			
Year	Identified	Unknown	Total
2019 - 2020	16	20	36
2023	17	9	26
Total	33	29	62

Bombings in Southern Governorates		
Year	Bombings no.	Total
2019 - 2020	3 Cars 2 Motorcycles 2 Suicide bombers	7
2024	2 Cars	2
Total	9	9

Source: Nidaa Al-Karama Centre for Rights and Development

Acts of Kidnapping, Unlawful Arrests, Arbitrary Detentions, Rapes, and Enforced Disappearances in Southern Governorates

2019 - 2020	283
2023	525
2024	704
Total	1512

Deaths Resulting from Torture in Prisons in Southern Governorates

2019 - 2020	+10
2024	23
Total	+33

Source: Nidaa Al-Karama Centre for Rights and Development

• Occupation of Aden and Its Neighbouring Areas

Aden, the economic and commercial capital of Yemen, lies on the coast of the Gulf of Aden. It is bordered to the north and west by Lahij Governorate, to the east by Abyan Governorate, and to the south by the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. By virtue of this location, Aden serves as an important commercial port and a regional and international free-trade zone.

On 14 July 2015, the coalition forces launched '*Operation Golden Arrow*' to seize the city of Aden. This offensive involved Saudi and Emirati ground troops alongside Yemeni mercenaries trained in Saudi Arabia, and was supported by intensive air and naval bombardment.

Since then, up to the time of writing this report, citizens in Aden and the surrounding governorates have suffered the direct and indirect consequences of this occupation in terms of security, public services, and the economy. Throughout the years of the aggression, these governorates have experienced a total collapse of security, marked by assassinations, unlawful detentions, kidnappings, enforced disappearances, and armed robberies targeting both public and private property.

The UAE provided every form of support to the Southern Transitional Council that was established in May 2017 and formed military units under various designations, such as '*Security Belt Forces*' and '*Elite Forces*'. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia continued to back the so-called National Army affiliated with the Hadi government, along with the governments formed after he transferred his powers to the Presidential Leadership Council in April 2022. Consequently, these areas effectively became proxy battlefields between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, each backing a specific faction. This culminated in armed confrontations in Aden on 28 January 2018 between the two sides.

In August 2019, fierce fighting erupted in Aden when the Security Belt Forces, loyal to the Southern Transitional Council, expelled Hadi's government and seized all military camps in the city, backed by UAE air strikes targeting gatherings of the so-called National Army. Furthermore, these countries—particularly the UAE—established military bases and secret detention centres in order to exacerbate the hardship endured by residents. The UN Security Council's Panel of Experts has documented these abuses in multiple reports.

• Occupation of Hadramawt Governorate

Hadramawt Governorate lies on the coast of the Arabian Sea and is the largest governorate in the republic by area. Al-Mukalla's port is one of the country's most important harbours, and Al-Mukalla airport is the third-largest airport in Yemen. The governorate shares its northern border with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This stretch of the border with Saudi Arabia—spanning over 700 km and accounting for half the land frontier between Yemen and Saudi Arabia—together with Hadramawt's vast oil reserve, has made it the object of Saudi ambitions for decades.

Just one week after the coalition's military operations against Yemen began, Al-Qaeda seized the city of Al-Mukalla in Hadramawt, providing a pretext for a large deployment of coalition troops into the governorate via Riyan Airport in April 2016, ostensibly to expel the militants after they had held the city for more than a year.

Over ten years, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have established military bases and secret prisons throughout Hadramawt, used to strengthen the presence of the forces of these two countries and to empower their affiliated factions with the aim of plundering oil wealth and sowing chaos and conflict among the various factions in the governorate. The governorate has since noticeably suffered service shortcomings, security problems, and a rise in assassinations. These moves also paved the way for the entry of US and UK forces into Hadramawt.

• Occupation of Al-Mahrah Governorate

Al-Mahrah—often called Yemen's eastern gateway—overlooks the Arabian Sea and boasts the country's longest coastline, stretching for 560 km. It borders Oman to the east and Saudi Arabia to the north. Beneath its surface lie enormous oil, gas, and mineral resources, making it a historical target for great powers given its strategic location and vast wealth. Although Al-Mahrah was entirely removed from the confrontation areas and battle fronts, the coalition countries sought to dominate it from the outset of the aggression to secure their own interests.

In 2016, Saudi Arabia sought to create a security unit called '*military police*' in Al-Mahrah, and the UAE attempted to form '*Mahri Elite Forces*', similar to the units it set up in Hadramawt and Shabwah, as part of its attempts to occupy as many strategic regions in Yemen as possible.

In late 2017, Saudi troops began deploying to Al-Mahrah via Al-Ghaydah Airport in a bid to secure control over the governorate⁽³³⁾. Saudi Arabia dispatched military forces to Al-Mahrah, dominated its most strategic sites, and established military bases and camps there.

For decades, Saudi Arabia has dreamed of laying an oil pipeline from its territory to Nashshūn port in Al-Mahrah, reaching the Arabian Sea. This would serve as a route for exporting its oil, shortening export routes covered by Saudi oil exports, cutting shipping costs, and providing an alternative to passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, Saudi Arabia seeks to establish a foothold in open waters like the Arabian Sea⁽³⁴⁾.

This Saudi endeavour faced resistance from the people and tribes of Al-Mahrah, who vehemently opposed Saudi presence in their regions. In mid-2018, they formed the '*Peaceful Sit-in Committee of the Sons of Al-Mahrah*', a grassroots movement against foreign military deployment⁽³⁵⁾. In its statements and various activities, the committee highlighted the presence of other foreign forces in addition to the Saudis, including Emirati, American, and British troops, and called for all of them to withdraw. In fact, US and UK forces had entered Al-Mahrah in batches following allegations of unknown attacks on ships in the Arabian Sea. This was highlighted by the British newspaper '*the Daily Express*' in August 2021, which reported that forty UK special forces soldiers arrived in Al-Mahrah under the pretext of pursuing the perpetrators of the July 2021 '*Mercer Street*' oil tanker attack in the Gulf of Oman and that the team would collaborate with US forces stationed there to train Saudi troops⁽³⁶⁾.

Since seizing control over Al-Mahrah, Saudi forces committed severe human-rights violations against civilians, including arbitrary detention in unauthorised sites, torture of detainees, enforced disappearances, and illegal transfers of prisoners to Saudi Arabia. A March 2020 [Human Rights Watch](#) (HRW) report titled '*Saudi Forces Torture, "Disappear" Yemenis*' documented testimonies from Al-Mahrah residents stating that Saudi forces had arrested those opposing their military presence in the province. HRW documented sixteen people arbitrarily detained by Saudi and allied Yemeni forces between June 2019 and February 2020—eleven of whom were transferred to Saudi Arabia. The report also noted that pro-Saudi Yemeni forces used live ammunition against protesters in November 2018 and that Saudi warplanes struck tribal checkpoints established by the residents of Al-Mahrah in April 2019⁽³⁷⁾.

33 [In 2018, the UN panel of experts on Yemen](#) noted that Saudi Arabia deployed the 123rd Infantry Brigade in Al-Ghaydah in November 2017 to enhance security along this road, which serves as the main supply route and the primary highway for commercial traffic and other movement.

34 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NLeshRPifpw>

35 <https://www.facebook.com/ietisamalmahraa/>

36 <https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1473978/british-special-forces-yemen-drone-attack>

37 <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/25/yemen-saudi-forces-torture-disappear-yemenis>

Occupation of the Socotra Archipelago

Although Socotra sits hundreds of kilometres from Yemen's war zones and remained unaffected by direct aggression, it too fell under occupation and saw foreign forces deployed.

The UAE used Cyclone Chapala, which struck the archipelago in October 2015, as a justification to pursue its plans under the guise of '*charitable humanitarian work*'⁽⁴⁰⁾. Likewise, Saudi Arabia established a presence on Socotra under the pretext of providing relief, development, and reconstruction assistance. What began as charitable work quickly turned into a full military takeover when three Emirati aircraft landed with tanks, armoured vehicles, and troops, seizing the airport, port, and other vital sites on the island. This was confirmed by Ahmed bin Dagher, former prime minister of the so-called Hadi government, in a statement issued on 6 May 2018⁽⁴¹⁾. A week later, Saudi forces arrived at the island, ostensibly to calm tensions between the Hadi government and the UAE⁽⁴²⁾. Since then, both states have constantly reinforced their

42 https://www.france24.com/ar/20180513-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%A7%

military presence by dispatching ever more troops and supporting rival mercenary militias loyal to each of them. Local Socotrans vigorously resisted this presence. In March 2021, they formed the '*Peaceful Sit-in Committee of Socotra Governorate*', declaring their principal aim to oppose all occupying foreign forces⁽⁴³⁾.

Under occupation, Socotra has endured serious security, economic, and social violations. The Emirati occupation of the island, coupled with the systematic efforts to seize its wealth and erase the identity of its people, represents one of the clearest forms of occupation. This includes the following:

- opening the island to whomever the UAE wished, while blocking ordinary Yemenis unless they secured UAE visas;
- issuing UAE visas to Israelis, whether as '*tourists*' or '*military experts*', to assist with building military bases;
- severing transport links between Socotra and other Yemeni governorates by halting Yemenia and Felix Airlines flights to and from the island, while exclusively maintaining Emirati military transport aircraft operations;
- raising the UAE flag over all public and private service buildings and facilities in place of the Yemeni flag;
- replacing Yemen's international calling code with the UAE's;
- abolishing Yemen's school curriculum in favour of one promoting Emirati identity;
- applying Emirati travel regulations and rules to all foreign arrivals and departures;
- conducting continuous military exercises and arms smuggling across the island;
- granting UAE citizenship to locals and bribing those who refused;

[D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D-8%B3%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86](https://almahriah.net/local/9430)

43 <https://almahriah.net/local/9430>

- repeated official assertions by UAE officials that Socotra belongs to the UAE;
- using the island as a site for military exercises and amphibious operations and as a staging ground for military equipment and machinery; and
- founding and supporting local militias while inciting disorder and instability.

In September 2020, Sheikh Isa Salim Al-Socatri—the senior tribal leader of Socotra—publicly denounced some of these abuses in a statement entitled ‘*Socotra Breathes Its Last and Bids Farewell to Its Yemeni Mother*’⁽⁴⁴⁾. Throughout the years of the aggression, the coalition countries and their backers have reinforced their foothold in Socotra by creating military bases—among them an Emirati-Israeli base⁽⁴⁵⁾, an Emirati base on Abd Al-Kuri Island, and a Saudi base near the airport of Hadiboh, the archipelago’s capital.

• Occupation of Ma’rib Governorate

Ma’rib is one of Yemen’s most important governorates due to its strategic significance, historical status, and archaeological heritage, as well as rich oil and gas reserves. It hosts numerous oil and gas extraction companies, in addition to the Safer oil refinery—one of Yemen’s most significant production facilities. The governorate also houses the Ma’rib gas-fired power plant, which once supplied electricity to most of Yemen, notably the Capital Sana’a. Agriculture is the primary livelihood for its population: Ma’rib ranks third among all governorates in terms of agricultural output, accounting for 7.6% of the total national output⁽⁴⁶⁾.

These attributes made Ma’rib a prime target for the coalition from the very outset of the aggression. In September 2015, coalition armies invaded Ma’rib and raised their flags on both banks of the Ma’rib Dam. This action marks one of the worst episodes of modern occupation⁽⁴⁷⁾. Since then, Ma’rib has been under occupation, and its various resources are systematically subjected to looting.

Many residents of several Yemeni cities were compelled to move to Ma’rib in search of livelihood or to use the city and its roads as a transit point for travel outside Yemen, particularly those whose lives and circumstances forced them into emigration, who sought medical treatment in hospitals abroad, or who pursued

44 <https://mancheete.com/posts/8286>

45 <https://thecradle.co/articles-id/26154>

46 <https://yemen-nic.info/gover/mareb/brife/>

47 <https://www.skynewsarabia.com/video/778776-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%94%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%94%D8%B1%D8%A8>

education in Arab or foreign countries. Some of these individuals were not spared from arbitrary violations committed against them by the authorities in Ma'rib, affiliated with the coalition countries. Many civilians were subjected to arrests and kidnappings in Ma'rib. Among these civilians were travellers who were forced to pass through the city as the coalition countries continued to close Sana'a International Airport, which serves as the main lifeline connecting millions of Yemenis to the outside world.

• Occupation of Al-Hudaydah and the Western Coast

Yemen's coastline stretches over 2,000 km—from its maritime border with Oman in the Arabian Sea to its border with Saudi Arabia in the Red Sea. Around one third of this coastline is situated on the Red Sea, forming Yemen's western shores across the governorates of Taiz, Al-Hudaydah, and Hajjah.

The strategic, political, economic, and geographical importance of the Red Sea to the world has heightened the significance of Yemen's western coasts, especially due to their inclusion of several key ports and maritime outlets—from Midi in the north to the Bab Al-Mandab Strait in the south. Bab Al-Mandab, which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, is one of the world's most important and busiest shipping lanes. Before the coalition's aggression, over 20,000 vessels carrying all types of cargoes passed through it annually, alongside 4% of global oil demand— approximately 4 million barrels per day⁽⁴⁸⁾.

Given this significance, the coalition countries of aggression targeted Yemen's western coast early on. In early January 2017, they launched '*Operation Golden Spear*'⁽⁴⁹⁾, seizing parts of the western shoreline—most notably Dhubab District, which controls the Bab Al-Mandab Strait and the port of Al-Mokha in Taiz Governorate.

The ambitions of the coalition forces did not stop there. Al-Hudaydah Governorate and its port—second only to Aden in importance, handling 80% of Yemen's imports—were prime targets. From the outset of the aggression, the coalition sought to disable and shut down the port. In mid-August 2015, air strikes destroyed four gantry cranes and several warehouses. Furthermore, since the beginning of their aggression, the coalition forces have closed the port multiple times⁽⁵⁰⁾.

48 <https://arabic.rt.com/news/778711-%D8%A3%D9%87%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%81%D8%A9/>

49 <https://www.aljazeera.net/opinions/2017/4/26/%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%87%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9>

50 <https://www.reuters.com/article/amp/idARAKBN1DA2HN/>

On 13 June 2018, the coalition countries of aggression launched ‘*Operation Golden Victory*’, during which an intensive assault was executed on the city of Al-Hudaydah by Saudi and Emirati forces and Yemeni mercenaries, backed by air and naval fire. Their attempts to control the city persisted until the [Stockholm Agreement](#) was announced in December 2018. It called for a ceasefire in Al-Hudaydah and its ports, withdrawal of armed forces, and handover of local security to Yemeni authorities. The agreement also stipulated that the United Nations would have a leading role in supporting the management and inspection operations of the Yemeni Red Sea Ports Authority at the ports of Al-Hudaydah, Al-Salif, and Ras Issa. Both parties to the agreement committed themselves to facilitating the movement of civilians and goods to and from the city of Al-Hudaydah and the ports of Al-Hudaydah, Al-Salif, and Ras Issa and to depositing the revenues from these ports into the Central Bank of Yemen through its branch in Al-Hudaydah to help pay the salaries of civil service employees in Al-Hudaydah Governorate and throughout Yemen.

Although the agreement stipulated a ceasefire in Al-Hudaydah Governorate, coalition-aligned mercenaries repeatedly breached its terms in various ways. These violations included repeated incursions, artillery bombardments, the construction of new fortifications, the use of reconnaissance aircraft, and firing various types of ammunition—all despite the presence of a UN mission tasked with overseeing the agreement’s implementation.

As part of a broader declared operation, the coalition announced renewed airstrikes on the city of Al-Hudaydah on 20 January 2022, claiming that the port was being used as a military site⁽⁵¹⁾.

• Occupation of the Red Sea Islands

Yemen possesses over 180 islands scattered across the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean, with the Red Sea archipelago alone comprising 151 islands⁽⁵²⁾.

Foremost among these is Mayyun Island, due to its location in the Bab Al-Mandab Strait—the vital link between the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, and the Gulf of Aden—through which more than 20,000 cargo ships pass each year. Its position also confers immense military and strategic value. As a result, the island

51 <https://www.skynewsarabia.com/middle-east/1494872-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%84-%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A>

52 <http://www.yemen-nic.info/news/detail.php?ID=8665>

has become a prime target for the coalition countries, especially the UAE, which has sought to occupy it since the onset of the aggression. The UAE's objectives in occupying the island are linked to its strategic ambitions to control the main ports and maritime trade routes in the region. In May 2021, based on satellite imagery, the Associated Press revealed that an air base was being constructed on Mayyun Island, attributing the project to the UAE⁽⁵³⁾.

A March 2021 investigation by Al Jazeera's news desk further reported that the UAE had dismantled its military base in Eritrea and relocated part of its facilities and military equipment, such as Patriot missile batteries and aircraft, to Mayyun⁽⁵⁴⁾. Emirati activity on the island commenced at the onset of the aggression in 2015. The UAE initiated the construction of a runway in mid-2016, which was halted in 2017, but then the facility was uncovered in 2021.

As for the islands of the Hanish Archipelago, the islands of Greater Hanish and Zuqar were occupied in December 2015⁽⁵⁵⁾. The archipelago holds significant military strategic importance, as it controls and oversees the maritime navigation routes in the southern Red Sea.

- **Plundering Wealth and Exploiting Vital Resources**

Over the past years, the occupation forces—namely the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia—have continued to vie for exploiting the wealth and vital resources of the Yemeni governorates, islands, and territories they occupy, directing and overseeing their affairs in various fields. In order to advance, extend their influence, secure control over ports and other strategic areas, and seize as many assets and resources as possible, both the UAE and Saudi Arabia have established and funded local movements and armed militias. They have deliberately stoked political discord and encouraged armed confrontations among these groups, thereby ensuring their continued presence in these regions and enabling them to plunder their wealth and exploit their vital resources, particularly in Aden, Shabwah, Ma'rib, Al-Jawf, and the island of Socotra.

53 <https://apnews.com/article/mysterious-air-base-volcanic-island-yemen-c8cb2018c07bb5b63e1a43ff706b007b>

54 <https://www.aljazeera.net/politics/2021/3/8/%d8%aa%d8%ad%d9%82%d9%8a%d9%82-%d9%84%d9%84%d8%ac%d8%b2%d9%8a%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a5%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%aa%d8%b9%d9%8a%d8%af-%d9%86%d8%b4%d8%b1-%d9%85%d9%86%d8%b4%d8%a2%d8%aa>

55 <https://www.reuters.com/article/oegtp-yemen-coalition-dr6-idARAKBN0TT11S20151210/>
<https://www.alarabiya.net/amp/arab-and-world/2015/12/15/>

During the years of the aggression, documented evidence concerning the scale and nature of plundering the wealth and resources in some occupied areas indicates that systematic looting of oil and gas resources in Mar'ib, Shabwah, and Al-Jawf amounted to more than 19 trillion Yemeni rials by April 2021, according to estimates published by the Ministry of Oil and Minerals⁽⁵⁶⁾. As for the crude oil looted by the coalition of aggression and its mercenaries from 2018 until July 2022, it amounted to one hundred and thirty million barrels, with a value exceeding nine billion dollars⁽⁵⁷⁾.

From another angle, the looting of antiquities and historical assets has been a deliberate objective of both Saudi Arabia and the UAE, especially those widely spread in Ma'rib Governorate. This city holds a heritage stretching back millennia and possesses relics unmatched by any other city in the Arabian Peninsula. Yemen Centre for Human Rights has obtained verified information about excavations carried out around numerous archaeological sites and cities in territories occupied by the coalition countries or controlled by their mercenaries in Ma'rib and other governorates. Some of the artefacts have been unearthed, smuggled out of Yemen, and subsequently exhibited in antiquity sale auctions or displayed in global museums.

Between the outset of the aggression and August 2022, a total of 2,610 Yemeni antiquities were exhibited and sold. These items were part of 4,265 smuggled artefacts offered in online auctions across six countries: The United States (five auctions), the United Kingdom (four), France (three), Israel (two) and, finally, one auction each in Germany and the Netherlands. The distribution of these antiquities by country was as follows: the United States topped the list with 2,167 pieces; the Netherlands came second with 972; Israel third with 501; the United Kingdom fourth with 421; France fifth with 135; and Germany sixth with 69⁽⁵⁸⁾.

The looting has escalated to the point where the UAE has carried out extensive removal of rare birds and plants from the Socotra Archipelago, a group of islands internationally recognised as a protected natural reserve⁽⁵⁹⁾.

Yemen's vast fishery resources likewise have suffered from the looting and destructive overfishing carried out by vessels aligned with the coalition countries of aggression⁽⁶⁰⁾. Losses to the national fish stock caused by illegal fishing by foreign fishing vessels reached 3.68 billion dollars⁽⁶¹⁾.

56 <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3167173.htm>

57 <https://www.ypagency.net/472836>

58 <https://hudhud.org/?p=255>

59 <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20191023-uae-steals-endangered-trees-from-yemens-socotra/>

60 <https://althawrah.ye/archives/645693>

61 <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3218500.htm>

- Feeding Racism and Spreading a Culture of Violence among the Population

Over the past ten years, the countries involved in the coalition of aggression have worked to undermine the deeply rooted social cohesion that Yemenis have enjoyed throughout history, tearing apart their social fabric by promoting violence rooted in racist concepts: sectarianism, denominationalism, and regionalism. From the moment the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia occupied several areas of Yemen, seized control of decision-making centres there, and took charge of administering the lives of residents across multiple governorates, attempts to incite these hateful concepts began to appear repeatedly in various media outlets—actions that constitute grave crimes under numerous international conventions and covenants.

The deliberate stoking of racist concepts among Yemenis was a targeted effort to pit particular population groups against others under different guises. For example, in the southern governorates, there were campaigns of violence aimed at northerners, accompanied by all manner of crimes against them—behaviours that emerged directly due to the policies of the occupiers, especially in Aden. The governorate witnessed recurrent outbreaks of violence and criminal acts, most notably the events of May 2016, which involved killings, crucifixions, and the public dragging of several northerners in the city's streets. Their property was looted; their homes were seized, and a process of forced displacement was carried out against them—most acutely affecting people from Taiz, hundreds of whom were expelled from the city, including many who had been born and brought up in Aden for decades⁽⁶²⁾.

Taiz Governorate saw another form of violence and hatred, fuelled by regionalism and sectarianism, actively encouraged by the occupying countries. Armed militias aligned with the coalition of aggression committed gruesome crimes against several families in the Al-Şarari villages, notably the Al-Rumaimah and Al-Junaid families. Their methods ranged from killing, dragging, and crucifying members of those families to burning some alive and throwing others from the tops of buildings. These militias went so far as to exhume the corpses of the slain and set them ablaze, to destroy many of those families' homes and mosques, and to loot their possessions. They also carried out mass abductions of women and children and compelled the surviving members of those families to leave their homes under the threat of force⁽⁶³⁾.

62 <https://www.dw.com/ar/%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%86/a-50041840>

63 <https://althawrah.ye/archives/118735>

- The Absence of Security and the Rise of Violence in the Occupied Regions and Cities

On 7 March 2018, the Union of Yemeni Writers and Authors in Aden voiced its deep concern over the deteriorating security situation in the southern governorates. According to its statement, crime and assassination rates surged in Aden in particular: More than 1,250 civilians were killed, including 22 mosque imams and preachers. The statement also recorded 45 bombing and booby-trap incidents, around 100 armed robberies, and numerous acts of vandalism and chaos—such as arson, abductions, and the widespread display of weapons, among others⁽⁶⁴⁾. Moreover, during a seminar held in February 2020 by the ‘*Coordination for the Support of Assassination Victims in Aden*’, it was reported that 200 people had been killed in targeted assassinations in Aden between 2015 and early 2020. All those cases were registered against an unknown perpetrator⁽⁶⁵⁾.

The coalition countries of aggression are held responsible for the security breakdown in the territories they occupy, with the United Arab Emirates singled out as a principal instigator. On 16 October 2018, the American news website ‘*BuzzFeed News*’ revealed that the UAE had hired fighters trained by the US military to carry out assassinations and eliminate various religious and political figures in Yemen. The website cited Abraham Golan, a Hungarian-Israeli security contractor and former leader of the assassination programme in the unit hired by the UAE, as he confirmed that the targeted assassination programme in Yemen was commissioned by the UAE, which provided him with a list of individuals to eliminate. He further revealed that the unit was paid \$1.5 million a month, with additional bonuses awarded for each successful assassination⁽⁶⁶⁾.

In a televised interview with Al Jazeera in December 2018, Adel Al-Hasani—a leader within the so-called ‘*Southern Resistance*’—stated that the UAE had established militias outside the formal state apparatus to eliminate its opponents, especially members of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Al-Islah), including mosque imams, religious preachers, and military commanders. He went on to name both the victims of these operations and those responsible—among them senior security officials in Aden Governorate⁽⁶⁷⁾.

64 <https://www.4may.net/news/1362>

65 <https://www.aa.com.tr/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9/%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A6%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-200-%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AD%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%86/1722160>

66 <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/aramroston/mercenaries-assassination-us-yemen-uae-spear-golan-dahlan>

67 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gPvrWlyQ8rE>

Also, the Taiz Governorate experienced a breakdown of security, reaching the point of chaos and clashes between mercenary militias, according to numerous accounts and testimonies from the governorate's own residents. One key example is the joint statement issued by several professional syndicates in Taiz city in August 2021. Issued in the wake of horrific violations there—including an attack on the Al-Hariq family in the Bir Basha neighbourhood, during which their homes were invaded, family members abducted, and others subjected to targeted killings—the statement asserted that these crimes were carried out by individuals affiliated with military and security bodies, suggesting they were part of a coordinated and systematic campaign⁽⁶⁸⁾.

Fighting among the mercenary militias recruited by the coalition of aggression has led to a surge in violence across the occupied regions and cities. Reports from the UN Security Council's Panel of Experts have revealed the extent of division and conflicts between what it called the '*proxy forces of the Saudi-led coalition*'. An example of this is the clashes that broke out between different factions in areas controlled by the coalition forces and the so-called Hadi government in the southern areas (Aden, Al-Mahrah, Shabwah, and Hadramawt), as well as in Taiz and Al-Hudaydah. Some examples for such clashes include the conflict between the so-called '*Transitional Council Forces*' (supported by the UAE) and elements from the Islah party, Al-Qaeda. Moreover, in Taiz, clashes took place between the so-called Abu Al-Abbass's forces, the Islah-aligned People's Army Group, and Ghazwan Al-Mikhlafi's forces⁽⁶⁹⁾.

The conduct of the coalition of aggression and its military operations had a profoundly negative impact on the ability of the relevant official bodies to sustain their counter-terrorism efforts, although they had achieved notable success prior to the start of the coalition's military operations. This produced new challenges for state institutions and hampered the continued implementation of anti-terror policies. Moreover, the aggression facilitated the spread, strengthening, and expansion of terrorism, alongside the backing of extremist groups, such as Al-Qaeda and ISIL, enabling them to seize entire Yemeni governorates. Consequently, terrorist attacks targeting markets, mosques, and other gatherings increased, resulting in hundreds of civilian casualties.

Extremist armed groups in the occupied areas—particularly in the governorates of Abyan, Lahj, Aden, and Shabwah, as well as parts of Hadramawt and Taiz—found a conducive environment for their criminal activities. They exploited the logistical and military support provided by the occupying states to expand and disseminate across the widest territory available. Amidst the prevailing security breakdown in these regions, they were able to carry out dozens of operations, among which assassinations and bombings were the most prominent.

68 <https://alsharaneews.com/2021/08/14/37735/>

69 [The Security Council and the Aggression on Yemen: Airstrikes & Resolutions](#), page 144.

In Taiz, fighters from the group known as '*Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula*' fought alongside coalition forces on multiple fronts⁽⁷⁰⁾. Khalid Batarfi, the leader of the group, admitted that his members had participated with the coalition forces on eleven fronts⁽⁷¹⁾. Throughout the years of the aggression, the United Arab Emirates—one of the coalition's principal leaders—continued to support Adel Abdu Farae, the commander of the so-called '*Abu al-Abbas Brigades*' in Taiz, despite him being listed on international terrorism lists⁽⁷²⁾.

Al-Qaeda had seized control of the city of Al-Mukalla in Hadramawt Governorate at the outset of the coalition's assault on Yemen. Then, it withdrew in April 2016 under secret agreements struck between coalition countries and its fighters. Those deals permitted them to leave the main cities with all their weapons and equipment. The coalition countries also went on to recruit hundreds more of these fighters⁽⁷³⁾.

- **Establishment of Secret Prisons by the Occupying States**

The violations and crimes committed by the coalition countries against the population in the occupied Yemeni cities and regions have multiplied, exacerbating citizens' suffering and worsening their living conditions in every sphere. Saudi Arabia and the UAE did not stop there; rather, they sought to recruit and train a large number of mercenaries both inside and outside Yemen, using them to carry out a range of serious breaches and abuses against citizens, who continue to suffer arbitrary detention and torture, with a growing number of enforced disappearances.

Dozens of international reports confirm that the UAE and Saudi Arabia have formed military units and security cells operating directly under their command in the occupied governorates—particularly Aden, Ma'rib, Shabwah, Hadramawt, Al-Mahrah, and Socotra. These include what are known as the '*Security Belt forces*' and the '*Elite Forces*'. Through these formations, both countries have perpetrated grave abuses, such as arbitrary detentions, kidnapping, and enforced disappearance. Detainees are often held in secret sites and detention centres entirely managed by the UAE, with local authorities having no knowledge or oversight of these facilities.

⁷⁰ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fSa6NYPmw3M>

⁷¹ <https://iraq.shafaqna.com/AR/291469/>

⁷² <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/politics/2018/12/30/%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B3>

⁷³ https://apnews.com/article/saudi-arabia-united-states-ap-top-news-middle-east-international-news-f38788a561d74ca78c-77cb43612d50da?utm_source=nextdraft&utm_medium=website

Local and international reports issued in 2017 documented that the UAE had established and was running eight secret prisons and detention centres in Aden Governorate. These include Khor Maksar detention centre, the Security Belt Camp in Al Buraiqeh, Bir Ahmed detention centre, the Construction Corps Camp detention centre, the Support and Logistics Camp detention centre, another facility in Al Buraiqeh, a detention centre in the village of Dhulumat, behind Al Buraiqeh, and the Camp 20 detention centre in Crater. These centres were managed by UAE-affiliated security formations known as the '*Security Belt Forces*'. The UAE also set up and operated other secret prisons in Hadramawt Governorate—namely, Al-Riyan detention centre inside Al-Riyan Airport, the Port of Al-Dhaba detention centre, Rabwah detention centre, the Republican Palace detention centre, and the Ghail Bin Yamin detention centre—all operated through the so-called '*Hadrami Elite Forces*'. In addition, the UAE established a detention centre on Socotra Island, referred to as the Socotra Island detention centre⁽⁷⁴⁾.

In 2017 and 2018, a major scandal emerged concerning the UAE's prisons in Yemen, where detainees endured torture and rape. '*The Associated Press*' published two investigations uncovering a network of secret detention facilities run by the UAE, where prisoners were subjected to various forms of abuse—from sexual humiliation and rape to being burned over open flames⁽⁷⁵⁾. The Associated Press clarified that these prisons were located within military bases, airports, ports, and even residential buildings, documenting at least eighteen such sites in southern Yemen, either directly managed by Emirati forces or by Yemeni units established and trained by the UAE.

The Associated Press's findings—based on interviews with former inmates, relatives of detainees, human-rights lawyers, and Yemeni military officials—indicate that local authorities were unaware of some of these prisons and lacked the authority to gain access to others. The reports revealed that Emirati officers tortured and ill-treated hundreds of Yemeni men held without trial, and that senior American military commanders knew about these torture practices.

In a December 2018 interview on Al Jazeera, the leader of the so-called '*Southern Resistance*', Adel Al-Hassani, spoke of the Emirati role in Aden. He stated that those running the secret prisons were exclusively Emiratis and Colombians, with no Yemenis present. As someone who had been detained in a UAE-run facility, Al-Hassani described in detail the torture methods employed and the role of foreign mercenaries. He recounted that some prisoners had been brought into cells bleeding and that metal instruments had

74 <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/22/yemen-uae-backs-abusive-local-forces>

For further details, please refer to the Human Rights report.

75 [Detainees held without charges decry Emiratis' sexual abuses | AP News](#)
[Inside Yemen's secret prisons — AP Photos \(apimagesblog.com\)](#)

been inserted into their bodies. He also revealed that the residence of Aden's security chief, Shalal Shaie, had been converted into a prison where innocent people were subjected to the most horrific crimes and abuses, without trial and beyond the reach of the law⁽⁷⁶⁾.

The UAE's establishment of secret prisons has not been confined to the southern governorates. Similar facilities have operated in areas it controls along Yemen's western coast, such as the detention centre at the Port of Al-Mokha⁽⁷⁷⁾. Moreover, the UAE has used these sites to hold Yemeni fishermen and has abducted others to centres it operates in neighbouring African states, including Eritrea and Djibouti⁽⁷⁸⁾.

Fourth: Recruiting and Training Mercenaries and Employing Them in the Aggression against Yemen

It is well known that the purpose behind the recruitment and use of mercenaries in armed conflicts is to carry out tasks that flagrantly violate the principles of international law, extending beyond serious breaches of the law of armed conflicts to include illicit international activities, such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and other grave international crimes. For this reason, most international conventions and the statutes of international humanitarian law contain numerous provisions criminalising the recruitment and use of mercenaries and require the surrender and prosecution of those responsible. The 1989 International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries⁽⁷⁹⁾ is regarded as the

⁷⁶ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gPvrWlyQ8rE>

⁷⁷ <https://al-sharq.com/article/21/03/2018/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%A7>

⁷⁸ <https://althawrah.ye/archives/630791>

⁷⁹ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-convention-against-recruitment-use-financing-and>

Article 1 of the 1989 International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries defines a 'mercenary' as any person who:

- is specially recruited, locally or abroad, in order to take part in hostilities in an armed conflict;
- is motivated primarily by the desire for personal gain and is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that party;
- is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the conflict;
- is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict;
- is not sent by a state which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.

Article 5 provides the following:

most comprehensive treaty prohibiting such practices, which constitute a severe breach of international law in general.

In the light of the Convention's provisions, the United Arab Emirates—a leading member of the Saudiled coalition waging aggression against Yemen since March 2015—has engaged in several unlawful practices relating to the recruitment, training, financing, and deployment of mercenaries in its military operations there. From the outset of the aggression, the UAE brought in large numbers of mercenaries and utilised them alongside coalition forces.

According to the British newspaper '*The Times*', the UAE secretly dispatched hundreds of Colombian mercenaries to Yemen to fight alongside its troops. This contingent of Colombians formed part of a private army that the UAE hired from the US firm '*Blackwater*', which provides security services to the UAE⁽⁸⁰⁾.

This company was not the only one that the UAE contracted to bring in mercenaries to fight in Yemen, as Abu Dhabi contracted with the American company '*DynCorp*', which specialises in providing contracted forces for proxy warfare, and the first batch of fighters from this company arrived in Aden in 2016⁽⁸¹⁾.

A 2020 study entitled '*The UAE and Mercenary Networks*' revealed that the UAE did not limit its recruitment to Colombian mercenaries. The UAE and Saudi Arabia also sought to employ African mercenaries, including forces drawn from Sudan, Chad, Uganda, South Africa, and Eritrea, as well as personnel from America, Britain, Australia, India, and Bangladesh⁽⁸²⁾.

According to a 2018 investigation by The New York Times, On the Front Lines of Saudi Arabia's War in Yemen: Child Soldiers from Darfur, '*the Saudis have used their vast oil wealth to outsource the war, mainly by hiring what Sudanese soldiers say are tens of thousands of desperate survivors of the conflict in Darfur to fight, many of them children*'⁽⁸³⁾.

States Parties shall not recruit, use, finance, or train mercenaries and shall, in accordance with this Convention, prohibit such activities.

States Parties shall not recruit, use, finance, or train mercenaries for the purpose of opposing the legitimate exercise by peoples of their inalienable right of selfdetermination, as recognised by international law, and shall take appropriate measures under international law to prevent such recruitment, use, financing, and training for that purpose.

They shall make the offences set forth in the present Convention punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of those offences

80 [Emirates Secretly Sends Colombian Mercenaries to Yemen Fight - The New York Times \(nytimes.com\)](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/07/world/middleeast/uae-secretly-sends-colombian-mercenary-to-yemen-fight.html)

81 <https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2016/03/07/454304/Yemen-mercenary-Blackwater-DynCorp>

82 <https://capitalforum.net/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88-%D8%B4%D8%A8%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%B2%D9%82%D8%A9/>

83 <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/28/world/africa/saudi-sudan-yemen-child-fighters.html>

Neither the UAE nor Saudi Arabia were content to rely solely on foreign mercenaries. They also recruited mercenaries from within Yemen under various designations—Security Belt Forces, the Shabwani Elite Forces, the Hadrami Elite Forces, the Republican Guards, and the Happy Yemen Brigades—to tear at the social fabric, create instability, and sow constant internal disputes. The UN Security Council’s Panel of Experts, in its reports covering 2015–2021, documented the coalition’s crime of mercenary recruitment. In its 2019 report, the Panel noted that these forces fell outside the control of what it termed the Yemeni government. Its 2020 report further detailed the continuous support provided by the UAE, including training and payment for most of these groups⁽⁸⁴⁾. This was confirmed by UAE officials—among them Lieutenant General Isa Al Mazrouei, Deputy Chief of Staff of the UAE Armed Forces and Joint Operations Commander in Yemen—who revealed in February 2020 that over the first five years of the war, more than 200,000 individuals had been recruited, trained, and equipped in areas under UAE control⁽⁸⁵⁾.

Fifth: Targeting the Yemeni Armed Forces and Their Assets

Under UN General Assembly Resolution 3314, any armed forces of one state attacking the land, sea, or air forces of another state constitutes a crime of aggression. During the years of the aggression, the infrastructure and vital installations of the Yemeni Armed Forces—including barracks, headquarters, units, facilities, depots, air and naval bases, airports, and warehouses—have been subjected to bombardment by the coalition countries of aggression and to looting and seizure by militias affiliated with them. As a result, the majority of these assets have been rendered non-operational, according to confidential documents obtained by the Yemen Human Rights Centre⁽⁸⁶⁾.

84 [The Security Council and the Aggression on Yemen: Airstrikes & Resolutions](#)

85 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LfBIUxQqGaU>

86 Confidential documents.



The market and the area surrounding the Imam Al-Hadi Mosque in Sa'dah Governorate were completely destroyed following airstrikes by the Saudi-led coalition on 9 May 2015.

Part Two

Grave Crimes Not Subject to Statute of Limitations

Chapter One: Crimes of Genocide

The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide⁽⁸⁷⁾ defines a number of acts as constituting genocide—precisely the acts committed by the Saudi-led coalition of aggression in Yemen since it began its military operations against a specific segment of the Yemeni population. Coalition leadership repeatedly conveyed this intent in public statements and media announcements. Most notably, in May 2017, Saudi Crown Prince and Minister of Defence, Mohammed bin Salman, declared that the Saudi Armed Forces could uproot the ‘Houthis’ within a matter of days—a direct reference to a group of Yemeni civilians deemed hostile to Saudi Arabia⁽⁸⁸⁾. On that basis, the coalition countries of aggression have carried out a series of actions and practices against Yemenis in general and against the Ansar Allah movement (the Houthis) in particular, amounting to crimes of genocide as defined by relevant international instruments.

First: Evidence of Crimes of Genocide

- Declaration of Sa’dah City as a Military Zone

On 8 May 2015, the coalition spokesperson, Ahmed Asiri, announced that Sa’dah city would henceforth be treated as a military target in its entirety, urging its inhabitants to evacuate. This declaration, followed by the sustained bombardment of the city and of Sa’dah Governorate as a whole, constitutes a crime of genocide against the Ansar Allah component, which regards Sa’dah as its centre⁽⁸⁹⁾.

Even before Asiri’s statement, the local authorities of Sa’dah Governorate and civil society organisations

87 [Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948](#)

Article II

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

88 <https://arabic.cnn.com/amphhtml/middle-east/2017/05/03/saudi-mohammed-bin-salman-yemen-war>

89 <https://www.skynewsarabia.com/middle-east/743949-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%B5%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9>

had declared Sa'dah city a '*disaster-stricken area*', issuing an urgent humanitarian appeal to official bodies, the international community, local and international relief agencies, and humanrights and humanitarian organisations, calling for swift intervention to save the city and governorate. This appeal came as a result of the coalition's attacks launched in March 2015, which targeted the governorate's population, ruined all life essentials, and destroyed the infrastructure⁽⁹⁰⁾.

Yemen Centre for Human Rights later published a report documenting the crimes committed by the Saudi-led coalition in Sa'dah over a 500day period, drawing on field surveys documenting material and human losses, local authority records, and the findings of local and international organisations monitoring Yemen's humanrights situation. The report concluded that Sa'dah Governorate suffered the highest civilian casualty toll of any governorate, that its entire civil infrastructure—including all public facilities and civil assets—had been razed, and that private property had been grievously damaged.

- **Identity-Based Genocide Crimes – Taiz**

Since the coalition countries of aggression seized parts of Taiz Governorate and established and funded various armed groups to assert control over these areas—particularly extremist factions, such as ISIL and Al-Qaeda— the governorate has witnessed growing manifestations of violence and hatred rooted in regional and sectarian divisions, which the occupying countries deliberately inflamed. This was starkly evident in the persecution of the AlJunaid and Al-Rumaimah families. Members of these families endured every form of torture: killings, dragging, crucifixions, and even burning in full view of bystanders. The armed groups also rounded up several women and children, forcibly expelling them from their homes and villages to remote locations. Additionally, they demolished the families' tombs and destroyed their homes and mosques. This targeting stemmed from a campaign of ethnic and sectarian incitement launched several months before the attack, based on the families' Hashemite lineage and ties to the '*Houthis*'.

A. The Al Rumaima Family

Hadnan Subdistrict lies within Mashr'ah Wa Hadnan District of Taiz Governorate and comprises several villages, including Hadnan and Dhi 'Anqib. The Al-Rumaimah family makes up 80% of Hadnan's population, who are politically diverse—affiliated with all of Yemen's parties and movements, including Ansar Allah. That very diversity was exploited by certain elements to stoke sectarian tensions, which escalated into armed assaults against the Al-Rumaimah family members aligned with Ansar Allah. These assaults involved horrific crimes: ethnic cleansing, detentions, the killing of captives, mass displacement of many families, looting of property, arson of homes, and forced exile.

⁹⁰ <https://yemen-press.net/news46698.html>

The initial steps in the campaign against the Al-Rumaimah family were to sever all roads into the village, imposing a complete blockade. On 23 July 2015, armed groups affiliated with coalition countries of aggression opened fire directly on the home of 70yearold Ali Abdul Qawi Al-Rumaimah in the village of Dhi 'Anqib, striking his twoyearold son, Abdul Aziz, in the head with flying glass shards. The gunfire intensified for several days, leading to further casualties:

- **Noor Ali Abdul Latif Al-Rumaimah** was shot in the left hand while in her room.
- **Abdul Nasser Abbas Al-Rumaimah** was wounded.
- **Faidah Abdul Jalil Abdullah** suffered a gunshot wound to her right leg.

Eyewitnesses and their relatives who experienced the events of this crime—among them Warda Ali Al-Rumaimah, author of the August 2018 book *'The Al-Rumaimah Family: A History of Resilience'*⁽⁹¹⁾, and Dr Arafat Al-Rumaimah, who gave detailed testimony to Yemen Centre for Human Rights—recount that the militants attempted several times to storm Hadnan, opening fire indiscriminately on houses.

This led to the shooting of the young woman Huda Abdullah Al-Rumaimah in the abdomen in front of her home at noon on Thursday, 29 July 2015. Due to being denied medical aid by the militants, she bled to death on Sunday, 2 August. Shaima Abdul Mu'min Al-Rumaimah, a 15-year-old girl, was shot through her right eye. On Friday morning, 14 August, an 88yearold Jalila Mohammed Al-Rumaimah was found shot dead at home, with a bullet wound at the back of her head. Those groups sniped her son, Waddah Abduljalil Al-Rumaimah (aged 36), in the head, and he too was found killed in his bedroom on the same day.

On Sunday, 16 August, hundreds of militants with military vehicles attacked the village of Hadnan from all directions. They carried out brutal acts, including killings, the dragging and mutilation of corpses, torture of abductees, looting and arson of homes, and theft of crops. Among that day's victims was Dr Afeef Al-Rumaimah, who was bound, taken from his home to the Al-Saeed Complex, and shot with some fifteen bullets. His body was then thrown from the third floor of the complex as militants were shouting takbir.

That same day, militants abducted Abbas Abdullah Al-Rumaimah from the house where he was staying with his family, including women and children. They bound him and transported him to Dhi 'Anqib, where they executed him by shooting him in the back. His body was then tied to a motorbike, dragged through the village, and left in an open area.

91 Diyaa Ali and Wardah Ali, *The Al-Rumaimah Family: A History of Resilience* (Sana'a: Al-Ra'id Centre for Studies and Research, 2018)—written in the Arabic language.

Other atrocities of some militants recounted by witnesses include the killing of Muhammed Abdulqawi: They tied his hands behind his back and dragged him through the area of Al-Rajha without regard for his health condition, until one of them shot him and killed him before the full view of the bystanders and villagers. They also abducted Sadiq Abdullah Al-Rumaimah, held him for nearly two months in a prison in the Al-Saeed Complex, and then executed him, according to what was conveyed to his family.

Abdullah Abdulrahman Al-Rumaimah was yet another victim of these armed groups. On Tuesday, 18 August, he went to visit the abductees being held at the school in an area known as AlJabana, which the militants had converted into a makeshift prison for those seized from the Al-Rumaimah family. Upon his arrival, he was shot by a bullet that tore through his left kidney and exited through his back. They then took him to the Noor Club building in the village of Dhī 'Anqib under the pretext of giving him medical aid, but he was left to bleed to death.

Yemen Centre documented this crime and recorded many of its details, issuing a statement condemning this horrific massacre⁽⁹²⁾, during which 24 people from the Al-Rumaimah family were killed, including several women. As of the time of writing this report, the bodies of some of the victims remain concealed.

N	Name	Age	N	Name	Age
1	Wael Abdulaziz Al-Rumaimah	30	13	Shujaa Abdullah Mohammed Al-Rumaimah	42
2	Mohammed Abdulaziz Al-Rumaimah	26	14	Yusuf Ahmed Al-Rumaimah	39
3	AbuTalib Abdulaziz Al-Rumaimah	22	15	Imad Abdul Ghani Al-Rumaimah	20

⁹² <https://thelinkyemen.net/news/6319>

4	Mohammed Al-Amin Al-Rumaimah	55	16	Dawood Mohammed Al-Rumaimah	26
5	Afeef Al-Amin Al-Rumaimah	48	17	Wadha Abdul Jalil Al-Rumaimah	25
6	Ali Al-Amin Al-Rumaimah	57	18	Jalila Mohammed Al-Rumaimah	88
7	Anas Ali Al-Amin Al-Rumaimah	23	19	Shaima Abdu Mohammed Al-Rumaimah	16
8	Muhammed Abdul Qawi Al-Amin Al-Rumaimah	42	20	Anwar Abdullah Al-Rumaimah	23
9	Izzuddin Mohammed Abdul Qawi Al-Amin Al-Rumaimah	21	21	Mujib Ali Abdul Qawi Al-Rumaimah	39
10	Shawqi Abdul Jalil Al-Rumaimah	22	22	Nizar Mohammed Al-Rumaimah	12
11	Mohammed Ali Al-Rumaimah	30	23	Mohammed Ahmed Al-Rumaimah	22
12	Abbas Abdullah Mohammed Al-Rumaimah	44	24	Walid Abdul Ghani Al-Rumaimah	23

Other Al-Rumaimah detainees were held in the Bakathir school in Taiz for a full year, until they were released as part of a prisoner exchange agreement following the Kuwait talks in August 2016. Among them were the following names:

N	Name	N	Name
1	Hamza Abdullah Mohammed Said Al-Rumaimah	10	Walid Abdu Abdulaziz Al-Rumaimah
2	Abdulrahman Ali Abdulqawi Al-Rumaimah	11	Waheeb Abdullah Abdullah Mohammed Al-Rumaimah
3	Abdulqawi Abdulaziz Al-Nahari	12	Mohammed Ali Abdulrahman Al-Rumaimah
4	Abdulqawi Abdulwarith Al-Rumaimah*	13	Jamal Al-Mahdi
5	Adham Abdulqawi Abdulwarith Al-Rumaimah	14	Mohammed Abdulmo'min Mohammed Al-Rumaimah (child)**
6	Waseem Abdulqawi Abdulwarith Al-Rumaimah	15	Fahd Ali Ahmed Said Al-Rumaimah
7	Ahmed Mohammed Abdulrahman Al-Rumaimah	16	Hashim Mohammed Ahmed Said Al-Rumaimah
8	Mohammed Ahmed Abdulrahman Al-Rumaimah	17	Majid Abdu Mohammed Said
9	Ahmed Harab	----	-----

* He suffered from kidney failure due to neglect and died months after his release.

** He was kidnapped from a bus in the Al-Jumhuri neighbourhood of Taiz in late April 2015 on account of his name; he was not released until late 2019 in a prisoner exchange deal.

The fate of five abducted individuals from the Al-Rumaimah family still remains unknown at the time of reporting:

- 1 - Ali Abdullah Mohammed Al-Rumaimah,
- 2 - Anas Ali Abdullah Al-Rumaimah,
- 3 - Nashwan Abdulrahman Mohammed Al-Rumaimah,
- 4 - Abdullah Ahmed Abdulaziz Al-Rumaimah, and
- 5 - Sadiq Abdullah Mohammed Al-Rumaimah.

B. The Al-Junaid Family

The inhabitants of the village of Al-Sarari, in the eastern part of Sabir Al-Mawadim District of Taiz Governorate, were the victims of the second act of mass extermination carried out by the armed groups aligned with the coalition countries of aggression. These groups slaughtered dozens of members of the Al-Junaid family in the village, looted their possessions, burned their homes, and detained the survivors, including women and children. They even exhumed the graves and shrines of the family's forebears, setting fire to whatever remained of the buried corpses. Dozens of families were forced to flee to the mountainous areas outside the village.

According to testimonies of eyewitnesses who experienced the details of the crime and the accounts of relatives who spoke to various media outlets, the village had been under siege by these armed groups for over a year on the pretext that its residents were '*Hashemites*'. During that time, food and medicine were barred from entering⁽⁹³⁾. In June 2016, the blockade intensified and military mobilisations mounted against Al-Sarari and neighbouring villages, until finally they were stormed on 26 July 2016. Footage released by the militants themselves shows takfiri members advancing under sectarian, supremacist slogans, bragging about setting fire to the village mosque and homes⁽⁹⁴⁾.

Eyewitnesses report that more than 1,500 militants stormed the village after bombarding it with over 130 artillery shells, ravaging it and its inhabitants with killing and destruction. Many villagers, including children and women, fell victim to the massacre. A wide-ranging detention campaign was then conducted against Al-Junaid family members who were living in Al-Sarari and nearby villages: Thirty-five women with their children were taken to a school; forty-five men (including fifteen elders) were driven to a military camp belonging to the coalition forces in the Al-Nashmah area; and others were transferred to various other camps. In all, more than 125 people were abducted. These armed groups also burned down dozens of houses and

93 <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news433819.htm>

94 <https://www.alyemenione.com/10018/>

exhumed the tomb of the Sufi Sheikh Jamal Al-Din Al-Junaid, who passed away six hundred years ago and is regarded as one of Yemen's Sufi luminaries. They then dragged his corpse from the grave, burned it, and demolished and torched his shrine and mosque. They also captured and killed Bilal Saeed Al-Junaid, the one in charge of the mosque⁽⁹⁵⁾.

- **The Family of Subay'yan – Ma'rib**

For the past ten years, the coalition countries of aggression have worked to tear apart Yemen's social fabric and undermine civil peace by various means, including killings motivated by the victims' identity and affiliation at the hands of their allied militias. On 29 June 2020, these militias attacked the densely populated Khash'ah Al-Sufila area in Wadi Ubaidah, Ma'rib Governorate, deploying armoured vehicles and tanks and unleashing heavy bombardment there. They specifically targeted the homes of the Subay'yan family, accusing them of belonging to what they call '*the Houthis*'. This assault claimed the life of Sheikh Mohsen Subay'yan and six of his brothers and their sons and left others wounded. According to the sole survivor of the massacre, the child Abdullah Mohsen Subay'yan, to various media outlets, the assailants proceeded to burn the family's houses and loot their contents⁽⁹⁶⁾.

- **Coalition's Wanted List**

The coalition of aggression leadership went beyond direct attacks on Yemeni civilians with various weapons by waging a campaign of incitement against a whole segment of society, which is a fundamental component of its structure—labelled as '*Iranian terrorist militias in Yemen*'—in clear violation of international law. On 5 November 2017, Saudi Arabia, as the head of the coalition of aggression, published a list of forty names, ostensibly of Ansar Allah leaders (or, as the Saudis termed them, '*the Houthis*') and offered financial rewards totalling 440 million dollars for information leading to their capture or location⁽⁹⁷⁾. This measure represents a systematic campaign of incitement, through which the coalition aims to eradicate an entire community component by targeting its foremost figures.

95 <https://laamedia.net/news.aspx?newsnum=1398>

96 <https://t.me/AnsarAllahMC/98633>

97 <https://www.alarabiya.net/saudi-today/2017/11/05/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B5%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%A2%D8%AA-%D8%B6%D8%A-E%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%82%D8%A9-40-%D9%85%D8%B7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86>

Second: Evidence of Assassination Crimes by Identity

- Dr Raji Ahmed Abdul-Malik Hamid Al-Din

The coalition countries of aggression have backed deliberate, targeted killings of Yemen's scholars, academics, and other prominent personalities—especially those associated with Ansar Allah. On 27 January 2018, militants from Takfiri groups, supported by the coalition countries of aggression, assassinated Dr Raji Ahmed Abdul-Malik Hamid Al-Din (President of the Iqra University for Science and Technology and Professor at the Faculty of Sharia, Sana'a University) while he was driving along Cairo Street in the capital.

- Saleh Al-Sammad, President of the Supreme Political Council

On 19 April 2018, aircraft belonging to the Saudi-led coalition of aggression—backed by America—targeted the motorcade of the President of the Supreme Political Council, Saleh Ali Al-Sammad, who was under surveillance during a visit to inspect the conditions of citizens in Al-Hudaydah Governorate. This act flagrantly violates all international conventions and norms that expressly forbid attacks on political figures. The heinous nature of this crime is underscored by:

- The victim's high political and sovereign stature, considering the assassination a type of aggression, as it targeted the head of state and led to depriving the state and its affected citizens of numerous civil rights.
- The deliberate nature of the attack, as evidenced by the fact that it was openly documented, filmed, and broadcast by media outlets aligned with the coalition countries of aggression.

- Al-Sayyid Ibrahim Badruddin Al-Houthi

The assassination of Al-Sayyid Ibrahim Badruddin Al-Houthi in August 2019 constituted an act of genocidal intent directed at a distinct group of Yemeni citizens—namely the relatives and family members of Al-Sayyid Abdul Malik Badruddin Al-Houthi. The leadership of the coalition of aggression repeatedly de-

clared their aim to exterminate all ‘*Houthis*’, affirming their intention to kill every last member of this group. This reflects the extent of the coalition’s persistence in committing atrocious, inhumane acts, both against the Yemeni people in general and against a specific segment of the population in particular.

Since 2015, Saudi and Emirati media—particularly the Saudi channels Al Arabiya and Al-Hadath, as well as the website of the Emirati newspaper Al-Bayan—repeatedly broadcast announcements of air strikes allegedly responsible for his death⁽⁹⁸⁾, demonstrating that the coalition forces had been pursuing him from the outset of the aggression in an attempt to kill him directly. Following his assassination, official Saudi and Emirati channels announced his assassination and identified him as one of the coalition’s most wanted targets.

- Hassan Zaid, Minister of Youth and Sports

Hassan Zaid was widely recognised as a political figure committed to peace and the renunciation of violence since the initial war in Sa’dah Governorate and the 1994 war in South Yemen (the so-called Separation Wars). Nevertheless, the coalition countries of aggression placed him on the wanted list, incentivising his assassination with financial rewards—a reprehensible incitement to violence and hate. On 4 November 2020, armed operatives ambushed Hassan Zaid as he drove with his daughter Salma through one of the main tunnels in Hadda, Sana’a, firing dozens of rounds into their vehicle. He was killed instantly, while his daughter sustained serious injuries to her left hand and shoulder and was rushed to a nearby hospital.

Salma later recounted the crime, saying:

Once we entered the tunnel, I didn’t know what was happening. I heard a banging sound and then gunfire. My father told me he was under fire. I next heard him groaning beside me. As soon as the shots rang out, he hugged me. I was driving at the time and could hear everything. When the bullets hit, I saw my father slumped beside me and felt a bullet in my hand. I screamed for people to come and help my father; I saw my father beside me, but I couldn’t do anything to save him.

98 <https://www.alarabiya.net/arab-and-world/yemen/2015/11/29/-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-%D8%B4%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%B2%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84%D9%83-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A>



The explosion caused by a bomb dropped by coalition aircraft on the Attan residential neighborhood in the capital Sana'a - 20 April 2015

Chapter Two: War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity

Articles 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court⁽⁹⁹⁾ enumerate a number of acts that fall within the scope of crimes against humanity and war crimes. These are precisely the acts committed by the Saudi-led coalition of aggression in Yemen since the outset of its military operations against Yemeni civilians. This chapter will examine some of these acts, together with illustrative evidence.

First: Main Statistics

Daily monitoring and documentation reports compiled by Yemen Centre for Human Rights indicate that the deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian gathering places was a systematic and recurring practice by the coalition countries of aggression. Hardly did a single day pass without strikes on civilian locations—including homes and private property—resulting in numerous deaths and injuries across various Yemeni governorates. The deliberate killing of civilians committed by the coalition countries of aggression is confirmed by the statistical records and detailed, documented accounts of victims, the majority of whom were women and children.

According to the Centre's record of civilian casualties—killed and wounded—over a ten-year period, a total of **45,270** civilians of all ages, including women, men, and children, were directly victimised by these acts. The table below presents the breakdown of these figures:

Wounded				Killed			
Children	Men	Women	Total	Children	Men	Women	Total
4,348	18,822	3,642	26,812	4,179	11,142	3,137	18,458

The deliberate targeting of civilians and their gathering places caused material damage to homes, public and private property, infrastructure, and economic facilities. The incidents were monitored and documented by the field teams of Yemen Centre for Human Rights and other human rights organisations, as follows:

⁹⁹ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/rome-statute-international-criminal-court>

An Infographic Illustrating Material Damage to Homes, Public and Private Property, Infrastructure, and Economic Facilities



Archaeological
and
Historical Sites

9815



Mosques

1,892



Airports

15



Residential
Buildings

617756



Ports

16



Agricultural
Fields

13,415



Fuel
Stations

524



Media
Facilities

67



Tourism
Facilities

405



Sports
Facilities

149



Schools and
Educational
Centres

1,400



Hospitals
and Health Facilities

436



**Food Storage
Facilities**

1,072



**Water Tanks and
Distribution
Networks**

3,430



**Communication
Networks
and Stations**

659



**Road
and bridge**

8,427



**Power station
and generator**

397



**Commercial
Establishments**

13,771



**University
Facilities**

191



**Fuel
Tankers**

459



Factories

434



**Government
Facilities**

2,257



Markets

718



**Food
Transport
Trucks**

1,308



**Fishing
Boats**

538



Vehicles

11,170



**Poultry
and Livestock
Farms**

499

Second: The Most Atrocious Massacres (Crimes of Killing and Genocide)

The deliberate targeting of civilian-populated areas by the coalition of aggression across various Yemeni governorates on an ongoing basis has left thousands dead and wounded, with no regard for any consequences arising from these crimes. Yemen Centre for Human Rights has documented a large number of the most appalling, heinous, and bloody crimes against civilians, the most notable of which are detailed in the following table.

M	Date	Governorate	Killed				Wounded				Total
			Children	Women	Men	Total	Children	Women	Men	Total	
1	2015-03-30	Hajjah	6	3	33	42	7	11	42	60	102
2	2015-03-31	Ibb	9	3	20	32	7	11	63	81	113
3	2015-03-31	Al-Hudaydah	0	20	45	65	0	25	46	71	136
4	2015-04-15	Sa'dah	9	5	33	47	15	8	75	98	145
5	2015-04-15	Amran	0	0	45	45	11	1	58	70	115
6	2015-04-20	The Capital Sana'a	8	3	73	84	80	69	498	647	731
7	2015-04-20	Hajjah	0	0	24	24	0	0	150	150	174

8	2015-04-21	Hajjah	0	0	26	26	0	0	74	74	100
9	2015-04-27	Aden	5	10	20	35	18	7	72	97	132
10	2015-05-06	Aden	12	13	40	65	10	10	30	50	115
11	2015-05-07	Sa'dah	32	9	12	53	8	6	36	50	103
12	2015-05-11	The Capital Sana'a	15	13	63	91	36	16	389	441	532
13	2015-05-12	Al-Hudaydah	6	7	103	116	14	9	71	94	210
14	2015-05-27	The Capital Sana'a	10	14	30	54	72	73	87	232	286
15	2015-06-07	The Capital Sana'a	0	0	95	95	0	0	360	360	455
16	2015-07-04	Hajjah	12	5	29	46	5	20	61	86	132
17	2015-07-06	Lahij	0	0	84	84	0	0	225	225	309
18	2015-07-07	Hadramawt	0	0	135	135	0	0	160	160	295
19	2015-07-19	Aden	0	0	48	48	0	0	75	75	123
20	2015-07-24	Taiz	23	19	83	125	25	32	93	150	275

21	2015-07-27	Lahij	0	0	70	70	0	0	35	35	105
22	2015-08-10	Abyan	0	0	68	68	0	0	55	55	123
23	2015-08-20	Taiz	15	13	36	64	10	18	25	53	117
24	2015-08-21	Taiz	28	28	14	70	20	20	10	50	120
25	2015-09-19	Sa'dah	25	5	76	106	0	0	35	35	141
26	2015-09-28	Taiz	11	33	20	64	14	32	22	68	132
27	2015-10-01	Sa'dah	32	2	62	96	0	0	35	35	131
28	2015-10-07	Dhamar	22	13	14	49	17	8	45	70	119
29	2015-10-17	Taiz	0	0	65	65	0	0	57	57	122
30	2015-10-22	Al-Hudaydah	0	0	147	147	0	0	85	85	232
31	2015-11-05	The Capital Sana'a	4	8	14	26	36	16	162	214	240
32	2015-12-05	Al-Hudaydah	5	7	36	48	11	4	79	94	142

33	2015-12-29	Taiz	0	0	85	85	0	0	103	103	188
34	2016-03-15	Hajjah	0	0	107	107	0	0	41	41	148
35	2016-09-10	Sana'a Governorate	2	0	25	27	12	0	68	80	107
36	2016-09-21	Al-Hudaydah	13	13	4	30	40	40	20	100	130
37	2016-10-08	The Capital Sana'a	15	0	98	113	18	0	689	707	820
38	2017-03-17	Al-Hudaydah	9	10	25	44	15	20	60	95	139
39	2017-12-26	Taiz	22	22	12	56	18	18	8	44	100
40	2018-08-02	Al-Hudaydah	3	35	17	55	9	90	71	170	225
41	2018-08-09	Sa'dah	41	0	10	51	30	0	49	79	130
42	2019-04-07	Sana'a Governorate	13	0	0	13	50	30	10	90	103
43	2019-09-01	Dhamar	20	20	10	50	40	40	20	100	150
44	2022-01-23	Sa'dah	0	0	91	91	0	0	236	236	327

Third: Evidence of Murder Crimes

- The Killing of Judge Yahya Rubaid – the Capital Sana’a

On 25 January 2016, coalition warplanes targeted the home of Judge Yahya Rubaid in the Al-Nahda residential area of the Capital Sana’a. The airstrike killed Judge Rubaid, eight members of his family, and neighbours and injured several others. This attack was a clear example of a deliberate killing of a civilian figure who had no military significance. The airstrikes completely destroyed Judge Rubaid’s house, as well as 13 nearby homes and several cars parked in the area.

Mohsen Mohammed Rubaid, the judge’s brother, recounts: ‘My house is close to my brother’s. I heard the blast and rushed to his place. I found Yahya lying in the street—he was alive but unconscious. His wife was next to him on the ground, barely alive. We tried to get them both to the hospital, but they passed away shortly after we arrived.’

- The Killing of the Family of Child Buthaina Al-Raimi – the Capital Sana’a

On 25 August 2017, coalition forces launched an airstrike on the Al-Raimi family’s house in the Faj Attan area, southwest of Sana’a city. The attack killed the entire family of eight-year-old *Buthaina*, including her parents, her four sisters, and her only brother. *Buthaina* was the sole survivor of the attack— just one of many crimes committed against Yemeni children since the war began in March 2015.

Later on, *Buthaina* experienced a new kind of tragedy: She and her uncle were abducted by those responsible for her family’s killing, in an apparent attempt to cover up the crime that had drawn global attention and become a stark symbol of the atrocities committed by the coalition countries of aggression against Yemeni children. Through the crime of abduction, Saudi Arabia sought to mask the true ugliness of its actions by attempting to display compassion and mercy towards the child Buthaina and by providing her with medical treatment. However, these fabrications were exposed when Buthaina returned to Yemen on 21 December 2018⁽¹⁰⁰⁾. Yemen Centre for Human Rights played a key role in securing her return.

- The Attack on Mabkhoot Al-Mazrouqi’s Home – Al-Jawf

On the morning of Wednesday, 15 July 2020, coalition warplanes struck the village of Al-Masa’fa (Al-Mazariq), in Al-Hazm District of Al-Jawf Governorate, launching two airstrikes on the home of Mabkhoot

¹⁰⁰ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7vsJNH82Fz0>

Mar'i Al-Mazrouqi. The following day, a team from Yemen Centre visited the site of the attack. Their findings revealed that 18 members of Mabkhoot's family were killed or injured: Eleven people died, including five children and two women, and seven others were injured—six of whom were children and one woman.

According to Mabkhoot, the family had gathered that day to celebrate the passing of one week since the birth of a newborn—a tradition in many parts of Yemen. Tragically, the infant was among the victims and died shortly after being taken to hospital due to the severity of the injuries. Mabkhoot described the scene:

The women and children were sleeping in a small tent we had pitched in the house courtyard. The men were resting in a room attached to the house, while some were sleeping outside next to that room. Others were inside the house. Around 7 am, two missiles hit the area at the same time—one struck the main house and the other hit the room annexed to the house, against whose wall the tent was erected.

During the field visit to the site of the crime to document the incident⁽¹⁰¹⁾, assess its tragic consequences, and hear from witnesses—particularly Mabkhoot Al-Mazrouqi, the homeowner—Yemen Centre's team documented the following:

- The house, including its annexes and contents—such as furniture, personal belongings, and a car parked in the yard—was completely destroyed.
 - Eleven people were killed and seven others wounded, most of them women and children.
 - The targeted home was not in a combat zone, nor was it near any military site. There was no indication that the house had been used for military purposes in any way.
 - Four of the injured were initially taken to Al-Jawf Hospital, then transferred to hospitals in the Capital Sana'a. Three others were moved to a hospital in Ma'rib. Several of the wounded were in critical condition and required intensive care.
- **The Attack on the Home of Ali Hadi Al-Afan – Al-Jawf**

On the morning of Saturday, 15 February 2020, coalition warplanes carried out six consecutive airstrikes on the Al-Hayjah area, in Al-Masloub District of Al-Jawf Governorate. The strikes occurred within a span of

¹⁰¹ <https://ychr.org/reports/870/>

approximately 30 minutes, with 5 to 7 minutes between each raid. The first strike directly hit the home of Ali Hadi Gabish Al-Afan, levelling it with its occupants inside. The second strike targeted the first group of civilians who rushed to help, including two families from the Jakhrah clan who were fleeing their homes.

The third and fourth airstrikes struck two civilian vehicles that had arrived to assist the wounded. One of the cars belonged to Mabrouk Yahya Halsan, who suffered serious injuries to his back and left arm, and whose car was destroyed. His brother, Ameen, miraculously survived. The second car, owned by Hussein Ali Yahya Al-Shahrani, was also hit, killing him and injuring another civilian who was with him.

The fifth airstrike used a highly destructive bomb and targeted members of the Al-Khafran family, who had sought shelter under a tree near their home in an attempt to protect themselves. The blast tore their bodies apart, scattering their remains around the tree. The victims were all children and their mother; only one child survived, but lost a leg.

In a final, sixth brutal airstrike, the coalition targeted the home of Shaje' Ahmed Jakhrah, injuring several members of his family.

These airstrikes culminated in one of the deadliest massacres committed by the Saudi-led coalition against civilians and children in Yemen. The total death toll reached 35 civilians, including 22 children and 7 women. Eighteen others were wounded, including 8 children and 4 women. Two houses, two vehicles, and a motorcycle were destroyed, and four neighbouring homes suffered severe damage⁽¹⁰²⁾.

Fourth: Evidence of Genocide and Attacks on Civilians

- The Crime of Targeting the Bani Hawat Residential Neighbourhood – the Capital Sana'a

After midnight on Thursday, 26 March 2015, the coalition of aggression on Yemen launched its first military attacks in the Bani Hawat residential area north of Sana'a, killing 71 people, the majority of whom were women and children. These victims were the initial victims of a series of genocidal acts against the Yemenis. These crimes have since become a systematic pattern for the coalition of aggression over the ten years that followed.

¹⁰² <https://ychr.org/reports/822/>

Bani Hawat is a working-class neighbourhood made up of dozens of modest, closely situated homes, inhabited by hundreds of Yemenis. Therefore, the attack resulted in the total destruction of numerous houses and vehicles, with many others sustaining significant damage.

According to testimonies from some of the survivors from this crime to different media outlets, neighbourhood residents were shocked by the first strike of the attack at exactly 2:20 am. When they tried to leave the area, they were hit by a second strike. Once they recovered from the shock, the neighbourhood appeared before them, destroyed atop its residents.

Yasser Ali Al-Hubashi, one of the survivors, said that he had not fully comprehend what had happened around him until three days later, when he found himself with his wife in one of the Capital's hospitals, having lost three of his children: Ammar (aged 18), Alaa (aged 14), and Aisha (aged 11). The people who rushed to the neighbourhood to rescue the victims confirmed that most of those pulled from under the rubble had been women and children.

The coalition countries of aggression admitted to the first strike during the initial press conference by the coalition spokesperson, Ahmed Asiri. He stated that the strike had achieved its objectives within the first 15 minutes, without mentioning this crime⁽¹⁰³⁾.

- **The Attan Massacre – the Capital Sana'a**

On Monday, 20 April 2015, at precisely 10:30 am, the coalition countries of aggression carried out an airstrike on Attan Mountain in Al-Sabeen District of the Capital Sana'a. The strike triggered a massive explosion that killed and injured people and caused widespread destruction across the surrounding area. The impact extended up to seven kilometres from the blast site, severely damaging residential, commercial, and governmental properties. Hundreds of homes, firms, offices, shops, public services, schools, hospitals, nurseries, universities, mosques, power lines, streets, and various modes of transport were destroyed.

The toll of the explosion reached 731 victims, including **84 deaths** and **647 injuries**, among them many children and women. The bombing also triggered the displacement of residents from Attan and nearby neighbourhoods to various areas in the capital and other governorates—at least **30,000** people were forced to flee. Some residents whose homes were destroyed were left with no choice but to take shelter in road culverts and stormwater drainage pipes.

103 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ieaMqDXDaYY>

Footage captured by residents at the moment of the blast revealed the sheer scale of the explosion, which was felt throughout Sana'a. The magnitude of the blast and the extent of devastation led many to describe the event as '*Yemen's Hiroshima*'.

- **The Crime of Targeting Al-Tayyib Al-Aidros's Building – Aden**

At 8 am on Monday, 27 April 2015, coalition aircraft targeted Mohammed Al-Tayyib Al-Aidros's building, which was located in Crater District, Aden. The building was targeted with an air strike that resulted in the complete destruction of the building, leading to the deaths of three people and injuries to two others, including women and children.

Ihab Younes Al-Tayyib, an 11-year-old child who survived beneath the rubble, recounts that his family spent a normal night before the bombing, had their Suhoor [pre-dawn meal], and went to sleep. They were awakened at dawn by the cries of his younger sister, Mariam. His mother took her out of the bedroom, while he, his father, and his brother Qasim remained in the room to continue sleeping. He later found himself in the hospital.

Mohammed Qasim Ghulam, the brother of the victim Bushra—Younes's wife—describes the details of the incident in his testimony. He states that when he arrived at the three-storey building, he found it completely destroyed. Together with a group of people, he began the process of retrieving victims from under the rubble. The people first found the three-year-old girl, Mariam, who was almost naked and only wearing a diaper. She was standing on the debris, so they asked her to jump into their arms before taking her to her aunt's house. Mohammed says that after extinguishing the fire that broke out following the attack, they began searching under the rubble. They found the body of Younes, as his body emerged above the debris, while his head was buried beneath it, and they retrieved him lifeless. Then everyone started digging to search for the others and found the child Qasim, who was still breathing. They rushed him to the hospital, but he died there due to a lack of oxygen. Mohammed quickly returned to the crime scene, searching with others for the rest. He began shouting his sister's name (Bushra) in hopes of hearing a response, but instead, he heard her son Ihab's voice crying out, '*I am Ihab, I am Ihab.*' He was pulled out with blood streaming from his head and was taken to the hospital. During the ongoing search, they found the body of the elder Ihab (aged 42), who was Younes's brother. The people there needed a long time and great effort in the digging process until they were able to retrieve Bushra (37 years old), but she was lifeless, holding her Quran.

The so-called '*National Commission for Investigating Allegations of Human Rights Violations*', affiliated with the government supported by the coalition countries of aggression, admitted to this crime, confirming that the perpetrator is the coalition's air forces that control Yemeni airspace⁽¹⁰⁴⁾.

- **The Nuqum Massacre – the Capital Sana'a**

On 11 May 2015, the coalition of aggression bombed Nuqum Mountain, located adjacent to densely populated residential areas in eastern Sana'a. The attack bore a striking resemblance to the earlier Attan bombing. It resulted in **532 casualties**, including **91 fatalities** and **441 injuries**, among them women and children.

With its massive blast, the airstrike caused widespread panic among residents of the capital. It also inflicted significant damage on a large number of houses and civilian facilities. Dozens of homes were entirely destroyed with residents still inside. Several mosques, schools, shops, water tanks, and vital infrastructure—including water, electricity, and telecommunications networks—were also damaged or destroyed. Public buildings (such as the Commercial Court, vocational institutes, and the outpatient clinics of Al-Thawra General Hospital) were among the structures affected. Thousands of civilians were left at risk from the series of secondary explosions that followed the main blast.

- **The Crime of Targeting Old Sana'a – the Capital Sana'a**

The Old City of Sana'a, according to sources, dates back more than 2,500 years. During the 7th and 8th centuries AD, it served as an important centre for spreading Islam. It has preserved a rich heritage and historical landmarks visible in its 6,500 houses, 106 mosques, and 21 hammams, some of which date back to before the 11th century. The houses of Old Sana'a are characterised by their proximity to one another and multi-storey structures built with fired bricks, earning the city a place on the World Heritage List in 1986 as the second Yemeni city to be included.

Despite the cultural and historical legacy of the Old City of Sana'a, it has been repeatedly targeted by several air strikes at different intervals by the coalition countries of aggression.

On 15 June 2015, an air strike targeted the Al-Qasimi Neighbourhood—one of the neighbourhoods in the southwestern part of the Old City of Sana'a. This air strike completely destroyed eight houses and inflicted extensive damage on nearby homes, mosques, and buildings.

104 <https://nciye.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Report-6.pdf>

On the night of Friday, 18 September 2015, the coalition of aggression targeted the Al-Filihi Neighbourhood—one of the neighbourhoods in the Old City of Sana'a—with an air strike that resulted in the destruction of Hifz Allah Al-Ayni's home and the death of 13 people, including 10 members of one family. Furthermore, this air strike caused damage to the historic Al-Filihi Mosque and to about 58 nearby historical and residential buildings, ranging from total to moderate and minor damage.

In the early hours of Saturday, 20 September 2015, the coalition of aggression launched an air strike on the Al-Bakiriyya Neighbourhood, targeting residential buildings and the historic Al-Bakiriyya Mosque. This led to the total destruction of some houses and partial damage to others, along with significant indirect damage to numerous areas of the Old City of Sana'a.

Moreover, the air strikes carried out by the coalition targeting the Attan and Nuqum Mountain areas throughout the years of the aggression have had significant impacts on the homes and mosques of Old Sana'a.

- **The Crime of Targeting the Residential Compounds of Al-Mokha – Taiz**

On the evening of Friday, 24 July 2015, during one of the nights of the Eid Al-Adha, coalition aircraft carried out nine air strikes on the residential area for workers of the steam power station in Al-Mokha, Taiz Governorate, and the surrounding region. This area contains 200 housing units for the workers and their families. The air strikes resulted in the deaths of 125 civilians and injured 150 others with severe wounds; women and children were among the casualties.

The residential area for workers was targeted with six air strikes using high-explosive bombs. The seventh strike hit another housing complex located about one kilometre to the north; it serves as home to some displaced workers. Additionally, two other air strikes targeted those fleeing the city towards the beach. All these attacks resulted in the complete destruction of water tanks and more than 50 housing units, and severe damage to over 120 housing units.

One of the victims, a 25-year-old woman, was rescued from under the rubble, suffering from a shrapnel wound that pierced her abdomen near her unborn child, whom she was carrying during her eighth month of pregnancy. She was taken to the hospital for emergency treatment. Later, she reported, *'On Friday night, my family and I were at home when we suddenly heard the sound of warplanes intensively flying overhead. We did not expect to be the target, but fear and terror overwhelmed us, especially when the aircraft carried out an air strike nearby. We heard a loud explosion that violently shook our flat. At that moment, we felt*

fear and panic. I was screaming in terror, and the entire city was filled with the cries and tears of children and women. Once we confirmed that the strike was near our flat, my family and I attempted to exit the house, but the planes were quicker than we were, returning to bomb the city again four minutes after the initial strike. That was when a shrapnel penetrated our flat wall, and one of the fragments struck me in the abdomen, near my embryo that I was pregnant with.'

In a report released on 28 July 2015, Human Rights Watch stated that the residential compounds in Al-Mokha is a civilian establishment and has not been utilised for military purposes. It found no evidence that the two residential complexes linked to the power station were used for military aims. Indeed, this finding has also been confirmed by other international organisations, such as Amnesty International.

- **The Crime of Targeting Wahaja Wedding – Thubab, Taiz**

On 28 September 2015, the coalition of aggression targeted the wedding camps of Mohammed Ali Besaibes's family—a camp for women and another for men—in Wahaja village between the districts of Thubab and Al-Mokha in Taiz Governorate, with 3 air strikes using high-explosive missiles.

The three air strikes that targeted the two camps resulted in 132 casualties: 64 deaths and 68 injuries, most of whom were children and women.

Mohammed Ali Sa'id Besaibes, the father of the groom and the owner of the house and wedding camp, reported, *'While my son and I were at home, I heard a plane flying very low overhead, and then a loud explosion that shook our house. I quickly ran outside to see the place of the explosion, and I found thick smoke mixed with dust covering the entire area, coming from the men's camp. Meanwhile, my son, the groom, rushed to the women's camp, where women from my family and from our village and nearby villages had gathered with their children. The total number of women, along with their young sons and daughters, was over 120. When my son reached at the women's camp, he yelled and urged them to exit the tent to avoid being hit by the air strikes. Unfortunately, the aircraft carried out a second strike on the women's camp, setting everything inside on fire. I saw body parts of women and children flying everywhere. Some women managed to escape from the camp and save themselves. I, along with the village people, searched for anyone still alive who needed rescue and assistance. Unfortunately, we found nothing but charred bodies and scattered remains everywhere, with pieces of flesh strewn across the area. I lost seven members of my family: my mother, my sister with five of her children, and my disabled nephew Sa'id Mahyoub, who was 19 years old.'*

Rupert Colville, spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR), mentioned this crime during his press conference on 29 September 2015, and stated that reports had shown that the wedding party on the previous day in Wahjah, Taiz Governorate, had been hit by a coalition air strike that killed up to 130 civilians, including a large number of women and children, and injured many others. He added that UNHCR staff in Yemen were working to verify these reports, including the exact details of the casualties, suggesting that if the numbers were as high as suggested, this could be the deadliest incident since the beginning of the conflict.

Dated 4 August 2016, the UNHCR report on the human rights situation in Yemen confirmed that the American-Saudi coalition targeted the wedding camp in the Wahja area. The report stated, *'OHCHR documented attacks by the coalition forces that struck two wedding ceremonies. According to numerous witnesses interviewed and information gathered by OHCHR, 80 civilians, including 32 women and 38 children, were killed and 40 injured as a result of air strikes that hit a wedding ceremony in Al-Mokha District, Taiz Governorate, on 24 September 2015. Witnesses told OHCHR that they heard the loud reverberations of military aircraft flying at low altitudes at about 9. 30 am, followed by the first two missiles, which hit a tent that was hosting the male guests. Moments later, witnesses stated that the tent hosting the female guests, located some 50 metres away, was struck by a third missile. Remnants of the missiles partially destroyed a house located approximately 7 metres away, causing the deaths of two civilians.'*

- **The Sanaban Wedding Crime – Dhamar**

On the evening of 7 October 2015, coalition aircraft targeted a wedding with two air strikes at the home of citizen Saleh Al-Sanbani in the village of Sanban, located east of the city of Dhamar.

The first air strike directly targeted the house, and the second hit the guest tents in the yard, turning the wedding into a mass grave. The attack resulted in the death of 49 people and injured 70 individuals, most of whom were women and children. The air strikes also destroyed the two-storey house and burned the tents and several cars.

Mohammed Ali Al-Sanbani, one of the eyewitnesses, described the incident as a major tragedy and said, *'I saw what I had never seen before in my life. Fire consumed everything in the house and the tents. The rubble of the house fell on the wedding guests. I saw children and women whose bodies were burning; some of them were charred. I saw the three grooms with blood staining their wedding clothes, and one of them had his body burned. We found torn bodies, severed hands and legs, headless corpses, and bodies we could not identify.'*

- The Mustaba Market Crime – Hajjah

The Centre recorded the targeting of dozens of markets in various governorates and areas of Yemen, resulting in the deaths and injuries of hundreds of innocent civilians, including men, women, and children. Among these crimes is the attack by the Saudi-led coalition on the Thursday Market in Mustaba District of Hajjah Governorate. More than 120 people were killed or injured in this crime, which was one of the bloodiest and most brutal acts of genocide.

Video documentation and photographs revealed the brutality of the crime against the civilians who were there during the attacks on 15 March 2016. These attacks targeted the market with two air strikes during peak hours when the area was crowded with citizens, as it is a popular market frequented by most residents of the area for their daily needs.

Due to the two air strikes, the health centre in the governorate issued an urgent call to the Ministry of Health to deploy medical and emergency teams to the hospitals in the districts of Abs and Mustaba to assist the injured individuals. The director of Abs Hospital in Hajjah reported that the hospital received 24 injured individuals—including two women—and that two of them died shortly after arrival⁽¹⁰⁵⁾.

Many UN and international non-governmental organisations issued widespread statements of condemnation following the crime. The United Nations strongly condemned the massacre, describing it as the second deadliest attack in two weeks, and emphasised that any deliberate attack against civilians or civilian targets is strictly prohibited and constitutes a serious violation of international humanitarian law. The statement of condemnation issued by the spokesperson for the Secretary-General called for prompt, effective, independent, and objective investigations into the crime⁽¹⁰⁶⁾.

In a report published by Human Rights Watch on 6 April 2016, the organisation condemned the crime and described it saying, ‘*Saudi Arabia-led coalition air strikes were indiscriminate or foreseeably disproportionate, in violation of the laws of war. Such unlawful attacks when carried out deliberately or recklessly are war crimes.*’ Additionally, the organisation revealed that it conducted on-site investigations on 28 March 2016, and found remnants at the market of a GBU-31 satellite-guided bomb, which consists of a US-supplied MK-84 2,000-pound bomb mated with a JDAM satellite guidance kit, also US-supplied⁽¹⁰⁷⁾.

105 <https://www.yamanyoon.com/?p=32146>

106 <https://www.dw.com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%B1%D9%89-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86/a-19126804>

107 <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/08/yemen-us-bombs-used-deadliest-market-strike>

- The Crime of Targeting the Great Hall – the Capital Sana’a

The Great Hall, located on Al-Khamseen Street in Al-Sabeen District of the Hadda area, was a venue for weddings and public events in the Capital Sana’a, with a capacity of up to 1,000 guests. However, coalition aircraft turned it into ruins, bearing witness to one of the major incidents and the largest massacres committed by the coalition countries against civilians in Yemen.

On 8 October 2016, the Great Hall was crowded with hundreds of Yemenis, including officials, leaders, tribal elders, civilians, and military personnel, who came to offer condolences for the death of Ali Al-Ruwaishan, the father of then-Minister of Interior Jalal Al-Ruwaishan. As it was a humanitarian and social occasion, no one expected that the coalition would target it, especially since the condolence gathering was publicly announced and the invitations were widely shared on social media. As is customary in Yemen, condolence gatherings are open to all men, and condolence gatherings of public figures typically see large crowds, particularly between 3:00 and 4:00 pm, which is considered a peak hour.

At approximately 3:20 pm, the Great Hall was crowded with hundreds of mourners, who were shocked, along with the nearby residents, by the fall of a missile launched by a coalition warplane. About seven minutes later, a second missile struck, targeting paramedics, the wounded, and those who were trapped under the rubble. The attack left behind a bloody scene with corpses, body parts, injured victims, and raging fires⁽¹⁰⁸⁾.

According to a report by the General Administration of Criminal Evidence (in the Capital Sana’a), affiliated with the Ministry of Interior regarding the crime—reviewed by the Centre— fragments of various sizes from the two missiles used in the bombing of the hall were found. One of these fragments bore the following markings and numbers: FORUSE ON MK82 - FIN GUIDED BOMB – 96214 ASSY 837760 – 4, identifying it as an American-made Mark 82 weapon, which is launched from warplanes and comes in a variety of sizes ranging from 81 to 84.

The number of victims of this crime reached 113 killed and 707 wounded individuals. Some of the wounded passed away days, weeks, or months later due to the injuries they sustained. Most of those who died from their injuries succumbed because of the blockade (which affected hospital capabilities), the closure of Sana’a Airport, and the prevention of humanitarian organisation planes from landing to evacuate the wounded. Several individuals were also reported missing.

This toll does not fully represent the actual number of fatalities and injuries, given the tragic circumstances surrounding the horrible crime, such as the complete charring of some bodies and the presence of dozens of mixed body parts belonging to various individuals.

¹⁰⁸ <https://ychr.org/reports/636/>

Initially, the coalition denied committing this massacre. However, after a week, the coalition admitted committing it but held other parties accountable. The Joint Incidents Assessment Team (JIAT), affiliated with the coalition countries of aggression, issued a statement regarding the targeting of the Great Hall in Sana'a on Saturday, 15 October 2016, stating, *'a party affiliated to the Yemeni Presidency of the General Chief of Staff wrongly passed information that there was a gathering of armed Houthi leaders in a known location in Sana'a, and insisted that the location be targeted immediately as a legitimate military target.'* It added, *'The Air Operations Centre in Yemen directed a close air support mission to target the location without obtaining approval from the coalition command to support legitimacy and without following the coalition command's precautionary measures,'* noting that the Air Operations Centre in Yemen directed the aircraft in the area to carry out the mission, resulting in fatalities and injuries among those present at the site⁽¹⁰⁹⁾.

Ammar Al-Jabri, one of the survivors of the massacre (who was the vocalist at the mourning ceremony), said, *'The first group of people came and left, and then the second group came and left, followed by the third, fourth, and fifth groups, and they all exited. Afterwards, the last group of mourners entered the hall, and at that moment, those who remained felt a strong tremor, not knowing at the time that it was the result of a missile strike.'*

Abid Al-Barda, a 31-year-old doctor, stated that he was with his father, nephew, and four brothers inside the hall, waiting for their turn to extend condolences to the family of the deceased when the explosion struck. He continued, *'I couldn't see anyone. There were dust, smoke, and loud screaming. We escaped like the others. The back gate was closed, but we broke it open. When another strike occurred, we were about 20 metres from the Great Hall, and I heard the sound of an aircraft.'*

Abdullah Al-Shami, a 35-year-old businessman whose leg was injured in the attack, said, *'I was sitting inside the hall during the condolence gathering when the air strike happened. After the air strike, I could not see who was next to me, and I was searching for an exit. There were bodies and body parts scattered around, with some people trapped under the rubble. There were children inside before the strike, but I could not see any of them afterwards. I just saw the light and ran towards it to escape.'* He added, *'The second bomb hit those who were trying to enter the building to help the survivors of the first explosion.'*

¹⁰⁹ <https://www.spa.gov.sa/1548643>
<https://www.justsecurity.org/33615/full-text-saudi-led-coalitions-statement-explanation-funeral-hall-bombing-yemen/>

Majed Nofal, the Emergency Operations Officer of the Yemen Red Crescent Society (YRCS), stated, *'The day of the incident was a completely normal day from the early morning hours, but suddenly we received a call from the operations centre of the Ministry of Health, informing us that an explosion caused by a missile attack at the Great Hall in Sana'a had occurred, and people were offering condolences on the death of the Interior Minister's father there.'* He added, *'Fortunately, one of the Red Crescent ambulances was near the scene of the incident, and the Red Crescent team, as they transported the wounded and collected the remains of the dead, was overwhelmed with fear and shock at the magnitude of the incident and the scale of the humanitarian disaster that unfolded that day.'*

Many condemnations were issued regarding this crime, most notably a statement by the United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, who declared that the attack was an air strike carried out by coalition forces. He noted, *'This latest horrific incident demands a full inquiry,'* and described it as *'heartless'* and *'an outrageous violation'* of international humanitarian law. The Secretary-General denounced the crime, saying, *'This was a community centre known to all. It was crowded with families and children.'* He added, *'Excuses ring hollow given the pattern of violence throughout the country'*⁽¹¹⁰⁾.

The UN Special Envoy for Yemen Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed stated, *'Every effort must be made to bring the perpetrators of these atrocious attacks to justice. We have all been deeply moved by the fact that these attacks took place at a time when important progress had been made following prolonged negotiations, while we were working on a permanent agreement'*⁽¹¹¹⁾.

The High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, condemned the attack on the condolence hall, describing it as a disgraceful act. He reiterated his call for an independent international investigation into the alleged violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Yemen, saying that the Commission had to conduct an immediate investigation into the incident and promptly inform the United Nations Human Rights Council of its findings.

Human Rights Watch described this crime as a war crime, and Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East and North Africa director, said, *'After unlawfully attacking schools, markets, hospitals, weddings, and homes*

¹¹⁰ <https://news.un.org/ar/story/2016/10/262132>

<https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/10/542342>

<https://www.voanews.com/a/un-chief-saudi-strike-yemeni-funeral-outrageous-violation/3544277.html>

¹¹¹ <https://www.alalam.ir/news/1871131/%D9%88%D9%84%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%AE-%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%83%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%A1>

over the last 19 months, the Saudi-led coalition has now added a funeral to its ever-increasing list of abuses.’ She added, ‘An independent international investigation of this atrocity is needed as the coalition has shown its unwillingness to uphold its legal obligations to credibly investigate’⁽¹¹²⁾.

The United Nations Security Council’s expert team referenced the crime of the Great Hall in its report [S/2018/193](#), attributing responsibility for this crime to the coalition forces.

- The Crime Targeting Al-Zaidiah Prison – Al-Hudaydah

On 29 October 2016, the coalition of aggression launched three air strikes targeting the central prison buildings in Al-Zaidiah City, in Al-Hudaydah Governorate. The first two air strikes targeted the prison buildings, which housed more than 100 prisoners, while the third strike hit the prison administration building. The air strikes resulted in the deaths of 60 people and wounded 39 others, including two children.

Moreover, the air strikes destroyed three buildings belonging to the prison and caused damage to their facilities. They also destroyed four vehicles used for transporting prisoners and caused extensive damage to the prison mosque.

- The Crime of Targeting the Fish Market, Fishing Port – Al-Hudaydah

On Thursday, 2 August 2018, the coalition forces of aggression targeted the entrance of Al-Thawra General Hospital and the fish market at the Al-Muhawaat fishing port in the city of Al-Hudaydah. This attack resulted in the deaths of 55 people and left 170 others injured, including visitors at the market and the hospital.

An eyewitness says, ‘The first air strike targeted the fishermen, and the second one was in front of the Al-Thawra Hospital, where some people were working on their cars and motorbikes. A bus carrying women on board was hit. They targeted everything—the young, the old, women, government buildings, and even hospitals. They even struck the yard of the hospital, resulting in the death of the hospital cafeteria owner, as well as six or seven motorcyclists. Also, there were dead fishermen.’

Ibrahim Zahir Al-Bahri says, ‘One of the victims at the fish market was working there to help his family make a living while still being a student. After he was injured by coalition aircraft in the first air raid, he was rushed to the Al-Thawra Hospital, where he was met with another missile fired by the aggression aircraft, resulting in his death.’

¹¹² <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/13/yemen-saudi-led-funeral-attack-apparent-war-crime>

- **The Crime of Targeting the Al-Ra'ee School – the Capital Sana'a**

On 7 April 2019, coalition aircraft bombed the residential neighbourhood of Sawan, east of the capital Sana'a, targeting Al-Ra'ee Governmental Girls' School and two adjacent private schools.

This crime resulted in over 100 casualties, including the deaths of 13 female students and injuries to 90 others, most of whom were students. The bombing caused a state of fear and panic among the residents of the area, especially the schoolgirls.

- **The Crime of Targeting the Al-Raqas Residential Area – the Capital Sana'a**

The coalition's air forces launched an air strike that directly targeted the Al-Raqas residential neighbourhood, located at the intersection of Al-Ribat and Al-Raqas Streets, near Mu'adh and Nusaiba schools. This neighbourhood is among the most densely populated areas in the Capital Sana'a. The attack occurred on Thursday, 16 May 2019, claiming the lives of six people, including four children from a single family and two men from another family. It also left 71 others wounded—27 children, 17 women, and 27 men. Among the injured were two Russian women working in healthcare, as well as several Somalis, some of whom were women. More than 15 homes were damaged, along with the two neighbouring schools, an institute, shops, and several vehicles.

The family of Ahmad Al-Hobaishi lost four children in this tragic incident: Siham (aged 16), Wasim (aged 13), Abdulrahman (aged 10 and physically disabled), and Khalid (aged 7). Ahmad Al-Hobaishi and his wife suffered critical injuries.

One of the targeted homes belonged to the President of Yemeni Media Union, Abdullah Sabri. He and all his family members sustained multiple injuries, and he lost his mother and two of his sons, Hasan and Luay. Targeting the home of a civilian journalist is a violation of the protection afforded to journalists and stands in clear breach of all international laws and norms that criminalise the targeting of media personnel in any form.

Baleegh, one of the injured and the son of journalist Abdullah Sabri, described the scene of the attack, saying, *'I closely looked at the scene—the flat was completely destroyed. There were no walls, no ceiling, nothing. I saw my father right in front of me with his leg broken, and he was in pain. My grandmother was on the other side. My brother was unconscious and was not speaking. I heard my mother saying, "Come and see whether your brother will survive; we could not find your other brother. " My father was in front of*

me and still breathing, so I went to check on my other brother. I frantically examined him and detected a faint pulse. I tried to give him first aid, but I could not. Then I returned to my father, wrapped his leg, and went down to the people to ask for help for my father.'

The father of a child named Mohammed, who was among the wounded, said, *'I heard the explosion and woke up in a panic. When I saw the sunlight, I realised that the ceiling had collapsed on me. I took the children to the living room, and when I turned around, I found Mohammed buried beneath the mud and rubble. I picked him up, expecting that he would not survive.'*

After a while, Yemen Centre for Human Rights visited several affected families to assess the psychological impact on children who survived these attacks.

Among the families that suffered harsh impacts as a result of the attack was the Al-Bahri family, with their seven children, one of whom is aged 14 and displays clear and tangible psychological effects in his speech. Since that day, he has been unable to speak normally, suffering from severe stuttering and difficulty in articulating words. Among the family's child victims are two girls aged 10 and 12 who live in constant fear, anxiety, and panic. Additionally, their health remains unstable, especially after their father's death from a series of illnesses that afflicted him for months following the bombing. The girls are now cared for by their elderly paternal grandmother, who injured her legs after falling from a window during the attack.

The Ma'sar family also lost their five-storey home in the attack and now live in a dire humanitarian situation. Their children experience intense fear and panic whenever they hear planes flying overhead.

- The Crime of Targeting the Communications Building – Al-Hudaydah

On 20 January 2022, the coalition of aggression aircraft launched several air strikes on the Communications Building neighbourhood in Al-Hudaydah, targeting the International Gateway for Communications and Internet in Yemen. This resulted in a complete internet outage across the country.

These air strikes led to the deaths of six people, including three children who were playing near the building, and 17 injuries, among them children.

The Crime of Targeting the Pre-Trial Detention Facility – Sa’dah

On 21 January 2022, three successive air strikes carried out by the coalition countries of aggression targeted the pre-trial detention facility in Sa’dah city. The facility was housing over 2,000 detainees, including African detainees. This attack resulted in the deaths of 91 individuals and injuries to 236 others, along with the destruction of the prison buildings and their annexes.

Several organisations and bodies, such as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), visited the prison days before the bombing to verify the conditions of the prisoners.

The ICRC said in a statement, ‘*Facilities used for detention in Sa’dah, Yemen, were hit, killing and injuring over a hundred detainees*’⁽¹¹³⁾.’ The UN Human Rights Office affirmed that there were no indications that the targeted prison in Sa’dah was engaged in military activities. UN Secretary-General António Guterres condemned these attacks, noting that the attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure are banned under international humanitarian law.

- The Crime of Targeting the Plot of the General Authority for Social Insurance and Pensions – the Capital Sana’a

At 5 am on 26 March 2022, coalition aircraft bombed two wooden houses—caravans—on an empty plot belonging to the General Authority for Social Insurance and Pensions in the Capital Sana’a. This plot is separated from the UN residential building by just a wall. The air strikes targeted the residence of the groundskeeper, Akram Abdullah Al-Askeri, who was 27 years old, killing him, his wife (Siham Abdu Jassar, aged 19), and his four-month-old daughter, Batoul. Moments later, the aircraft launched a second strike targeting the residence of the second groundskeeper, Bashir Ghaleb Al-Ezzi, resulting in the deaths of his wife (Amal Abdullah Al-Askeri, aged 30) and his children: Izz Al-Din (aged 15), Hajar (aged 13), Omar (aged 11), and Ahmad (aged 7).

The direct bombing of the two wooden houses resulted in the immediate deaths of both families, as all injuries were to the head, leading to the separation of the head from the body or causing significant shattering of the skull. There were fragments of the wooden houses on the bodies of the deceased. Seven bodies were transported to the Republican Hospital morgue, while the body of the four-month-old girl, Batoul, was taken to the Kuwait Hospital morgue, along with her mother’s severed hand, which was still holding her.

¹¹³ <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/yemen-icrc-expresses-deep-concern-about-human-toll-caused-escalating-violence>

Fifth: Violation of Captives' Rights

Despite the special protections provided by international covenants, including the Third Geneva Convention on the protection of prisoners of war, Yemeni captives have suffered greatly, whether in Saudi and Emirati prisons and detention centres, in prisons established and operated by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi on Yemeni soil, or in several of their military bases located in the neighbouring countries.

- Execution and Torture of Captives

The coalition of aggression and its affiliated armed groups disregarded the most basic levels of international principles and standards in how they deal with Yemeni captives in their prisons and military bases. Additionally, humanitarian considerations were completely ignored in their treatment of these captives, who suffered inhumane and humiliating treatment from the moment of capture, during their transportation to detention locations, and throughout their detention periods. Furthermore, there have been numerous cases where captives were executed by being thrown from high places, buried alive, or subjected to dragging and shooting.

During the years of the aggression, several cases of captive executions were observed, with perpetrators filming and sharing them on social media, while other cases were recorded by the National Committee for Prisoner Affairs. Some of these cases include the following:

- In July 2017, four captives belonging to the Yemeni Army and Popular Committees were executed in Mawza' District, Taiz, through shooting, slaughtering, and throwing from high mountains, and their bodies were mutilated.
- In August 2017, the captive Abdul Qawi Al-Jubari was buried alive in Mawza' District, west of Taiz Governorate.
- In July 2018, the captive Ali Mohammed Ali Saleh Al-Sunman, one of the members of the Yemeni Army and Popular Committees, was executed in the Alab crossing in Baqim District, Sa'dah, as he was thrown from a mountaintop after a barrage of bullets had been fired at him.
- In November 2021, ten captives from the Yemeni Army and Popular Committees were executed by shooting at the West Coast—Ali Ahmed Hamoud Jahaf, Said Abdul Karim Ali, Ramzi Khalid Qasim, Adnan Ali Dabwan, Fadl Bahiji Hassan Nakhly, Taha Mohammed Jaber Hindi, Yusuf Yaqub Mohammed Al-Hatimi, Abdullah Sharaf Al-Habali, Hasan Mohammed Al-Hasani, and Mohammed Abdullah Abdullah Al-Ahdal.
- In March 2022, Saudi Arabia executed two captives: Hakim Al-Bataini and Haidar Al-Shudhani—members of the Yemeni Army and Popular Committees.

. Accounts from Inside Captives' Detention Facilities

The methods of mistreatment and torture used against captives by members affiliated with the coalition forces were numerous. These included beating on the back, head, feet, and all body parts with hands and electric wires, restraining their movements with iron chains and shackles weighing more than a kilogram, suspending them in the air, depriving them of sleep and rest, administering electric shocks, and threatening to harm their families by targeting them with air strikes. Captives were also terrorised through mock executions, subjected to loud noises and foul odours, placed in solitary confinement in narrow cells, insulted with obscene and degrading language, threatened with slaughter, and beaten during interrogations with a blindfold. Some captives were burned with gasoline, while others were given powders or substances in their food or drink, causing severe pain, stomach cramps, and diarrhoea, or were injected with unknown drugs or substances. Captives also endured insufficient and unsanitary food and severe overcrowding in detention cells, where each cell contained 30 detainees. Also, access to the toilet was restricted with fixed times that did not meet their needs. Additionally, they were prohibited from reading the Quran collectively.

Mohammed Yahya Hussein Al-Tinah, from Dhamar Governorate and one of the captives who spoke about the harsh conditions they endured in a prison in Lahij Governorate, said, *'We were 75 people crammed into a 4x5-metre room. Sweat was pouring like water and seeping out from under the door. There was no ventilation, no fan—nothing. They added carbon to the water to increase the room temperature, irritate our eyes, and cause tears to stream down. This form of torture resulted in our bodies becoming entirely swollen.'* This prison lacks any humanitarian standards and is under Emirati control, led by individuals known as Hamdi Shukri and Aref Shukri, who are affiliated with the UAE, according to Al-Tinah's testimony. Mohammed Al-Tinah confirms that he has developed several chronic illnesses and lost some of his senses, stating, *'I developed diabetes, high blood pressure, heart problems, nerve damage, and impaired vision. In the final days, they even stopped giving me aspirin just to increase my suffering.'*

Mustafa Al-Naami—one of the captives who entered the prison with both legs but came out with only one, after being sold to Saudi military units—said, *'Yemeni mercenaries handed us over to the Saudis, who started to interrogate, beat, and slap us.'*

Mustafa was taken captive while injured, but was not given first aid. Rather, he was directly carted off to prison, where he remained for months without any notable medical care. His injured left leg was amputated, even though it could have been treated. He recounted, *'I asked them to take me to another hospital, but they did not do anything for me. Then they moved me to a third hospital. When I woke up, my leg was*

already amputated. I asked them why they amputated it, and they replied, “Just like that.” The bullet was in my leg, yet they amputated it from the knee. It did not need to be amputated. They performed the amputation without my consent, without a signature, and against my will—they did that out of malevolence.’

• A Journey Behind Bars

A Journey Behind Bars is a novel written by Amir Al-Din Jahaf, one of those who were captured in Ma’rib prisons while travelling abroad for his studies. Jahaf shared the accounts of other captives he encountered during his time in various detention centres, describing the conditions as follows, *‘An outbreak of disease spread through the prison. Lice appeared in clothes, along with strange fleas. Boils began to appear on the thighs, pubic area, and genitalia, eventually developing into pus-filled sores. This outbreak spread widely among all inmates. We lacked hygiene and sunlight. We could not sleep, sit, or rest properly. We became nothing but skin and bones, and because of the itching, we longed for even a moment of sleep.’*

While describing his suffering in the detention centres in Ma’rib prisons, Jahaf recounts the condition of some captives who were captured on the frontlines. Many of them were captured while injured. Describing their state, Jahaf says, *‘There was an individual who was shot in the head, another who lost an eye, and another who had his intestines torn apart. There was no medicine, and on top of that, they were subjected to torture, beatings, and mistreatment.’*

Ra’i Al-Akbari, from Haraz District in Sana’a Governorate, spoke in the novel about what was happening in the Political Security Prison regarding the practices of the prison officials, led by ‘Abu Qasha’, who used the most despicable and violent forms of torture against the detainees simply because he knew they possessed a pen with which they wrote prayers. He stripped them of their clothes and beat them. He even made four captives lie on top of four others and ordered them to roll over, and then ordered them to do that again in reverse. Moreover, he ordered some captives to walk on other captives lying on the ground. He then stripped those who walked on the lying captives to repeat the same process on them; then he drew his dagger, ignited it with a lighter until it turned red, and placed it on their genitals, causing burns.

Ibrahim Al-Mahtouri, a young man not yet in his twenties from Al-Mahabishah District in Hajjah Governorate, was captured at the Midi front and spent many months in the prisons of Khamis Mushait in Saudi Arabia. In the novel, Jahaf recounts the suffering of Al-Mahtouri and the other captives inside the prison, where their legs were tied behind a metal grate. The prisoners were monitored by surveillance cameras, and each individual was prohibited from speaking even to his fellow captives: If one of them spoke, Saudi soldiers would enter and beat him. They also faced beatings during nighttime interrogations.

Ghaleb Al-Ansi, from Al-Jawf Governorate, was captured while injured on the front lines, suffering from festering wounds on his chest. While in captivity, the prison staff would suspend him by his wrists and beat him with iron whips and cables until his skin peeled off; then they would pour salt on his wounds to intensify his pain even further.

In his novel, Jahaf mentions some of the brutal torture practices inflicted by the gaolers on the captives as he personally witnessed some of these practices and accompanied several of those victims. These practices include the following:

- pulling out fingernails and using electric shocks on the areas of the removed nails during interrogations;
- hitting the head with a thick iron rod, beating with a metal chain, and tying a 5-litre empty bottle to the testicles while gradually filling the bottle;
- employing the rotisserie method by inserting a stick behind the knees, placing the captive on two barrels, tying their hands behind their back, and spinning them like a rotisserie chicken;
- neglecting wounds until maggots began to appear;
- selling captives to Emiratis and Saudis;
- beating the elderly and stepping on them until they defecate;
- beating, dragging, and stepping on heads until noses break;
- whipping captives' backs with cables;
- denying treatment for any illnesses, leading some captives to die from diseases like diarrhoea; and
- beating captives who were suffering from cholera.

- **Air Strikes on the Captives' Detention Sites**

Although the coalition forces were aware in advance and were continuously notified by the ICRC that these sites are designated as captives' detention facilities, air strikes repeatedly targeted these sites.

On 13 December 2017, the Saudi-led coalition launched 12 air strikes on the prisoner detention facility at the Military Police Camp in Sana'a. The attack resulted in the deaths of over 31 captives, injuries to 32 others, and the escape of 45 captives.

In August 2019, the coalition air strikes killed several captives captured at the Kitaf front, while being transported to the sites designated for their detention. These air strikes targeted the captives' transport truck on the public road.

At midnight on 1 September 2019, coalition fighter jets struck multiple buildings used as detention facilities for captives at the Community College in Dhamar Governorate with 14 missiles. One of the buildings—a concrete structure with several floors and a basement—had been prepared to accommodate and detain combatant prisoners fighting for coalition forces. The building housed 179 captives.

The National Committee for Prisoner Affairs announced that the detainees in this facility were part of a swap agreement according to the Sweden Agreement of 2018 and that 50 of them were supposed to reunite with their families, but the exchange did not take place. According to rescue teams, more than 100 corpses were retrieved from under the rubble of the building that was destroyed during the attacks that night, with dozens remaining under the debris until the next day.

The building was bombed despite the fact that the ICRC knew it was a detention centre for captives and had visited it several times, according to the mission's statement⁽¹¹⁴⁾.

Yemen Centre for Human Rights visited the crime scene and met with several of the injured individuals at Dhamar General Hospital. Yahya Baalawi, one of the guards, recounted that he had been stationed at the main gate of the building when he heard aircraft flying overhead, striking the site where the captives were located, followed by a second strike on an adjacent building and a third strike on the wall, after which he fell into a coma, suffering a broken hand and leg.

Abdul Aleem Al-Qabati, one of the captives, reported, *'Around midnight or a quarter-hour earlier, I was in one of the cells with around a hundred other prisoners. After we finished reading the Quran, the air strike hit, and the debris fell on me. I was rescued before dawn, and I sustained injuries to my head, leg, and back'*⁽¹¹⁵⁾.

- Negotiations Regarding Captives

The National Committee for Prisoner Affairs has been actively following up on the prisoner file, working to secure their release and protect them from the inhumane practices carried out by the forces of the coalition of aggression and their mercenaries. Over the past period, the Committee has made progress in this file through agreements with the United Nations or through local exchange deals. Key developments regarding the captives are as follows:

114 <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/yemen-scenes-devastation-every-single-detainee-either-killed-or-injured-attack>

115 <https://ychr.org/reports/536/>

- By March 2023, a total of 6,272 captives were freed, including 1,382 through the United Nations and 4,890 through local transactions.
- In April 2023, as part of the 'Ramadan Deal', 706 prisoners were exchanged for 186 others under the supervision of the UN and the ICRC.
- A total of 129 cases of captive executions inside detention centres has been documented, including those who died from torture or medical neglect.
- 200 cases of captives sold to the Saudi and Emirati regimes have been confirmed, despite being captured on domestic battlefronts. They were later freed through exchange deals.
- The National Committee for Prisoner Affairs participated in more than ten rounds of negotiations throughout the past years.
- The release of hundreds of prisoners from the mercenaries of the coalition countries of aggression took place as part of humanitarian initiatives, the latest being the release of 153 captives in January 2025.

Over the past years, the coalition countries of aggression obstructed more than 20 prisoner exchange agreements, which had been agreed upon by local parties and were supposed to result in the release of more than 10,000 captives from both sides of the conflict.

Sixth: Forcing Individuals to Serve in the Ranks of the Forces of the Coalition of Aggression

[The Hague Regulations of 1907](#) prohibit forcing nationals of an opposing party to participate in military operations directed against their own country, even if they had been serving that warring party before the outbreak of war. Article 147 of [Geneva Convention \(IV\)](#) emphasises that compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power constitutes a grave breach.

Regardless, Saudi Arabia, as the leader of the aggression coalition against Yemen, arrested dozens of Yemenis seeking work in its territories and forcibly transferred them to recruitment camps to fight on the border fronts on behalf of the Saudi army⁽¹¹⁶⁾.

116 <https://euromedmonitor.org/en/article/2238/Saudi-Arabia:-Expulsion-and-deportation-of-thousands-of-Yemenis-a-human-rights-violation>

Seventh: Targeting Civilian and Protected Objects

Over the past ten years, the military attacks carried out by the coalition of aggression have targeted all civil, cultural, and historical objects. The blockade practices imposed by the coalition have inflicted severe damage on several service facilities that international law prohibits disrupting or harming in any way. According to international law, targeting these objects constitutes a war crime because of their crucial role in civilians' daily lives and the essential material and moral services they provide. These include facilities that supply food and fuel, hospitals, schools, food storage facilities, water networks and reservoirs, electricity and communication stations and networks, and other infrastructure known in international treaties and agreements as '*civilian objects*'. This also includes structures or buildings linked to the population's culture, religious beliefs, and history, such as archaeological landmarks, places of worship, museums, and other objects recognised in international conventions as '*historical and cultural objects*'.

- Destroying Civilian Objects and Targeting Resources and Service Facilities

The scale of the tragedy and humanitarian catastrophe resulting from ten years of aggression against Yemen is no longer hidden. During this period, all infrastructure and service facilities came under constant attacks, resulting in the destruction of hundreds of facilities. The comprehensive blockade and the looting of strategic resources have rendered the remaining facilities incapable of providing services, particularly those reliant on petroleum imports, such as hospitals, fuel stations, electricity plants, and water networks.

The infrastructure and service facilities have become non-functional, and the sectors providing public services have collapsed, as the coalition countries of aggression continue to obstruct the entry of basic necessities and commercial imports, plunder resources, halt salary payments, print new currency without financial backing, and engage in other inhumane practices. This has led to the failure of all service sectors and significant losses across various sectors, resulting in more than 27.4 million people being deprived of access to the most basic services.

To starve civilians, the Saudi-led coalition has persistently and deliberately targeted key sources of food security, comprising various sectors on which Yemenis rely to meet their essential needs for food and water.

• **Losses and Damages to the Oil and Mineral Sector**

The operations of the coalition of aggression have primarily focused on targeting this vital sector, leading to severely affecting all other service sectors. The coalition countries of aggression have systematically attacked the main facilities and subsidiary units in the oil sector, seizing control of oil production fields in Shabwah, Ma'rib, and Aden and looting their reserves and revenues.

Over the past ten years, the aggression has inflicted severe damage to the Ministry of Oil and Minerals' units, resulting in damages exceeding \$60 billion, while total losses across various oil sectors have exceeded \$100 billion⁽¹¹⁷⁾.

According to the report from the Ministry of Oil and Minerals dated 27 March 2021, losses have affected numerous companies and entities within the sector, including the oil and gas companies and their affiliated facilities, the Oil and Minerals Investment Company, the Oil Refining Company (Ma'rib Refinery), Yemen General Oil and Gas Corporation, the Geological Survey and Mineral Resources Authority, the Seismic Monitoring Centre, the Petroleum Training Centre, and the General Office of the Ministry. Yemen Gas Company incurred losses of \$4.4 billion; the Petroleum Exploration Authority incurred losses of \$19 billion; the Seismic Monitoring Centre, located in Dhamar, incurred losses of \$5 billion; and the Liquefied Natural Gas Sector incurred losses of \$14 billion.

The coalition of aggression persisted in looting Yemen's crude oil, which amounted to 29,692,000 barrels in 2019, valued at \$2.3 billion. In 2020, the looted quantity reached 31,620,000 barrels, worth \$2.02 billion. From 2018 to 2020, the total value of Yemeni crude oil deposited in Saudi Arabia's National Commercial Bank amounted to \$5.62 billion.

• **Losses and Damages to the Agricultural and Livestock Sector**

According to the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation in September 2022, the total losses in the agriculture sector amounted to \$111.28 billion. The direct losses and damages accounted for \$7.48 billion, while the indirect losses and damages reached \$103.80 billion⁽¹¹⁸⁾.

117 <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3230857.htm>

118 <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3201187.htm>

• Losses and Damages to the Water Resources and Sewage Sector

Over the past ten years, the networks, reservoirs, systems, and pumping stations for both water and sewage have been continuous targets for the coalition of aggression, negatively impacting the performance of this sector and diminishing its ability to provide water and sewage services in urban and rural areas.

According to the 2023 statistics from the Ministry of Water and Environment, the total direct losses in the water sector reached 406 billion rials. A total of 1,344 facilities were damaged due to the aggression. 989 of these facilities were completely destroyed and 499 were partially damaged⁽¹¹⁹⁾.

According to 2021 report from the Ministry of Water and Environment, the coalition of aggression's air strikes completely destroyed 412 facilities belonging to the Water Resources Authority, with estimated losses of 3.26 billion rials. Also, these air strikes caused partial damage to other facilities, resulting in losses estimated at 825.05 million rials, as direct attacks destroyed most of the infrastructure of the water sector and its branches in the governorates.

Direct attacks were focused on targeting and bombarding the central water reservoirs. One such instance was the complete destruction of the water tank in the Nahdin area in the Capital Sana'a, which had a construction cost of \$4 million and a storage capacity of 5,000 cubic metres. As of the end of March 2021, the losses incurred in the water and sewage infrastructure in the capital and the water agencies and institutions in all governorates amounted to 65.68 billion rials. Furthermore, the attacks destroyed 410 water-quality monitoring stations for climate, rainfall, and groundwater, leading to losses of 3.23 billion rials. The rural water facilities were among the most affected, with 79 facilities completely destroyed, leading to losses of 5.71 billion rials. Additionally, 37 facilities sustained partially damage, amounting to losses of 2.71 billion rials⁽¹²⁰⁾.

• Losses and Damages to the Fisheries Sector

During the period of the aggression, the losses in the fisheries sector exceeded \$14.46 billion, due to attacks on fishermen, the marine environment, and the infrastructure of the fishing sector. Additionally, there was extensive destruction of boats and fishing gear, a cessation of investment projects, losses in fish stocks due to illegal fishing, and a decrease in revenues and fees owed to the state from traditional fishing, commercial activities, and services associated with the sector.

119 <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3230836.htm>

120 All the figures and indicators mentioned were included in the statement of the Ministry of Water and Environment in March 2021—presented in the Arabic language.

Coalition warships and aircraft conducted 80 direct assaults on islands, fishing harbours, and fish landing centres across 53 maritime areas. These attacks caused the deaths and injuries of 491 fishermen, destroyed 476 fishing boats, and led to the seizure of 173 boats by mercenaries. Additionally, dozens of fishermen were abducted, tortured, and killed, with some still missing today⁽¹²¹⁾.

Since the onset of the aggression and the blockade, the fisheries sector in the Red Sea has suffered financial losses of \$12.65 billion. The total damages inflicted on fishing infrastructure due to systematic bombing and destruction have reached \$9.45 million, while losses in boats and fishing equipment amount to \$6.27 million. Furthermore, the ongoing aggression, unjust blockade, and imposed restrictions over the past ten years have resulted in a decline in fish production, which led to major losses amounting to \$3.61 billion, and halted investment projects have incurred losses totalling \$2 billion⁽¹²²⁾.

• Losses and Damages to the Health Sector

Up to March 2025, the coalition's strikes and the persistent blockade led to the deaths of 66 medical professionals, including doctors, specialists, and health assistants. Additionally, more than 50% of healthcare facilities were rendered non-operational, and over 539 health facilities, as well as a pharmaceutical factory and two medical oxygen production plants, were either completely or partially destroyed. Moreover, 100 ambulances were attacked while carrying out humanitarian rescue missions⁽¹²³⁾.

Until 2023, nearly 98% of medical equipment has become worn out and difficult to maintain due to the blockade imposed by the coalition countries. The coalition has continued to prevent and obstruct the entry of medical equipment and medications needed to treat various chronic diseases. A total ban was imposed on the entry of radiological solutions and medicines, as well as 362 types of essential drugs, including blood derivatives, anaesthetics, immunosuppressants, and others.

The coalition's actions, which caused the salaries of civil servants (including healthcare workers) to be cut off—an act that constitutes a war crime—have led to the total collapse of the health sector.

These crimes and practices against the healthcare sector have led to a significant spread of epidemics amid the aggression and blockade. In fact, 4 million people have been reported to be suffering from diarrhea and cholera; 22,000 children from measles; 7,000 from dengue fever; and 1.2 million from malaria⁽¹²⁴⁾.

121 <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3231529.htm>

122 <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3218500.htm>

123 <https://moh.gov.ye/en/news/3618>

124 https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3231669.htm?file_id=1

• **Losses and Damages to the Transportation Sector**

From March 2015 to March 2024, the direct and indirect damages and losses resulting from the aggression and blockade in the land, sea, and air transportation sectors totalled \$13.64 billion. The losses incurred by the air transport sector, represented by the Civil Aviation and Meteorology Authority and Yemenia and Al Saeeda Airways, amounted to \$6.91 billion. Meanwhile, within the maritime transport sector, the Yemen Red Sea Ports Corporation incurred losses amounting to \$3.31 billion, while the General Authority for Maritime Affairs lost approximately \$2.43 billion. Furthermore, the losses in the land transport sector, represented by the General Authority for Regulating Land Transport and the Local Corporation for Land Transport, totalled \$999.87 million⁽¹²⁵⁾.

• **Losses and Damages to the Telecommunications Sector**

The preliminary financial losses sustained by the telecommunications and postal sector due to the military aggression and blockade exceeded \$10.93 billion.

During the ten years of aggression, the aggression has systematically targeted and destroyed 1,106 civilian telecommunications and postal facilities in over 2,760 air strikes, resulting in the deaths of more than 79 workers in the telecommunications and information technology sector. In addition, 706 facilities were completely destroyed, and an additional 400 suffered severe partial damage. The aggression also led to the closure and suspension of services in more than 862 telecommunications and postal facilities, isolating over 114 Yemeni villages and towns from the world.

The aggression deliberately prevented the reactivation of destroyed telecommunications stations and sites and thwarted the restoration of communications service in affected areas. This was achieved by either continuing to ban civilian telecommunications equipment and systems from entering Yemen or repeatedly targeting sites that had been restored to service. Moreover, the use of submarine internet cables was also prohibited.

Not a single mail message has reached Yemen since 2016 as the aggression continues to shut down air, land, and sea ports for postal services⁽¹²⁶⁾.

On 20 January 2022, coalition aircraft carried out multiple air strikes on the telecommunications building neighbourhood in the city of Al-Hudaydah, targeting Yemen's International Gateway for Telecommunications and the Internet. This led to a complete internet outage across the country.

¹²⁵ <http://www.yemen-nic.info/crimes/detail.php?ID=77579>

¹²⁶ <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3230889.htm>

The war on Yemen destroyed more than 35% of the infrastructure of the telecommunications and information technology sector through over 2,770 airstrikes, leaving more than 120 Yemeni villages and towns cut off from the rest of the world⁽¹²⁷⁾.

• **Losses and Damages to the Electricity and Energy Sector**

As of August 2022, the total losses in the electricity sector due to the aggression and blockade reached \$23.79 billion. Additionally, this sector was targeted with 278 air strikes from the aggressor's aircraft, resulting in 83 deaths and 300 injuries⁽¹²⁸⁾.

• **Losses and Damages to the Education Sector**

Since the beginning of the aggression, the number of damaged educational facilities has reached 3768: 435 facilities have been completely destroyed, while 1,578 facilities sustained partial damage; moreover, the aggression has led to the closure of 756 schools, with 999 others being repurposed as shelters for displaced individuals. This has affected approximately 2 million students across the country⁽¹²⁹⁾.

Regarding higher education, the estimated cost of direct damages, as of March 2022, amounted to 188.61 billion rials, while the estimated cost of indirect damages reached 471.95 billion rials⁽¹³⁰⁾.

As for technical and vocational education, the losses exceeded \$1.5 billion by September 2022. Air strikes have targeted 68 training institutes and community colleges nationwide⁽¹³¹⁾.

• **Losses and Damages to the Tourism Sector**

The tourism sector has suffered significant losses, estimated at over \$8 billion as of March 2023. The aggression led to the destruction and damage of more than 473 tourist sites and landmarks, as well as the closure of 543 travel agencies. Additionally, the aggression resulted in the layoffs of 95% of tourism sector workers and the loss of more than 15,000 job opportunities within tourism establishments⁽¹³²⁾.

127 <https://www.21sep.net/280030>

128 <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3200731.htm>

129 <https://e-learning-moe.edu.ye/>

130 <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3181459.htm>

131 <https://althawrah.ye/archives/766243>

132 <https://www.alalam.ir/news/6569398/%D8%AE%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B2-%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%AB%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86-8-%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B1>

• Losses and Damages to the Media Sector.

Over the past ten years of aggression and blockade, the media sector has suffered extensive losses and damages, totalling more than 134 billion Yemeni rials. The sector has also lost some of its cadre: Over 350 media professionals were killed, including 47 from the national media and 290 from the military media⁽¹³³⁾.

On 16 May 2019, the aggression targeted the Ministry of Information building with three air strikes, causing severe damage to the building and its facilities and rendering it non-operational. The material losses incurred by the ministry were estimated at 6 billion Yemeni rials. The aggression also caused the suspension of television and radio broadcasts of national media through satellites and resorted to cloning and forging official TV channels, radio stations, and the Yemen News Agency (SABA).

The total losses and damages to the facilities, buildings, and premises of Yemen General Corporation for Radio and Television reached 15.18 billion Yemeni rials. The bombing completely destroyed the Sa'dah Radio building and the Saba TV building and inflicted damage on the buildings of Al-Eman TV and Yemen TV.

Regarding the Yemen News Agency (SABA), its losses in facilities, buildings, and equipment exceeded 3 billion Yemeni rials. The losses incurred by Al-Thawra Press and Publishing Corporation exceeded 360 million Yemeni rials. As for the Al-Jumhuriya Press, Printing, and Publishing Corporation, its newspaper ceased publication after its headquarters in Taiz were looted; its contents were burned; and its printing press, as well as technical and office equipment, were stolen. The corporation's material losses are estimated to amount to more than 30 billion Yemeni rials.

The losses and damages were not limited to official media alone; private media outlets were also targeted. Three buildings related to the media sector were destroyed in Sa'dah, along with 11 radio transmission stations in various governorates, incurring losses exceeding 819 million rials. The building and equipment of Al-Masirah TV's office in Sa'dah were bombed and destroyed, with material losses estimated at over 600 million rials. Additionally, Yemen Today TV building in the Capital Sana'a, was bombed and destroyed, resulting in total losses exceeding 4.2 billion rials.

133/ <https://althawrah.ye/archives/818866>

• **Losses and Damages to the Judiciary**

Over the years of aggression, the initial financial damage to the facilities and buildings of the judiciary has reached more than 4.6 billion Yemeni rials. The air strikes carried out by the coalition of aggression have destroyed 49 judicial facilities across 15 governorates. 21 of these facilities were completely destroyed, and 28 were partially destroyed⁽¹³⁴⁾.

- **Destroying Cultural, Historical, and Religious Objects**

Although they are protected under international laws, the cultural objects that represent Yemen's historical and archaeological cultural heritage have been a primary target of systematic bombing and destruction by the coalition of aggression and its mercenaries. Given Yemen's rich history, in which various ancient and Islamic civilisations were built throughout the ages, at least tens of thousands of its buildings are classified as archaeological and historical. However, most of these buildings have suffered damage due to the aggression.

In fact, it is evident that the systematic targeting of cultural sites that are archaeological and historical—which is committed by the coalition of aggression through air strikes—cannot be random, as the coalition possesses advanced aircraft capable of precisely identifying targets. Furthermore, the coalition has used terrorist organisations (ISIL and Al-Qaeda) to bomb and loot many of these sites, landmarks, and facilities. This systematic targeting is classified as a war crime under international agreements and conventions.

Over the course of ten years, the number of targeted sites and landmarks that are fully or partially damaged has reached 9,815 archaeological and historical sites and landmarks: 63 sites that contain three locations inscribed on the World Heritage List (Old Sana'a, Shibam Hadramawt, and Zabid) and 9,752 landmarks, including 105 mosques and shrines and 9 museums.

Some artefacts have been looted and smuggled out of the country. The number of Yemeni artefacts displayed and sold in international auctions from the beginning of the aggression to August 2022 reached 2,610 pieces⁽¹³⁵⁾.

¹³⁴ **Source: Ministry of Justice, March 2021—in the Arabic language.**

¹³⁵ <https://hudhud.org/?p=288>

Eighth: The Attack on Employees and Private Assets Related to Humanitarian Assistance

International humanitarian law protects humanitarian workers who provide relief and protection to populations at risk during armed conflicts, considering them as civilians⁽¹³⁶⁾. Moreover, it also protects the medical facilities and humanitarian aid objects, even if they are not marked or their geographic locations are not shared with the conflict parties. However, the states of the coalition of aggression have repeatedly targeted humanitarian personnel and aid objects.

Since March 2015 and up until February 2019, Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) facilities were hit by five air strikes carried out by coalition forces. Among these incidents were the destruction of Haydan Hospital in Sa'dah Governorate by an air strike carried out by the coalition on 27 October 2015, the bombing of a health centre in Taiz on 3 December 2015⁽¹³⁷⁾, and the attack on the organisation's cholera treatment centre in Abs, Hajjah Governorate, on 11 June 2018⁽¹³⁸⁾.

Given the absence of security in areas under the control of the coalition of aggression, cases of assaults and abductions of humanitarian aid workers and attacks on humanitarian organisations have been recurrent over the years of aggression. Among these incidents is the fact that three humanitarian organisations were attacked in Al-Dhale' Governorate in December 2019⁽¹³⁹⁾. Additionally, on 13 February 2022, the United Nations reported that five staff members were kidnapped in southern Yemen while returning to Aden after a field mission⁽¹⁴⁰⁾.

136 <https://guide-humanitarian-law.org/content/article/3/humanitarian-and-relief-personnel/>

137 <https://www.msf.org/msf-supported-hospital-bombed-yemen-death-toll-rises-six>

138 <https://www.msf.org/report-bombing-msf-facility-unacceptable-and-contradictory-abs-yemen>

139 <https://news.un.org/ar/story/2019/12/1046011>

140 <https://www.france24.com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7/20220213-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%AE%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B8%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86>

Ninth: Forced Displacement and Eviction

The operations of forced displacement and eviction constitute a violation of international human rights law and international humanitarian law. Since the onset of the aggression, many civilians in the governorates controlled by the coalition countries of aggression have faced arbitrary detention and forced displacement under various pretexts.

One of the most notable instances is the forced displacement of the Al-Rumeima and Al-Junaid families in the year 2015 and 2016, following attacks on their villages in Taiz Governorate driven by sectarian motives.

The so-called '*Security Belt Forces*', affiliated with the coalition countries of aggression, executed various retaliatory assaults on civilians from the northern governorates who were living in Aden, after detaining, assaulting, harassing, and forcibly displacing them to areas outside of Aden⁽¹⁴¹⁾.

Tenth: Illegal Detention and Hostage-Taking

Enforced disappearance of persons is classified as a crime against humanity. It means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorisation, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organisation, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time⁽¹⁴²⁾.

The abduction and arrest of civilian travellers continued in areas controlled by the coalition countries of aggression, particularly in the city of Ma'rib. These operations targeted those forced to travel through these areas because of the circumstances imposed by the coalition after all essential access points were shut down, foremost of which is Sana'a International Airport, the main artery that connects millions of Yemenis to the outside world.

141 <https://www.dw.com/ar/%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%86/a-50041840>

142 <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/rome-statute-international-criminal-court>

Since 26 March 2015, many civilians have been kidnapped and subjected to enforced disappearance at the hands of groups affiliated with the coalition of aggression.

- **Mohammed Salba**

Mohammed Salba, who is a businessman, was abducted on 16 June 2016 from the Al-Falaj checkpoint in Ma'rib while on his way to the Shahin border crossing for customs clearance, despite the fact that he was not affiliated with any political faction and only working in trade. Salba was kidnapped along with a relative, and 350 thousand Saudi riyals he had in his possession were looted, along with all of his personal items. He was held behind bars for more than 3 years, during which he was subjected to the most horrific types of torture. After his release, Salba detailed the abuses taking place in the mercenaries' prisons in Ma'rib, including the torture of prisoners, beatings of the elderly, electric shocks, nail extraction, and he brutal torture of travelling prisoners, the wounded, and captives, carried out without mercy or compassion⁽¹⁴³⁾.

- **Mustafa Al-Mutawakel**

Mustafa Al-Mutawakel, PhD, is an academic figure who was kidnapped on 27 April 2017, specifically from the Al-Falaj area, Ma'rib, while returning from Morocco after participating in the annual conference for investment authorities, as he was the head of the General Investment Authority in Sana'a. After he arrived at Seiyun Airport and took the bus that took him to Sana'a, armed elements abducted him from the bus and took him to an unknown location. They even prevented his family from visiting or communicating with him until the writing of this report⁽¹⁴⁴⁾.

- **Khalil Al-Jaradi**

Pharmacist Khalil Al-Jaradi was kidnapped and imprisoned after travelling from Sana'a with his family to settle in the city of Ma'rib, where he stayed for a year and a half working in a pharmacy. Armed gangs of mercenaries took him to the Political Security Prison in 2018.

During his time in prison, Al-Jaradi encountered daily interrogations, humiliation, and harsh beatings with various torture devices. He was later brought before the prosecutor and the court, where he was acquitted. Despite this acquittal, he was sent back to the Political Security Prison, where he endured two more years of torture until he was released in a prisoner exchange in October 2020⁽¹⁴⁵⁾.

143 <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3133365.htm>

144 <https://www.yemenipress.net/archives/80313>

145 <https://ychr.org/news/1004/>

Eleventh: Assault on Personal Dignity

Assault on personal dignity, particularly subjecting a person to humiliating or degrading treatment, is considered a serious violation of international humanitarian law⁽¹⁴⁶⁾. The Rome Statute regards such actions as war crimes because they are committed against individuals protected by the 1949 Geneva Convention⁽¹⁴⁷⁾.

Since the onset of the aggression, numerous civilians have been subjected to assaults on their personal dignity in areas under the control of the coalition forces and their mercenaries. Such assaults included rape, forced displacement and relocation, illegal detention, imprisonment, physical abuse, insults, and other violations outlined in the report.

Twelfth: Using Ammunition and Prohibited Weapons

Many international law rules emphasise the prohibition and criminalisation of using certain weapons to limit the means and methods of combat and to ensure the regulation of combat operations. These rules have their legal basis directly in international humanitarian law (the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Conventions) and in the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. All of these conventions oblige parties to armed conflicts to take all necessary precautions when selecting means and methods of warfare⁽¹⁴⁸⁾.

The coalition forces have repeatedly used various types of prohibited weapons and munitions in many of their attacks, targeting various areas in Yemen, including densely populated cities and neighbourhoods.

146 <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule156>

147 <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/rome-statute-international-criminal-court>

148 Article (35/1) of Additional Protocol (1) to the Geneva Conventions (1977), states: '*In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.*' The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 were the first attempts to establish binding laws restricting the freedom of parties in an armed conflict to choose methods and means of warfare. Article (22) of the 1907 Hague Convention introduced the principle that limits the freedom of combatants in choosing means of harming the enemy, stating, 'The right of Belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.'

Article 55 of Additional Protocol (1) to the Geneva Conventions (1977) prohibits the use of methods or means of warfare that are intended or expected to cause such damage to the natural environment as to harm the survival of the population and environmental resources.

2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions:

https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/document/file_list/dp_consult_11_2008_cluster_munitions.pdf

<https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/ccm-2008>

Several international organisations have documented the use of such weapons in Yemen, and the coalition itself has acknowledged the use of these weapons⁽¹⁴⁹⁾.

Yemen Centre for Human Rights has monitored the use of cluster munitions by the Saudi-led coalition since the beginning of the aggression and has documented several attacks in which these munitions were used across various governorates.

Date	Governorate	Target Area
27/03/2017	Sa'dah	Almalaheeth – Dhaher District
05/04/2017	Al-Hudaydah	As Salif District
09/04/2017	Lahij	Kahbob Area
21/04/2017	Ma'rib	Harib Al Qaramish District
27/04/2017	Al-Jawf	Khub Washaaf District
04/05/2017	Al-Jawf	Sabrayn Area – Khub Washaaf District
06/05/2017	Taiz	Al-Najiba Area – Al-Mokha District
15/05/2017	Taiz	North Al-Mokha
20/05/2017	Sa'dah	Several residential neighbourhoods in Sa'dah city and adjacent areas
21/05/2017	Sa'dah	Al Atfin and Taybat al Asim Areas- Kitaf District
31/05/2017	Taiz	Nabda Mountain – Al-Mokha District
12/06/2017	Taiz	East Yakhtul Village – Al-Mokha District
12/06/2017	Taiz	South of Khalid Camp

149 <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde31/3208/2016/en/>

29/06/2017	Ma'rib	Sirwah District
12/07/2017	Sa'dah	Al Aboust Area - Sahar District
17/07/2017	Sa'dah	Mahda Area - As Safra District
19/07/2017	Sa'dah	Akwan Area - As Safra District
25/07/2017	Sa'dah	Razih District
31/07/2017	Sa'dah	Al Dhuriya Area - Sahar District.
11/08/2017	Sa'dah	Monabbih District
28/08/2017	Taiz	Al-Kamb Area – Maqbanah District
06/10/2017	Al-Jawf	Kharab Al-Marashi District
07/10/2017	Sa'dah	Baqim District
20/10/2017	Sa'dah	Qahzah Area
09/11/2017	Sa'dah	A'Al Al-Sheikh Area – Monabbih District
16/11/2017	Sana'a	Al-Ramadah Village – Nihm District
23/11/2017	Al-Jawf	Matun District
26/11/2017	Sa'dah	Dhuib Area – Haydan District
23/12/2017	Al-Hudaydah	As Sukhnah District
21/03/2018	Sa'dah	Maran Area - Haydan District
23/03/2018	Sa'dah	Alhamazat and Altaweelah Areas - Sahar District
24/03/2018	Sa'dah	A'Al Al-Sheikh Area – Monabbih District

In its 2025 report titled '*Cluster Bombs: A Serious Humanitarian and Social Catastrophe*', [Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre \(YEMAC\)](#) reported that the countries of the coalition had deployed cluster munitions during their ten-year war on Yemen in approximately 2,969 air raids across 125 districts in 19 governorates. The report recorded the use of 21 types of cluster bombs: 13 of American manufacture, two British, four Brazilian, and two Pakistani. Field teams from YEMAC have removed and cleared nearly 3,187,640 small cluster submunitions, representing only about 30% of the total cluster munitions actually used.

According to YEMAC, the use of cluster bombs in Yemen has caused widespread civilian casualties. As of February 2025, around 4,944 victims had been documented, including approximately 1,973 killed and 2,971 injured, most of them women and children. Yemenis continue to suffer death and mutilation daily due to the explosion of cluster bomb remnants across the country.

The following infographic illustrates the number and types of cluster munitions, as well as their civilian victims.

From 2015

Number of Civilian Casualties from Cluster Bombs

Until 2025



From 2015 Airstrikes Involving the Use of Cluster Bombs Until 2025

2969

Raid

10

Years

Affected Governorates

19

Affected Districts

125

Types of Cluster Bombs Used

21

Types



Thirteen: Starvation of Civilians

The blockade against civilians is considered an act of genocide, a crime against humanity, and a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Articles 55 and 56 of Geneva Convention (IV) emphasise the necessity of ensuring the flow of food, medicine, medical supplies, and services. Additionally, Customary Rule 53 states, *'The use of starvation of the civilian population as a method of warfare is prohibited.'*

On 9 August 2016, the coalition of aggression imposed a total ban on Sana'a International Airport, closing the airspace surrounding Sana'a⁽¹⁵⁰⁾. This air blockade exacerbated restrictions on the import of goods into the country. On 6 November 2017, the coalition intensified this closure into a complete blockade of the country⁽¹⁵¹⁾. This blockade was used as a method to starve civilians by preventing all humanitarian aid and commercial goods—including food and fuel—from entering the country, resulting in a catastrophic impact on the civilian population and creating the worst humanitarian crisis the world has ever witnessed.

According to the [United Nations Population Fund \(UNFPA\)](#), *'The crisis in Yemen continues unabated. The deteriorating economic outlook, protracted conflict, and crumbling basic services are exacerbating humanitarian needs across the country. In 2025, an estimated 19.5 million people across Yemen need humanitarian assistance and protection services'*⁽¹⁵²⁾.

The ongoing aggression and blockade have devastated the economy, resulting in millions becoming food insecure. Hunger and malnutrition are among the most pressing challenges in Yemen today. More than 17.3 million Yemenis are food insecure⁽¹⁵³⁾. Nearly half of Yemeni children under the age of five suffer from malnutrition, while around 3.5 million children and women are at risk of acute malnutrition⁽¹⁵⁴⁾.

150 <https://www.nrc.no/news/2021/august/thousands-of-critically-ill-patients-stranded-with-sanaa-airport-closure>

151 <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/07/yemen-coalition-blockade-imperils-civilians>

152 <https://yemen.unfpa.org/en/publications/2025-unfpa-humanitarian-response-yemen>

153 <https://www.undp.org/yemen/stories/combating-food-insecurity-yemen-individual-needs-country-level-resilience>

154 <https://news.un.org/ar/story/2025/05/1141226>

Fourteen: The Blockade and Its Effects

The coalition's aggression was accompanied by a comprehensive blockade of Yemen, resulting in severe humanitarian repercussions and catastrophic consequences for the Yemeni population. The coalition did not limit itself to direct bombardment and the killing of civilians with bombs, missiles, and bullets; it also intensified the starvation and killing of civilians through the comprehensive blockade and by preventing essential goods from entering Yemen. The blockade also had severe economic consequences, inflicting substantial losses that further compounded the suffering of the Yemeni people.

Key consequences of the blockade concerning the closure of Sana'a Airport:

Health Sector:

- The number of deaths resulting from the blockade and the lack of access to services reached nearly 1.5 million people.
- More than 17 million people suffer from acute hunger, including 3.6 million children, of whom 630,000 are in a critical condition that directly threatens their lives.
- More than 20 million people have been deprived of essential healthcare, while 120,000 cancer patients and 40,000 people with thalassaemia and inherited blood disorders face the risk of death because of the ban on the entry of refrigerated medicines.
- The conference noted that 8,000 dialysis patients face a slow death, while 2,300 children have developed leukaemia since the beginning of the aggression, with incidence rates doubling as a result of the use of prohibited weapons and the closure of the airport, which has led to medicines running out.
- The statement further explained that the blockade resulted in the disappearance of 1,600 types of medicines, including 550 life-saving medicines and 12 essential medicines for chemotherapy, in addition to the withdrawal of 83 international pharmaceutical companies from the Yemeni market and a 200% increase in medicine prices.
- The ministry confirmed that the blockade deprived 200,000 patients of the opportunity to travel abroad for treatment, noting that 28,000 cancer patients had died in previous years as a result of not receiving appropriate treatment. At the only leukaemia centre in Sana'a, 30% of children eligible to travel die because of a lack of medicines.

Tourism Sector:

- The US-Saudi aggression and blockade against Yemen brought the tourism sector to a near-complete standstill, particularly due to the comprehensive air blockade, which resulted in the complete cessation of tourist activity.
- The closure of 543 travel agencies resulted in estimated losses of \$1 billion, while the suspension of flights to and from Yemen caused preliminary losses estimated at approximately \$2 billion, leading to the dismissal of more than 95% of workers across the various tourism-related sectors.
- More than 400,000 foreign tourists have been prevented from visiting Yemen each year.
- Approximately 500,000 Yemeni expatriates living abroad who would normally visit the country each year have been prevented from travelling to Yemen.
- Various international, regional, and local festivals, conferences, and forums in the scientific, economic, medical, artistic, and cultural fields were prevented from being held.
- Since 2015, Yemen has lost approximately \$11 billion in tourism revenues and foreign-currency earnings from the nearly 500,000 tourists who visited Yemen annually, based on official statistics for 2014. This figure would be even higher if the annual growth rates expected during the period had been taken into account.
- The near-total suspension of international tourism and tourism investment, as a direct result of the impact of the aggression and blockade on the tourism sector, transformed tourism from a promising sector for economic and social development into a largely paralysed sector. Consequently, the sector's contribution to GDP fell from approximately 6% before the aggression to less than 1% during the years 2015–2025.
- More than 500,000 families that depended on the tourism sector were adversely affected.

Education Sector:

- The profound repercussions have affected the very foundations of primary and secondary education. Sana'a Airport's role is not limited to transporting individuals; it is also a logistical lifeline for bringing

in humanitarian assistance, entering technical supplies, facilitating academic exchange, and enabling coordinators from international and UN organisations working in education to enter the country. The closure of the airport has further intensified the impact of the aggression and blockade on the education of more than 10.6 million children. There have also been international warnings that the education of approximately six million additional children could be disrupted. UN statistics also clearly indicate that nearly two million children are out of school, while approximately 2,961 schools have been damaged, with a large number of them being used as shelters.

- The number of students from brotherly and friendly countries studying at Yemeni universities under cultural-exchange scholarships fell from 5,334 male and female students to 149 during the period of the aggression, a decrease of 5,185 students, many of whom returned to their home countries.
- There were also 3,696 students holding university scholarships abroad, in addition to 1,866 students holding postgraduate scholarships.
- It has also become impossible to recruit professors from abroad in specialised fields in which Yemeni specialists are scarce and which are needed by Yemeni universities, community colleges, and higher institutes.
- Most postgraduate students who receive scholarships abroad have been unable to travel because of the heightened risks associated with travelling to Aden if they consider departing from its airport, thereby depriving them of their educational opportunities.
- It has also become impossible to conclude cooperation agreements and establish reciprocal exchange programmes for professors and researchers between Yemeni and foreign universities, contributing to the isolation of Yemeni universities.
- The mortality rate among professors and teachers in educational institutions has also increased because of the difficulty of transporting critically ill patients who require treatment abroad, particularly as many of them are elderly.
- Conducting analyses of research samples has become difficult and costly because the necessary analytical equipment is unavailable in Yemen. In many cases, samples are also damaged as a result of being sent through Aden Airport.

- Universities and academic programmes have been unable to obtain international accreditation because the aggression has prevented external review panels and international assessors from reaching Yemen.
- Most faculty members also face difficulties travelling to participate in international scientific conferences and seminars and to keep abreast of the latest developments in their fields.
- Most of the supplies required for the educational process at all levels are unavailable, as the majority of these supplies are imported from abroad.
- Yemeni students have also been hindered from obtaining international scholarships offered by universities to international students as part of the requirements for international accreditation, owing to the difficulty of obtaining passports issued by the mercenary government and recognised by most countries.
- Families of students and even members of academic staff experience anxiety and psychological distress when travelling through areas controlled by the mercenary authorities, if they are forced to travel from there, because of the arrests, humiliation, delays, and additional financial penalties they may face.
- Everyone working in educational institutions under the Sana'a government is regarded as an enemy by the mercenary government, are prohibited from travelling, and are at risk of arrest if they attempt to travel through any airport or border crossing other than Sana'a Airport.
- The closure of Sana'a Airport and the other airports has effectively turned most of Yemen's population into prisoners in a vast prison and detention centre, which is contrary to human rights and international norms.



المركز اليمني لحقوق الإنسان
Yemen Center for Human Rights



A child suffering from severe malnutrition due to the blockade imposed on Yemen since the start of the aggression

Chapter Three: Aggression and Needy Groups

Over the past ten years, civilians of all categories have been subjected to serious crimes in violation of international norms and laws. However, certain segments of Yemeni society have suffered the most as a result of military assaults, the ongoing blockade, and the actions of the occupying forces in territories controlled by the coalition countries of aggression and their mercenaries. These groups are among the most disadvantaged, and under no circumstances do they possess the capacity to engage in any form of military activity. They do not constitute legitimate military targets and are entitled to special protection under national laws, as well as all relevant international norms and laws, throughout various phases of the war. These include women, children, displaced persons, refugees, people with disabilities, the marginalised, and prisoners, in addition to those no longer able to take part in combat, such as captives and the wounded.

First: Children

The aggression and blockade over the past ten years have triggered a persistent malnutrition crisis, with 2.2 million children suffering from acute malnutrition, including over 540,000 affected by severe acute malnutrition—a life-threatening condition if left untreated. Every ten minutes, one child dies from a preventable cause⁽¹⁵⁵⁾.

According to the UNICEF, *'1 in 2 children under five are acutely malnourished. Among them, over 537,000 suffer from severe acute malnutrition (SAM)—a condition that is agonising, life-threatening, and entirely preventable'*⁽¹⁵⁶⁾.

The coalition countries of aggression have committed all six grave violations against children⁽¹⁵⁷⁾. They have killed and injured thousands, recruited many children into their ranks as soldiers for various military roles, destroyed schools and hospitals, and obstructed the delivery of food and medicine. Moreover, their forces have repeatedly committed acts of sexual violence against children in the areas under their occupation and control.

155 <https://news.un.org/ar/story/2023/03/1119157>

156 <https://www.unicef.ch/en/current/news/2025-03-25/ten-years-war-yemen-country-brink>

157 The United Nations Security Council has officially identified and condemned [six grave violations against children](#) in times of war. These are killing and maiming of children, recruitment or use of children in armed forces and armed groups, attacks on schools or hospitals, rape or other grave sexual violence, abduction of children, and denial of humanitarian access for children.

- Killing and Maiming of Children

The killing and maiming of children are the first of the six grave violations criminalised under international humanitarian law. Yemen Centre has documented the number of children killed and injured as a result of direct attacks from the beginning of the aggression up to March 2025, with the total standing at 8,527 children—4,179 killed and 4,348 injured—across various governorates of the country.

• Dahyan Children

On Thursday, 9 August 2018, the coalition countries of aggression carried out a series of airstrikes that directly targeted a passenger bus passing through a crowded market in Dahyan District, Sa'dah Governorate. The bus was carrying dozens of children aged between 5 and 14 who were on a trip organised by a summer centre. The attack resulted in the deaths and injuries of many of the children, along with several civilians who were present in the market at the time, including paramedics who were hit in subsequent raids on the same location.

The coalition countries of aggression announced responsibility for targeting the bus. They justified the attack by stating that the bus was a legitimate target in accordance with international norms and conventions, including international humanitarian law, and claimed the strike hit military experts and missile launchers.

Multiple sources indicate that the bomb used in the Dahyan market attack in Sa'dah Governorate was an American-made, laser-guided Mk 82 bomb, which is a type of rocket munition the coalition countries have used in strikes on other civilian gatherings, resulting in significant civilian casualties.

The airstrike on the children's bus killed 51 civilians, including 44 children, and injured 79 others, most of whom were also children.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported that airstrikes carried out by the Saudi-led coalition killed dozens of people—the majority of whom were children under the age of 15—in the city of Sa'dah, northern Yemen, and that dozens of dead and wounded were taken to hospitals following an airstrike that targeted a bus carrying children in a market in Dahyan District, north of Sa'dah⁽¹⁵⁸⁾.

During her visit to the wounded victims of the Dahyan children's bus attack, Lise Grande (the UN Resident Representative and Humanitarian Coordinator in Yemen) described what she witnessed as the aftermath of an airstrike, calling it the highest civilian toll ever recorded from such raids. She emphasised that there is absolutely no justification—none whatsoever—for such an act⁽¹⁵⁹⁾.

The day after the crime, the United Nations Security Council called for a transparent and credible investigation into the attack on the bus. This took place during a closed session on Yemen, convened by the request of Sweden, the Netherlands, Poland, Bolivia, and Peru to discuss the massacre of Dahyan stu-

158 <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1KU137/>

159 <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news505175.htm>

dents in Sa'dah Governorate. During the session, the Council expressed deep concern over the attack in Sa'dah and all recent assaults in Yemen.

• **Global and International Days for Childhood**

The United Nations has designated three international days to celebrate childhood: 4 June (the World Day for Innocent Children Victims of Aggression), 11 October (the International Day of the Girl Child), and 20 November (Universal Children's Day). Yet while the world observes these occasions, children in Yemen have continued to be killed and injured by the coalition countries of aggression over the past ten years, all in full view of the whole world. On these very days dedicated to celebrating childhood, approximately 140 children were reported killed or wounded, according to Yemen Centre for Human Rights.

- **Child Recruitment**

Although this crime is recognised as the second of the six grave violations against children, and despite National Law No. 45 of 2002 prohibiting the involvement of individuals under the age of 18 in armed conflict or military recruitment, the coalition countries and their mercenaries have continued to enlist children into various military formations.

In January 2020, the National Salvation Government in Sana'a undertook a unilateral initiative that was welcomed by the United Nations and much of the international community. The initiative involved the release of 64 children who had been captured on the frontlines—most of whom had been recruited to defend the Saudi border⁽¹⁶⁰⁾, while others were conscripted by armed groups funded by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

International reports have revealed instances of child recruitment by the coalition and their mercenaries since the onset of the aggression. These children were deployed to various fronts, often placed on front-line positions without any prior training, combat experience, military equipment, or even basic protective gear or logistical support. As a result, many were killed, and the majority were captured⁽¹⁶¹⁾.

- **Child Abduction and Sexual Violence**

Yemen Centre for Human Rights has recorded a significant number of abduction and rape cases involving child victims, particularly in various regions of the governorates of Aden, Taiz, and Al-Hudaydah. These governorates have witnessed repeated incidents of sexual violence against children carried out by forces loyal to the UAE⁽¹⁶²⁾.

160 <https://www.aljazeera.net/politics/2019/3/27/%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%85%D8-A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8-AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86>

161 For further details on the recruitment of children by coalition forces, please refer to the Centre's September 2021 report entitled 'Childhood with Colour of Blood and Smell of Death'—in the Arabic language.

162 Sexual Act means any violent act of a sexual nature committed against a child. This may include rape, other forms of sexual

In April 2018, UAE-affiliated members committed a rape crime against a child in the district of Hays, Al-Hudaydah Governorate. On 21 May 2018, a 12-year-old child from the coastal area of Al-Hima in Al-Hudaydah Governorate was raped by members of the so-called '*National Resistance*', affiliated with the UAE. On 22 December 2018, armed members affiliated with the Saudi-led coalition in the coastal city of Al-Mokha in Taiz Governorate abducted and raped a 9-year-old child from Maqbanah District. In June 2019, Yemen Centre documented an incident where three armed individuals abducted a 7-year-old child from outside his home in the district of Al-Tahita, Al-Hudaydah, and then brutally raped him. According to witnesses, the child was found unconscious on a farm in Al-Tahita District, with signs of torture and severe beating.

In July 2020, Yemen Centre recorded a new crime committed by military elements in the district of Hays, Al-Hudaydah Governorate, where mercenary Oman Saeed Abdu Salem (40 years old) raped an 8-year-old child Maria. To protect the perpetrator, the assaulted child and her family were detained by military leaders affiliated with the coalition after she was taken to the hospital, and they attempted to pressure the family into dropping the case, which caused widespread public outrage and protests in the district.

At a press conference held at the end of 2019, Tahama Organisation for Rights, Development, and Humanitarian Heritage, along with several civil society organisations, revealed that 84 cases of rape crime against children had been recorded⁽¹⁶³⁾.

- **Deprivation of Children's Right to Education**

Schools are among the civilian objects protected under international humanitarian law, which prohibits any form of targeting against them during armed conflict. United Nations Security Council Resolution [1261 \(1999\)](#), Children and Armed Conflict (CAC), recognises the targeting of schools as one of the gravest violations committed against children in times of war, due to schools' direct connection to one of children's fundamental rights—the right to education. The resolution further affirms that targeting schools constitutes a crime for which perpetrators must be held accountable, and that appropriate measures must be taken to ensure they do not evade justice⁽¹⁶⁴⁾.

violence, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced marriage or pregnancy, and forced sterilisation.

163 <https://tahamarights.org/ar/category>

164 [UN Security Council Resolution 1261 \(1999\) on Children and Armed Conflict \(CAC\)](#)

International Humanitarian Law – Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the targeting of civilian objects and underscores the essential role of schools and hospitals for the civilian population, especially children.

International Humanitarian Law – Additional Protocol I reads, '*Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives.*'

United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child affirms that a child's right to education and healthcare remains inviolable, even during armed conflict.

International Humanitarian Law – the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court considers attacks on schools and hospitals

During the period covered by the report, millions of children faced the threat of being denied their right to education, as the coalition countries of aggression destroyed hundreds of schools and educational facilities, either entirely or partially. Furthermore, hundreds of schools were repurposed to shelter displaced persons forcibly evicted from their homes across various regions, while others were forced to close because they were no longer safe. According to UNICEF, approximately 4.5 Yemen million children have been left out of school⁽¹⁶⁵⁾.

Key indicators confirm that the educational process in Yemen has been severely affected in recent years due to several factors, including:

- the targeting and destruction of 3,768 educational facilities across various governorates;
- the overwhelming fear and anxiety gripping families over the dangers of sending their children to schools that continued to be targeted by aerial bombardments;
- the growing challenges in printing school books since 2015, resulting in a severe shortage of textbooks and other educational materials due to the lack of financial resources for printing and the suspension of support from donor countries;
- the repeated strikes by teachers, who are among the most affected groups by the ongoing suspension of their salaries—the sole source of income to support their families and secure their livelihoods—forcing some to abandon their profession in search of alternative means to support their families and meet basic needs; and
- the deteriorating health conditions of many students, resulting from malnutrition, family displacement, and the military operations conducted by the coalition countries.

- **Depriving Children of Food and Healthcare**

Hospitals, health facilities, and their services have been among the primary targets of attacks by the coalition countries of aggression and have suffered severe consequences from the military operations they have funded on the ground. At the same time, these facilities have borne the brunt of the comprehensive blockade, which has prevented the entry of food, fuel, and medicine into the country. International conventions have consistently stressed the need to protect such facilities, recognising the targeting of healthcare services as one of the gravest crimes against children, given their vital role in preserving children's lives under all circumstances. These conventions also criminalise any actions that undermine or limit this protection, classifying such acts as international crimes that expose perpetrators to legal accountability⁽¹⁶⁶⁾.

to be war crimes, unless these facilities are being used for military purposes.

165 <https://news.un.org/ar/interview/2024/08/1133656>

166 **The Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949), Article 18: 'Civilian hospitals organised to give care to the wounded and sick, the infirm and maternity cases, may in no circumstances be the object of attack, but shall at all times be respected and protected by the Parties to the conflict.'**

The dire humanitarian situation caused by the aggression, the blockade, and ongoing denial of food and medicine over the past ten years has had a devastating impact on the health of the majority of Yemeni children. More than 5.5 million children have become vulnerable to childhood diseases, for healthcare, vaccination, and nutrition services for children have drastically deteriorated: A child reportedly dies every ten minutes⁽¹⁶⁷⁾.

Over the ten years of aggression, 2.9 million children under the age of five have suffered from malnutrition. More than 3,000 have been diagnosed with leukaemia, and anaemia affects 86% of children under five. A further 9,000 cancer cases are recorded each year, yet the coalition of aggression has blocked access to the radiological equipment and medicines essential for diagnosis and treatment⁽¹⁶⁸⁾.

48% of Yemeni children also suffer from stunted growth as a result of a lack of essential micronutrients, which prevents their proper physical and cognitive development⁽¹⁶⁹⁾.

• Foetal and Newborn Deformities

Numerous medical reports have confirmed that the weapons and ammunition used by the coalition countries of aggression have been a direct cause of foetal and neonatal deformities, particularly in the governorates of Sa'dah, Al-Hudaydah, Sana'a, and Taiz. According to the Ministry of Public Health and Population, there has been a significant rise in cases of foetal malformations and stillbirths. This rise is largely attributed to the coalition's use of various types of weaponry, especially those internationally banned due to their harmful effects on human health and the environment, their role in the spread of cancer and viral diseases, and their devastating impact on unborn children. In 2022, the Ministry of Health recorded more than 22,000 cases of foetal malformations, including 1,200 in which the affected fetuses did not survive. Complex foetal anomalies—which are not recorded in the Global Atlas of Congenital Anomalies—have also been identified. Beyond the direct consequences, such weapons also have indirect impacts, including causing birth defects in fetuses and newborns, by contributing to the collapse of healthcare services, the health system's inability to combat viral and chronic illnesses, and a severe shortage of medicines. Furthermore, the rate of premature and low-birth-weight infants has increased by more than 9% annually amid the aggression and blockade, including 3000 cases of children born with congenital heart, 50% of whom died⁽¹⁷⁰⁾.

167 <https://www.france24.com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7/20230324-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B7%D9%81%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%BA%D8%B0%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%8-A%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B7%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86>

168 <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3473722.htm>

169 <https://news.un.org/ar/interview/2024/08/1133656>

170 The Tenth National Report on the Impact of the Aggression Committed by the United States, the United Kingdom, Zionism,

• Psychological Suffering of Yemeni Children

The severe impact on Yemeni children has deepened over the years due to the ongoing actions and practices of the coalition countries of aggression. These effects range from the direct consequences of the aerial attacks and food insecurity to the spread of epidemics, lack of access to safe drinking water, absence of healthcare, denial of the right to education, and the collapse of basic social services. Collectively, these factors have placed immense pressure on children, significantly worsening their psychological well-being. Despite the critical and alarming nature of these effects, Yemen Centre has encountered considerable difficulties in obtaining detailed information on the psychological impact of the coalition's attacks and the wider humanitarian situation affecting children. Furthermore, there is a lack of accurate data and indicators regarding the damage caused by the attacks to mental health care facilities and access to their services. Nonetheless, the available information indicates a severe shortage of relevant institutions and poor-quality services in these facilities that remain operational.

Studies and reports have revealed the suffering of some children who exhibit a range of psychological effects, such as stuttering, insomnia, bedwetting, and recurring disturbing nightmares. In addition, they experience heightened feelings of fear, insecurity, anxiety, and anger, as well as physical symptoms, including headaches, chest and abdominal pain, and fatigue—all of which are medically recognised as indicators of severe psychological distress.

In late August 2020, Yemen Centre conducted visits to several families in the Al-Ribat neighbourhood in the Capital Sana'a, where the homes had been directly hit by airstrikes in mid-May 2019. The visiting team drew several conclusions about the psychological impact on children who survived these attacks.

The Al-Bahri family and their seven children are among those who have experienced some of the most severe effects, as their children exhibited significant psychological issues, including stuttering, speech difficulties, anxiety, and persistent terror. Similarly, the Ma'sar family reported that their children suffer from intense panic and fear, as well as disrupted sleep patterns, whenever they hear aircraft overhead⁽¹⁷¹⁾.

Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates against Yemen (26 March 2015 – 26 April 2025)—an official government report currently pending publication (in the Arabic language).

171 <https://ychr.org/news/890/>

Second: Women

Throughout ten years of aggression, women have been the primary victims at every stage of the aggression, not only as casualties but also as helpless witnesses to the deaths of their family members beneath the rubble of their homes, blocks of flats, and public gathering spaces. They were the foremost to endure the suffering of the worst humanitarian situation caused by the aggression and blockade.

The military operations in Yemen have killed tens of thousands of breadwinners who had supported thousands of families, forcing women to take on additional responsibilities and work within a limited range of professions to meet their families' most basic needs. As a direct consequence of the coalition countries' military operations, millions of people have been forced to relocate and seek refuge in search of safety and survival. This marked the beginning of a new phase of suffering for all family members in shelter and displacement camps, particularly for women, who have been subjected to violations and inhumane practices.

According to statistics from Yemen Centre, the number of female victims during the reporting period reached 6,779, including 3,137 killed and 3,642 injured.

More than 1.8 million pregnant and breastfeeding women suffer from malnutrition, with over 46,000 having died over the past decade, and maternal mortality during childbirth has risen by 160%⁽¹⁷²⁾.

- Crimes of Killing Women in Wedding Halls and Mourning Gatherings

Many attacks carried out by the coalition of aggression have resulted in the deaths of women in locations specifically designated for female gatherings, such as wedding halls, mourning tents, and other women-only assemblies. Among these crimes was the targeting of a women's wedding camp in the Dhubab area, located in Al-Mokha District of Taiz Governorate, with multiple missiles in September 2015. The attack claimed the lives of more than 130 people, the majority of whom were women and children.

Such massacres of women's gatherings were repeated. On 7 October 2015, less than a month after the aforementioned crime, coalition warplanes struck a wedding celebration in the Sanban area of Mayfaat Ans District, Dhamar Governorate. The attack targeted both the house and the tent designated for women's gatherings, resulting in the deaths of 49 individuals—mostly women and children—and injuring 70 others, including 17 children and 8 women.

¹⁷² <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3473722.htm>

In February 2017, coalition aircraft bombed a women's funeral gathering in the Arhab area, north of Sana'a, killing more than eight women and injuring ten others.

In December 2017, coalition aircraft also targeted groups of women as they walked home from a wedding in the Al-Qaramish area of Ma'rib Governorate, resulting in the death of 12 women and leaving dozens of others seriously injured.

On 22 April 2018, a wedding ceremony in the Bani Qais area of Hajjah Governorate was also targeted, resulting in the deaths of more than 30 civilians, most of whom were women and children.

- **Kidnapping and Sexual Violence against Women**

The abduction of women in Yemen is regarded as a grave taboo under tribal customs and constitutes a serious violation of all local and international laws and values. Throughout the years of the aggression, dozens of women have been subjected to kidnapping and sexual violence in areas controlled by the coalition forces and their mercenaries.

The governorates of Ma'rib and Al-Jawf have witnessed numerous cases of kidnappings and arbitrary detention. One such case occurred in 2018, when Samira Marsh was arbitrarily detained from her home in Al-Jawf and subsequently transferred to the city of Ma'rib.

In February 2021, Yemen Centre documented the death of Safaa Al-Amir, who died in a military intelligence prison in Ma'rib after being subjected to a month of torture following her abduction along with her father and husband.

Also, in February 2021, a group of Saudi-affiliated security forces raided the homes of displaced families in Ma'rib and abducted five women in front of their families. The following morning, they returned and took two more. The abducted women were handed over to Saudi Arabia without any notification to their families regarding their whereabouts, sparking widespread public outrage across all governorates.

- Denial of Women's Right to Health Care

The collapse of the healthcare sector due to the aggression and blockade has left women among the most severely affected, particularly in accessing essential medical services tailored to their needs. Pregnant women have been forced to give birth under extremely difficult and unsafe conditions, with some tragically losing their lives as a result of pregnancy-related complications or illnesses that could have been treated had they reached medical facilities in time. Women living in rural areas —often located tens of kilometres from the nearest cities — are especially at risk of death due to the lack of access to healthcare.

Moreover, the effects of the blockade and aggression have led to the deaths of 46,000 women, with 1.8 million women suffering from malnutrition annually and a further one million facing serious health complications as a result of the ongoing blockade⁽¹⁷³⁾.

- Women in Displacement Camps: Ongoing Suffering and Repeated Violations

According to the latest statistics, ten years of aggression have displaced 4.8 million people, with women and children making up the largest proportion⁽¹⁷⁴⁾. Women in displacement camps and other settings face a daily struggle to secure basic necessities, and their suffering is further compounded by the challenge of preserving their dignity and caring for their families while residing in overcrowded houses and unsafe tents.

There have been repeated cases of displaced girls being abducted and taken to areas around Ma'rib. One such case occurred in September 2020, when the commander of the so-called Special Forces, affiliated with the coalition countries in Ma'rib, abducted a girl from a camp of displaced persons from Al-Jawf Governorate and took her to a flat after midnight under the pretext of interrogation⁽¹⁷⁵⁾. Such practices—documented by human rights activists—have been repeatedly carried out by security forces in Ma'rib Governorate, who have summoned many women from displacement camps during the night under the pretext of investigations and security procedures.

173 The Tenth National Report on the Impact of the Aggression Committed by the United States, the United Kingdom, Zionism, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates against Yemen (26 March 2015 – 26 April 2025)—an official government report, written in the Arabic language, currently pending publication.

174 <http://yemen.un.org/en/288915-%D9%86%D8%AD%D9%88-%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9>

175 <https://sa24.co/show13711661.html>

Third: The Marginalised (Ahfad Bilal)

Ahfad Bilal, commonly referred to as the marginalised, have not been spared from the direct attacks of the coalition countries of aggression, with their residential areas targeted across multiple regions.

In April 2015, the Ahfad Bilal community (residing in the Al-Zuhairah area of Mawiyah District, Taiz Governorate) was directly targeted by the coalition of aggression. The attack resulted in ten deaths and ten injuries, and six houses were damaged⁽¹⁷⁶⁾.

On 13 July 2015, the coalition countries carried out a brutal massacre against the community of Ahfad Bilal in the Al-'Ummal (Labours') Neighbourhood—also known as the City of the Marginalised—in the Sa'wan area of the Capital Sana'a⁽¹⁷⁷⁾. The workplaces of the marginalised at the Sanitation Fund on the 60-Metre Road, the Capital Sana'a, came under repeated attacks. These airstrikes, together with the effects of the blockade, have exacerbated the suffering of the marginalised and severely worsened their living conditions, particularly for women and children.

176 <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news393732.htm>

177 <https://thelinkyemen.net/news/6095>

Fourth: Displaced People and Refugees

Internally displaced persons (IDPs), who have fled their homes due to the war without crossing international borders, are protected under international humanitarian law as civilians, provided they do not take a direct part in hostilities.

Statistics indicate that, since the beginning of the aggression, more than 4.8 million people have been forced to flee their homes and seek refuge in other regions of the country. Many families across several governorates have opened their doors to host them, but this has placed added pressure on the availability of essentials (such as food, shelter, and basic household supplies) for both the displaced and their hosts. In fact, the displacement that is driven by the aggression and acts of terrorism continues to contribute to the growing demand for shelter and basic necessities.

Over the past ten years, displacement camps have been directly targeted by coalition attacks in several areas. One such attack occurred on 31 March 2015, when the Al-Mazraq Camp, located in the Al-Mazraq area in Hajjah Governorate, came under attack, resulting in the deaths of 40 displaced persons and injuries to more than 260 others, most of whom were women and children⁽¹⁷⁸⁾.

In April 2021, Yemen Centre documented the appalling use of displaced persons in the Sana'a camp in Ma'rib Governorate as human shields by military forces affiliated with the coalition⁽¹⁷⁹⁾. International law strictly prohibits this practice, deeming it a criminal act for any party to a conflict or war to use civilians as human shields, as set out in the 1929 and 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1977 Additional Protocol, and the 1998 Rome Statute⁽¹⁸⁰⁾.

178 A report by Amnesty International, dated August 2015, stated, 'A coalition attack on 9 July killed 10 members of one family including four children who had sought shelter at a school in north Aden after being displaced from their home because of fighting. "We came here to escape the war," the father of three young women who were killed in the strike told Amnesty International, "we had nowhere else to go".'

179 <https://ychr.org/news/1022/>

180 Article 58 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, under the title 'Precautions against the effects of attacks', outlines a series of obligations imposed on states regarding the protection of civilians:

- (a) without prejudice to Article 49 of the Fourth Convention, endeavour to remove the civilian population, individual civilians, and civilian objects under their control from the vicinity of military objectives;
- (b) to avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas; and
- (c) to take the other necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, individual civilians, and civilian objects under their control against the dangers resulting from military operations.

The 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol 1) further stipulates, 'The presence or movements of the

The aggression and blockade have resulted in worsening the suffering of the displaced, as well as their forced displacement into camps, schools, and some homes and the loss of their livelihoods. In addition, many have been exposed to disease, epidemics, and famine.

Refugees—individuals who have left their countries and crossed international borders after facing persecution or being at risk of it—are protected under international humanitarian law and other relevant laws. However, the Centre's database indicates that African migrants have suffered fatalities and injuries in areas targeted by coalition attacks since 2015.

International organisations have confirmed that some Yemeni officials affiliated with the coalition countries of aggression have tortured, raped, and executed migrants and asylum seekers from the Horn of Africa at a detention centre in Aden. The authorities there denied asylum seekers the opportunity to request refugee protection and carried out the collective deportation of a number of migrants by sea under dangerous conditions⁽¹⁸¹⁾.

civilian population or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede military operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations.'

181 <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/17/yemen-detained-african-migrants-tortured-raped>

Fifth: Persons with Disabilities

According to World Health Organisation, the current number of persons with disabilities in Yemen is estimated at approximately 4.9 million⁽¹⁸²⁾. However, the actual figure is expected to be significantly higher, particularly due to the ongoing aggression, the effects of the blockade, and the remnants of war, such as landmines and internationally banned cluster bombs. Between 50 and 100 individuals are added daily to the number of persons with disabilities due to multiple factors, most notably airstrikes and shelling by the coalition and its local forces, as well as child malnutrition, congenital malformations, stunted growth, and renal failure⁽¹⁸³⁾.

Since the onset of the aggression in March 2015, our country has endured ten years of relentless aerial, maritime, and ground attacks involving various types of weaponry, including those internationally prohibited arms. Centres, homes, and organisations serving persons with disabilities across numerous cities and governorates have also been targeted, resulting in loss of life, serious injuries, and a broad range of physical, psychological, and social harm. According to the Fund for the Care and Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities, approximately 80,000 citizens, including children, have suffered various disabilities as a result of explosive remnants of war, cluster bombs, and direct bombardment. Children account for approximately 56% of the victims of these explosive weapons and diseases caused by malnutrition.¹⁸⁴

This has been accompanied by a land, sea, and air blockade, imposed openly in full view of the international community and its institutions. As an integral part of Yemeni society, people with disabilities have faced far greater setbacks and direct harm, suffering more than other groups from the deteriorating humanitarian situation and the collapse of essential services due to the particular challenges arising from their disabilities.

182 <https://womendisabilitypeace.org/2025/05/31/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A9-4-9-%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86/>

183 <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3165739.htm#:~:text=%D9%88%D9%81%D9%8A%20%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%20%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%85%D8%A9%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%81%D9%88%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9.%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B2%D9%8F%D9%91%D9%85%D8%8C%20%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B4%D9%84%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%84%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%8C%20>

184 <https://althawrah.ye/archives/1210407>

Numerous organisations and centres serving persons with disabilities have been forced to cease operations: some due to complete or partial destruction by airstrikes, others as a result of looting or confiscation, and many more owing to a sharp decline in funding that left them unable to fulfil their obligations to those they serve. Among these was the Handicap Care and Rehabilitation Fund, which had previously provided institutional support to the programmes and activities of 135 associations and centres across the capital and various governorates. Its collapse has resulted in tens of thousands of persons with disabilities being denied access to the services they had formerly received through these organisations.

In the context of the airstrikes carried out by the coalition fighter jets on 5 January 2016, which targeted several areas and residential neighbourhoods in the Capital Sana'a, the coalition forces committed yet another grave crime—this time against one of the most needy groups, those in the greatest need of specialised care. This attack targeted Al-Noor Centre for the Blind in As-Safiyah District, which houses around 100 blind individuals⁽¹⁸⁵⁾. The centre—surrounded by residential homes, schools, and Mother's Specialist Hospital (which specialises in caring for mothers and children)—was struck by two rockets, one of which exploded, while the other failed to detonate. This attack caused both physical and psychological harm to several blind residents of the centre, with some continuing to suffer from its effects to this day.

185 <https://yehwrf.org/news/fund-news/267>

Sixth: Fishermen

A significant portion of the population in coastal regions relies on fishing as their primary source of income, making them one of the most impoverished groups within Yemeni society, with individual daily earnings often falling below one dollar. Fishermen live in extremely modest dwellings (straw-made huts) located away from residential areas. Over the ten years since the onset of the aggression, fishermen have frequently been targeted by coalition aircraft. Additionally, they have immensely suffered due to the effects of the unjust blockade, with the coalition forces restricting their access to fishing under false and baseless justifications.

On 22 October 2015, Yemen Centre documented a brutal and bloody crime committed by the coalition countries of aggression on the island of Uqban in Al-Hudaydah Governorate. The airstrikes targeted several fishing boats as fishermen sought their livelihood in the waters surrounding the island. The attacks killed 200 fishermen and injured many others. Dozens more succumbed to their injuries, as rescue teams were unable to access the area for five consecutive days due to the continued bombardment of both the island and the rescue boats.

According to witness testimonies, the first airstrike instantly killed 70 fishermen. As the remaining fishermen rushed to assist the wounded, the aircraft returned and targeted the rescuers, with the bombardment continuing, causing the death toll and number of injuries to steadily rise. The attacks did not stop there, for when some survivors attempted to flee to Uqban Island, Apache helicopters intervened, launching more than 15 air raids on the island and indiscriminately targeting anyone in their path. Many of the victims' bodies were lost in the sea, while others were later found washed up on the shores of Al-Hudaydah. Locals managed to retrieve several of the bodies, but only after they had decomposed in the water for days.

One of the survivors of the massacre, Ahmed Mahdi, who lost some fingers on his hand, said, *'We are fishermen seeking our livelihood, and the aircraft struck us without warning. The bodies are still in the sea, and we have not had the chance to retrieve them.'*

The Centre's team searched for any indications of potential military targets in the area but found no military objectives on the island whatsoever. The Centre confirmed that all those killed or injured in the attacks on Uqban Island were civilians⁽¹⁸⁶⁾.

¹⁸⁶ <https://ychr.org/statement/sfycfh/214/>



المركز اليمني لحقوق الإنسان
Yemen Center for Human Rights



Al-Hudaydah port cranes after being repeatedly targeted by coalition warplanes

Chapter Four: The Economic Consequences of the Aggression and Blockade

The coalition of aggression used every means to destroy Yemen's economy—through direct attacks and a blockade that disrupted the functioning of the country's productive and service sectors and prevented essentials, such as food, medicine, and fuel, from reaching Yemeni ports, deliberately seeking to starve the Yemeni people to death. This is in addition to the direct targeting of economic infrastructure, the seizure of public revenues, the freezing of monetary assets, the cutting of salaries, and the printing of currency without backing—ultimately attempting to bring down the entire financial system. This war resulted in catastrophic economic losses, leading to the collapse of GDP, a rise in poverty, unemployment, and inflation, as well as the deterioration of all macroeconomic indicators.

The economic war against the Yemeni people—including the targeting of infrastructure, the prevention of food and medicine from entering the country, and the denial of salaries to state employees—constitutes a clear violation of international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions, and breaches the economic and social rights guaranteed in international covenants.

Ten years of Saudi–American aggression have inflicted heavy losses on Yemen's economy as a result of the widespread destruction that has struck all pillars of the national economy. The aggression, which began by imposing a land, sea, and air blockade on Yemen, did not stop at halting the operations of sea-ports, airports, and land crossings, preventing the arrival of basic supplies of food, medicine, and fuel. It went further, launching a series of airstrikes on ports and airports that put most of them out of service. The aggression deliberately struck every element of domestic production—factories, farms, production plants, telecommunications, and electricity. It targeted the oil sector because of its large role: It accounted for roughly 30–40% of GDP; its revenues made up about 83.3% of total exports; it contributed around 50% of foreign-exchange reserves, and it was a principal source of budget financing, covering 50–60%⁽¹⁸⁷⁾. The aggression also imposed restrictions on financial transfers between Yemeni banks and regional and international banks with the assistance of the United States, which led to a sharp fall in the state's foreign-currency revenues due to the cessation of oil and gas exports—from \$3.817 billion in 2014 to \$802 million in 2015, falling further to \$28 million in 2016—representing declines of 79% in 2015 and 99.3% in 2016 compared with 2014.

¹⁸⁷ *Bulletin of Economic and Social Developments in Yemen: The Yemeni Economy under War*. Sana'a: Studies Sector, Ministry of Planning, June 2018 (in the Arabic language).

As a result of the severe damage inflicted on Yemen's economy over the past ten years, poverty indicators have worsened to unprecedented levels. According to United Nations data, the poverty rate in Yemen rose from 47% to 75% in 2019⁽¹⁸⁸⁾, and with the continuation of war and blockade, it climbed further to 85% by the end of 2024. The unemployment rate rose to over 65% by 2022, with the labour market severely affected as many businesses shut down, and jobs were lost across both the public and private sectors⁽¹⁸⁹⁾. A World Bank report issued in June 2025 noted that per-capita real GDP in Yemen fell by 58% over ten years of aggression. The scale of lost-opportunity costs to the Yemeni economy as a result of the aggression reached unprecedented levels. Estimated at roughly \$60 billion during the first three years of the aggression, cumulative lost output rose to about \$93 billion by late 2019, and then climbed to \$126 billion in 2020, according to a study prepared by the United Nations Development Programme, as a consequence of the aggression.

In this context, the study estimated the lost-opportunity costs for 2015–2021 to be \$145 billion. Estimates from the Ministry of Planning and Development indicate that the cost of foregone real GDP was about \$11.3 billion in 2015—the difference between potential output without the aggression and actual output under it—rising to \$16.7 billion in 2016. As the aggression persisted, the cost of lost economic opportunities continued to increase, reaching \$27.4 billion in 2021. Thus, the total cumulative cost of lost opportunities is estimated at roughly \$145 billion in real terms. Projections had put the total cost of foregone real GDP—including direct and indirect impacts and losses to the economy, i.e. the foregone value of the society's production of goods and services—at around \$165 billion by the end of 2024⁽¹⁹⁰⁾. This has been accompanied by a sharp 70% decline in the volume of foreign trade⁽¹⁹¹⁾.

The economic war on Yemen has taken many forms and produced direct and indirect consequences, most of which are examined in different chapters of this report. In this chapter, we set out some of the stages and measures relied upon by the coalition countries of aggression in their economic campaign; they are as follows:

Economic warfare against Yemen has taken various forms and produced both direct and indirect consequences. According to statistics from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Investment, the aggression and blockade caused economic damage and losses amounting to approximately \$1.1 trillion. These included

188 *Ministry of Finance Responds to the Report of the Committee of Academic Experts and Explains the Real Causes of the Cash-Liquidity Crisis*. Sana'a: Al-Wahda Newspaper, 3 November 2016 (in the Arabic language).

189 <https://26sep.net/index.php/local/5066?>

190 <https://sanaacenter.org/ar/publications-all/main-publications-ar/21499>

Challenges to Yemen's Public Revenues (study). Sana'a: Sana'a Centre for Studies, 19 December 2023.

191 <https://yemeneco.org/archives/28911?>

losses of \$82.5 billion in the industrial sector and \$111.13 billion in the foreign trade sector. Losses in the oil and minerals sector amounted to \$57 billion, while those in the agriculture and livestock sector reached \$111 billion. The transport sector—air, land, and sea—sustained losses of \$23.2 billion, while losses in the electricity, energy, and water sector reached \$28.2 billion. The water and sanitation sector sustained losses of \$800 million, while the tourism, antiquities, and cultural sector incurred losses of \$11 billion. Meanwhile, cumulative losses in economic output exceeded \$645 billion.

The following outlines some of the stages and measures adopted by the coalition countries of aggression in their economic warfare:

First: Economic Exhaustion

This phase began in the early hours of the aggression and ended in September 2016. During this period, Yemen's economy across all sectors was hit by severe economic shock, to which the government in Sana'a responded with parallel economic measures. In the first months of the aggression, everything related to the state's public revenue in the governmental and public sectors—which plays a vital role in driving economic and social activity—was targeted, given that it contributes roughly 45.3% of GDP, employs 31% of the working population, and provides social-assistance benefits to 1.5 million of the poorest and most needy segments of society⁽¹⁹²⁾.

This targeting caused a sharp deterioration in the humanitarian situation for millions of Yemenis by late 2016, as the coalition of aggression and its mercenaries tightened the chokehold on public finances, seized public revenues in the southern and eastern governorates, and expanded the economic war—from controlling state resources in these governorates to restricting foreign trade flows and targeting tax and customs revenues. As a result, the available revenue base from oil and gas fell by 72% in 2015 and by 85% for January–September 2016, while non-oil own-source revenues fell overall by 42% throughout the same period. In addition to the halt in non-oil exports—which had accounted for about 12% of Yemen's total exports—there was a rise in the import bill. Tax revenues fell by around 23%, other revenues by about 8%, and grants by about 83.4%, alongside a large decline in drawdowns from external loans.

According to data from the Central Bank of Yemen, the aggression in its first year deprived the 2015 budget of approximately 801 billion and 562 million Yemeni rials. The 2016 budget lost roughly 985 billion and 900 million rials. Economic estimates indicate that the aggression and blockade caused a sharp contrac-

¹⁹² Hajar, Ahmed. *Economic Aggression against Yemen: Effects, Repercussions, and Ways of Responding (study)*. Political Approaches journal, Issue 4 (in the Arabic language).

tion in real GDP of about 34.6% in 2015. These estimates attribute this contraction to the full and partial destruction of infrastructure and public and private facilities, the suspension of donor support and investment programmes, the paralysis of economic activities, and unprecedented crises in food, water, fuel, and electricity. According to official statistics issued by the Ministry of Planning in Sana'a in early 2016, the real GDP that had been expected to reach \$16.3 billion in 2015 fell to about \$6.4 billion because of the aggression and blockade—a loss of roughly \$10 billion, equivalent to 77.5% of real GDP in 2010⁽¹⁹³⁾.

Since the launch of the aggression in March 2015, total imports of goods and products have fallen by about 50% compared with pre-aggression levels in 2014⁽¹⁹⁴⁾, and imports of Yemen's food needs, such as wheat and maize, have dropped by 90–95%, demonstrating the severe impact of the blockade on the supply of vital goods. Estimates published in 2018 showed that the price of the food basket had risen by more than 150% compared with pre-aggression levels and that overall costs had increased by 60%⁽¹⁹⁵⁾. These costs have continued to rise as the economic blockade persisted.

With the sharp fall in the country's foreign-currency revenues, the Central Bank's foreign reserves declined significantly. These reserves fell from \$4.66 billion in 2014 to \$2.8 billion by mid-2015, and further to \$1.7 billion by the end of 2015. This decline of more than 70% since before the aggression reflects the severe pressure on Yemen's economy and the acute shortage of hard currency, standing out as one of the most significant economic consequences of the blockade and aggression⁽¹⁹⁶⁾.

During this phase, the Saudi aggression was wagering on the success of both direct and indirect economic warfare in order to trigger a total economic collapse in Yemen. However, it was surprised by the resilience of the Yemeni economy, despite an overall decline in performance. According to economic experts, the endurance of the national economy during the first two years of the aggression is largely due to the fact that it was a fragile and unregulated economy and that such fragile economies are often able to absorb and adapt to shocks. Another factor was the reduction in the import bill during the first year of the aggression, as the coalition of aggression laid siege to Yemen and blocked the entry of essential imports through Yemeni ports. In addition, the public spending was mostly limited to salary payments, and government expenditure on privately-owned power stations was reduced. At the same time, the Sana'a government lifted

193 <https://www.yecscs.com/article/49>

Al-Tayri, Nabil. *The Repercussions of the War and the Blockade on the Yemeni Economy*. Sana'a: Centre for Yemeni Political and Strategic Studies, 21 October 2016 (in the Arabic language).

194 https://cdn-odi-production.s3.amazonaws.com/media/documents/Impact_of_conflict_on_the_financial_sector_in_Yemen_Jg6sNMp.pdf?

195 <https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/yemen-inside-a-crisis-food-security?>

196 https://alwahdawi.net/news-12907?utm_source=chatgpt.com

<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/bcec26e3-0bde-43cd-8a3a-db5aa758d29b/content>

subsidies on fuel derivatives by declaring a policy of price liberalisation—removing what had been a major burden on the state budget. Also, the Central Bank in Sana'a adopted a set of monetary policies during the first two years of the aggression that prevented mass withdrawals from commercial banks, halted domestic dealings in US dollars, and introduced a series of measures that strengthened public confidence in the local currency. These policies effectively curbed all banking activities that sought to undermine the purchasing power of the Yemeni rial.

Despite praise from the World Bank and the IMF for the neutrality of the Central Bank of Yemen in Sana'a and for its ability to operate impartially and engage with all parties on equal terms, the coalition of aggression deliberately sought to undermine the Bank's capacity to manage the country's monetary policy and to maintain the value of the national currency. This was done by halting foreign currency inflows to the Central Bank in order to obstruct its role in securing the country's essential imports from external markets. Furthermore, the coalition of aggression disabled all revenue channels and prevented the transfer of the revenue to the government's account at the Central Bank. It also froze a portion of the local currency within the occupied governorates, while simultaneously withdrawing the national currency from the markets of Sana'a and freezing it. The objective behind these actions was to paralyse the Bank's ability to continue paying public sector salaries. These measures created a severe liquidity crisis in the local currency. This phase ended in the aggression forces rendering the Central Bank in Sana'a non-operational and announcing its relocation to the city of Aden.

The coalition of aggression also imposed restrictions on the external activities of commercial and Islamic banks by issuing a decision to prevent the transfer of surplus hard currency funds from Yemeni commercial and Islamic banks to the financial hub in Bahrain to bolster their accounts in international banks. As a result, these banks were unable to facilitate traders' imports or open letters of credit in regional and international banks⁽¹⁹⁷⁾.

197 <https://www.yecscs.com/article/115>

Al-Moayyad, Ibrahim (Economic Researcher). *The Challenges Facing Yemen's Economy Between April 2015 and August 2016*. Sana'a: Centre for Yemeni Political and Strategic Studies, 17 October 2017.

Secondly: Financial Fragmentation and Large-Scale Currency Issuance

This phase started in late 2016 as a reaction to the failure of the military aggression to achieve any of its objectives and the failure of the political pressure exerted by the so-called International Quartet, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Britain, and the United States, to force the Sana'a negotiating delegation to agree to sign a surrender agreement under the guise of peace. This took place at the conclusion of the Kuwait negotiations, held under UN sponsorship in August of the same year. America openly participated in this stage, as confirmed by the threat of former US Secretary of State John Kerry at the end of the Quartet meeting held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in late August: He threatened to resort to harsher sanctions against Sana'a. Similarly, former US Ambassador to Yemen Matthew Tueller repeated these threats, vowing to destroy the purchasing power of the local currency until it would become a worthless piece of paper, not even worth the ink used to print it⁽¹⁹⁸⁾.

In this stage, when the coalition of aggression tightened the naval and air siege under Saudi-American instructions, the outgoing president, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, dismissed the Central Bank governor in Sana'a, Mohammed Awad bin Hammam, and ordered the transfer of the bank from the Capital Sana'a to Aden. This occurred in late September of the same year. This decision coincided with American directives to block the Central Bank's access to its foreign currency reserves in international banks. This led to an increased financial and monetary divide between Sana'a and Aden, an exacerbation of Yemen's economic crisis, and the imposition of collective punishment on state employees. This occurred as the government loyal to the coalition in Aden failed to fulfil its obligations to pay state employees' salaries and deliberately interfered with the Central Bank's operations to destroy what remained of economic vitality and activity, as detailed below:

- Disastrous Monetary Policies

Since the first month of 2017, the Aden-based Central Bank began selling the remaining hard currency reserves in government banks in Aden at rates higher than those in the parallel market to obtain local currency liquidity. In July of that year, the Central Bank in Aden made a disastrous decision—relinquishing its responsibility to safeguard the national currency and defend it against foreign currencies in the local market—by adopting a full floatation policy, leaving the currency's exchange rate entirely at the mercy of supply and demand in an unstable market, while lacking the hard currency reserves needed to stabilise the market. However, the Central Bank in Sana'a maintained a managed float policy for the currency. This step coincided with the Aden government's withdrawal of the SWIFT system from the Central Bank in late 2016, with American assistance. This prevented the bank in Sana'a from opening letters of credit for traders and providing hard currency to cover essential goods.

¹⁹⁸ <https://archive.almanar.com.lb/4597991>

Key Rounds of Yemeni Negotiations and Talks Held since the Start of the War in 2015. Lebanon: Manar TV.

- Large-Scale Currency Printing

Under the approval of the International Quartet overseeing the economic war on Yemen, the government aligned with the coalition of aggression entered into contracts with international companies to print hundreds of billions of rials without financial backing. This measure sought to offset its inability to reclaim public revenues in the southern governorates and in Ma'rib Governorate, which remain under the control of armed militias and political factions.

The amount of printed currency had reached approximately 1.72 trillion Yemeni rials by the end of 2018. These sums were transferred to the Aden Bank in batches between 2017 and 2019. Furthermore, the bank in Aden entered into a secret and undisclosed contract worth two trillion rials for the printing of 5,000-rial banknotes. The contract was signed in 2017 by the former governor of the Central Bank in Aden, Munassar al-Quaiti, and this currency has not yet been released into circulation. In 2019, the Aden-based Central Bank signed a new undisclosed contract worth 600 billion rials. According to available information, these sums were delivered to the bank in separate instalments throughout 2019, 2020, and 2021. In 2020, the government, aligned with the coalition of aggression, concluded another agreement with the Russian company Goznak to print a new 1,000-rial banknote. Around 400 billion rials of this currency were issued without backing, out of a total planned amount of 2 trillion rials⁽¹⁹⁹⁾.

This massive inflationary issuance caused the local currency in the occupied governorates to collapse by more than 1,200% over ten years of aggression. In 2015, the exchange rate of the US dollar was 214.87 rials, but after the currency crash, the rate in Aden and other occupied governorates reached 2,700 rials per dollar in March 2025. In contrast, in areas under the Sana'a government, the older notes issued before 2018 and backed by reserves held steady at 535 rials per dollar. This monetary divide pushed up the prices of essential goods (such as food, medicine, and fuel) in the occupied governorates, multiplying the hardships faced by people living there⁽²⁰⁰⁾.

The Sana'a government succeeded in stabilising the currency's exchange rate by implementing precautionary economic measures. Chief among these was the prohibition of trading in unbacked banknotes within the markets under its authority—which make up 67% of the Yemeni market—and relying on the old currency, which was printed with monetary backing, as the medium of exchange.

199 <https://arabic.rt.com/business/900751-%D9%88%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%AF%D9%81%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86/>

Gairley, Fred. *A New Batch of Yemeni Banknotes, Printed in Russia*. RT Russian Channel, 24 September 2017.

200 <https://yemeneco.org/archives/26965>

Aden Prints and Sana'a Bans—the Chaos of Banknote Printing and the Scenario of Submerging the Yemeni Rial in Inflation. Yemen Eco Economic Website, 26 June 2021.

Third: Confiscation of Government Employees' Salaries

Contrary to the commitment made by the outgoing president, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, before the United Nations General Assembly to pay state employees' salaries without interruption, the governments formed by the coalition countries of aggression in Aden have reneged on their previous pledges to pay state employees without exception. Instead, they have imposed collective punishment on 850,000 employees in the governorates under the administration of the government in Sana'a, who are responsible for the livelihood of more than 4.5 million people. This has led to rising poverty and unemployment, a deterioration in the living conditions of state employees, and the emigration of hundreds of qualified national professionals seeking a better standard of living abroad.

Despite the initiative of the leader of the revolution, Al-Sayyid Abdul Malik Al-Houthi, and the initiatives presented by the Supreme Political Council and the National Salvation Government, as well as local and international calls to neutralise the economy, the governments backed by the coalition countries of aggression have persistently evaded their obligations to pay state employees' entitlements guaranteed by the constitution. These parties, aligned with the coalition of aggression, further obstructed the economic provisions of the 2018 Stockholm Agreement concerning the payment of state employees' salaries and the coverage of the shortfalls in the salary account. This account had been activated under the directive of the Supreme Political Council in Sana'a during the first half of 2020, in implementation of the agreement that obliged Sana'a to deposit the due tax and customs revenues collected from imported oil derivative vessels—permitted entry under the international inspection mechanism in Djibouti—into the salary account at the Central Bank branch in Al-Hudaydah. Meanwhile, the government aligned with the countries of aggression must cover the deficit in the monthly salary account using proceeds from oil and gas. Despite Sana'a fulfilling its obligations, the other party refused to transfer the funds and deliberately undermined UN-led efforts to end the suffering of state employees, whose salaries have been seized by the government aligned with the coalition of aggression since late September 2016.

Given that Chapter One of Yemen's budget—covering wages and salaries—has, since the 1990s, been largely funded by crude oil revenues exceeding 50%, the government in Sana'a called on the United Nations to compel the parties aligned with the coalition of aggression to pay public sector salaries based on the 2014 payroll lists. However, those parties deliberately resorted to evasion and procrastination tactics, continuing to export significant volumes of crude oil from Safer (Ma'rib), Al-Uqlah (Shabwah), and Al-Masilah (Hadramawt), while ignoring the demands of state employees and wilfully pursuing a policy of starvation against them. After all efforts failed, and as numerous facts that this government had tried to conceal about the daily production of oil since mid-2016 came to light, an OPEC report revealed that this

government had sold millions of barrels of oil over the past years. The report stated that Yemen's crude oil exports reached 8.64 million barrels in 2016, which represents an average of 24,000 barrels per day, and rose to 25.56 million barrels in 2017 at a daily average of 71,000 barrels. The OPEC report further noted that Yemen's oil exports increased to 33.84 million barrels in 2018, and remained steady at 102.6 million barrels in both 2019 and 2021.

According to official estimates from Sana'a, the coalition of aggression looted more than \$14.45 billion in Yemeni crude oil revenues between 2016 and 2022. This is in addition to widespread looting and smuggling operations carried out through foreign vessels organised by those aligned with the coalition of aggression. In response to this plunder, the Sana'a government imposed a ban on crude oil exports from all production sectors in the occupied governorates, making the resumption of exports conditional upon the coalition's agreement to allocate the revenues to the regular payment of public sector salaries.

Despite the coalition's attempts to use state employees' salaries as leverage to extract concessions from Sana'a during the peace process, the government in Sana'a continues to treat the issue as a humanitarian matter and places it at the forefront of any negotiations held under UN auspices.

Fourth: Overburdening the Economy with Loans Disguised as Deposits

Since the transfer of the Central Bank's functions, Yemen's external public debt has risen from \$6.8 billion to over \$10 billion. This includes a \$2 billion Saudi deposit made at the end of 2018 under the pretext of supporting Yemen's economy and halting the collapse of the exchange rate of the newly printed currency—an amount that was ultimately squandered. An additional \$1 billion was provided by Saudi Arabia through the Arab Monetary Fund, which charges the highest lending rates. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and the UAE provided \$3 billion following the ousting of outgoing president Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi in Riyadh in early April 2022. These grants and deposits, which effectively turned into loans burdening Yemen, were designed by the coalition countries of aggression to impose future control over Yemen's monetary policy and to plunge the country into debts that have brought no tangible benefit to the lives of Yemenis, not even in the occupied governorates. Furthermore, these funds were handed over to illegitimate authorities, neither requested by the representatives of the Yemeni people nor ratified by a president elected in accordance with Yemeni law. It is worth noting that Yemen's total external debt was estimated at around \$6 billion by the end of 2016, but during the years of aggression, this figure rose to \$10.5 billion. In other words, almost \$5 billion was borrowed by a government that does not represent the Yemeni people but rather the countries of the aggression⁽²⁰¹⁾.

Fifth: Resilience and Relative Stability

Despite the escalation of the economic war by the coalition of aggression and its mercenaries and their use of the Yemeni rial as a weapon against the Yemeni people, the Central Bank in the Capital Sana'a, defended the national currency and economy through a series of stringent measures targeting the banking market. It began by intensifying oversight over the market, halting speculation, and arresting those manipulating exchange rates in the local market. These efforts were followed by a decision to ban the use of newly printed currency and to designate the older currency as the sole legal tender, a step that successfully averted a deeper collapse of the national currency.

Since 2020, the areas under the Sana'a government have entered a phase of financial stability, following a series of regulatory and monetary measures that helped stabilise the exchange rate at around 535 rials per US dollar. Key among these measures were the ban on the circulation of newly printed unbacked currency, tighter control over the banking sector, curbing speculation, and increased oversight of money transfer operations. In contrast, inflation and economic deterioration have continued in the occupied areas due

201 https://sanaacenter.org/files/Rethinking_Yemens_Economy_No12_Ar.pdf

Addressing the Crushing Weight of Yemen's Public Debt. New York: Sana'a Centre for Strategic Studies, 20 July 2022.

to corruption and the unregulated issuance of new currency. Despite this stability in the areas under the Sana'a government, the economic war has persisted in various forms, including the continued blockade of ports, the detention of vessels, and the obstruction of fuel shipments.

The International Legal Responsibility of the Coalition of Aggression

The actions committed by the coalition of aggression, led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE with direct backing from the United States, represent a clear violation of international humanitarian law under the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, particularly Article 54 of Additional Protocol I, which prohibits the starvation of civilians and the targeting of objects indispensable to their survival⁽²⁰²⁾. The deliberate destruction of economic infrastructure, the enforcement of blockades, the obstruction of the entry of food and medicine, and the suspension of public sector salaries are acts that amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes⁽²⁰³⁾. Furthermore, the imposition of financial sanctions, the freezing of money transfers, and the collective suspension of salaries constitute violations of articles 6 and 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Hence, these actions give rise to international legal responsibility on the part of all countries involved in the economic war⁽²⁰⁴⁾.

The coalition countries of aggression, along with those that have provided support or political, logistical, or technological cover for the aggression, bear both direct and joint legal responsibility under Article 16 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, issued by the UN's International Law Commission⁽²⁰⁵⁾.

202 <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-54?>

203 <https://www.icrc.org/en/law-and-policy/food-security?>

204 <https://www.refworld.org/legal/resolution/unga/1966/en/11181?>

205 https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf?



A blind child during a protest condemning the Saudi-led coalition's bombing of the Al-Noor Centre for the Blind in Sana'a, 11 January 2016

Chapter Five: UN-Sponsored Truce

The Yemeni people welcomed the announcement of a two-month humanitarian truce, with the possibility of extension, made by the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy to Yemen, Hans Grundberg, on 2 April 2022, following agreement by all parties. The truce was intended to serve as a starting point for what Grundberg described as '*restoring trust between the warring parties*' and resuming a political process aimed at ending the '*conflict*', as he termed it.

The truce, which came into effect at 7:00 pm on Saturday, 2 April 2022, mandated the cessation of all offensive military operations on land, sea, and air. It also included provisions to ensure humanitarian measures, such as reopening Sana'a Airport, allowing the entry of fuel derivatives, reopening roads, and other agreed-upon points aimed at securing the truce's success.

The truce was marred by numerous violations and a lack of commitment from the parties of the aggression to its terms, effectively becoming an alleged truce before the entire world and demonstrating the United Nations' inability to enforce the commitments it sponsors. The truce was renewed and extended for the first time on 2 June 2022, under the same original terms and for the same two-month duration.

Under the supervision and observation of the United Nations, the parties that represent the coalition of aggression once again shirked their commitments. This was evident in the briefings by the UN envoy, Grundberg, which contained misleading claims revealing the lack of genuine commitment by the coalition countries of aggression to the terms of the truce, without addressing their violations and obstruction of the agreed-upon points. Despite this, the National Salvation Government in Sana'a sought to adopt a positive outlook on the truce and agreed to its extension, aiming to provide humanitarian relief to alleviate the suffering of the Yemeni people, even if only minimal.

The first extension of the truce ended amid persistent violations, shirking of commitments, ongoing blockade, and military breaches on the ground, including incursions and airstrikes, the prevention of flights, the detention of ships carrying fuel derivatives and essential goods, and the failure to open any of the agreed-upon roads. Nevertheless, the parties agreed to a second extension of the truce under the same terms and for the same two-month duration, commencing on 2 August 2022, with a strong emphasis on obliging all parties to fully implement their commitments that had not been fulfilled during the original truce and the first extension. These included operating the full number of scheduled flights to and from Sana'a International Airport and ensuring their regularity to the agreed destinations. The renewed extension included a commitment by the parties to intensify negotiations aimed at reaching an expanded truce

agreement as soon as possible. As announced by Grundberg, this expanded truce would introduce new provisions, such as a transparent and effective mechanism for the regular payment of salaries for civil service employees and retired civilians, the reopening of roads in Taiz and other governorates, the expansion of travel destinations to and from Sana'a Airport, and the provision and steady flow of fuel through the ports of Al-Hudaydah. Such an expanded agreement would also provide an opportunity to negotiate a comprehensive ceasefire, address humanitarian and economic issues, and prepare for the resumption of a Yemeni-led political process under United Nations auspices, with the aim of achieving a just and sustainable peace⁽²⁰⁶⁾.

After six months—the full duration of the truce, which ended on 2 October 2022—it became evident to all that the truce was marred by repeated violations and breaches committed by the coalition countries of aggression. These violations even escalated to the point where ships carrying fuel derivatives were completely barred from entry for thirty consecutive days during the second extension, all in full view of the United Nations—the very body sponsoring the agreement—without any serious or effective response on its part. Faced with this reality, Sana'a—represented by the Supreme Political Council and its negotiation delegation—was left with no choice but to declare it would not accept any further extension unless there was full compliance with the original truce and its subsequent extensions.

During the truce period, Yemen Centre for Human Rights closely monitored the extent to which the parties, particularly the coalition countries of aggression, adhered to the terms of the agreement. It documented and examined violations and breaches according to the agreed provisions and issued a report covering 160 days of the truce entitled '*The Alleged Truce*'. The following is a review of this report, supplemented with additional data and statistics covering the entire duration of the truce.

206 <https://osesgy.unmissions.org/press-statement-un-special-envoy-yemen-hans-grundberg-two-month-renewal-un-mediated-truce>

Terms of the Truce Agreement

The truce agreement that was published on the official website of the United Nations Special Envoy to Yemen stated the following:

Recognising the urgent need to de-escalate violence and to address humanitarian and economic needs, the parties will implement a two-month Truce, starting 02 April 2022 and ending 02 June 2022, with the possibility of extension. The purpose of the Truce is to provide a conducive environment for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. It is not a pause to be used by the parties to regroup and resume military operations. The Truce will comprise the following elements:

- 1- *A halt to all offensive ground, aerial, and maritime military operations, inside and outside of Yemen, and a freeze in current military positions on the ground.*
- 2- *The entry of 18 fuel ships during the two-month Truce to the ports of Al-Hudaydah.*
- 3- *Two commercial flights per week in and out of Sana'a Airport during the two-month Truce to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Arab Republic of Egypt.*
- 4- *Once the Truce comes into effect, the SE [Special Envoy] will invite the parties to a meeting to agree on opening roads in Taiz and other governorates to facilitate the movement of civilian men, women, and children, benefiting from the atmosphere of the Truce.*
- 5- *Engagement of the parties with the SE on proposals for next steps towards ending the war.*

The arrangements are temporary in nature and do not constitute a precedent.

Modalities and Timing:

- *The Truce will go into effect 24 hours after the SE's announcement.*
- *During the 24 hours, the parties are responsible for informing their affiliated forces of the halt to all offensive military operations and to freeze military positions on the ground.*
- *The parties will appoint authorised focal points to work with OSESGY on all elements, including military aspects, to support adherence and respect for the Truce. While there will be no independent monitoring, OSESGY will support the coordination required by the parties to help implement the Truce.*
- *The Truce may be extended with the consent of the parties⁽²⁰⁷⁾.*

207 <https://osesgy.unmissions.org/united-nations-initiative-two-month-truce-0>

In the following section, the report provides a detailed account of the violations and breaches committed by the coalition countries of aggression, in clear contravention of the agreed-upon terms of the truce throughout its three phases.

First: Violations of Military Operations

The first clause of the agreement stipulated, *'A halt to all offensive ground, aerial, and maritime military operations, inside and outside of Yemen, and a freeze in current military positions on the ground'*. However, in practice, these operations did not cease. On the contrary, violations by the coalition countries of aggression and their mercenaries continued across various points of contact, involving the use of various aerial and ground-based weaponry. These breaches resulted in more than 250 civilian casualties, including killed and injured individuals.

Number of the Dead			
Total	Men	Women	Children
101	91	3	7
Number of the Wounded			
Total	Men	Women	Children
158	92	21	45

Second: Entry of Fuel Derivative Ships

The second clause of the agreement stipulated, *‘the entry of 18 fuel ships during the two-month Truce to the ports of Al-Hudaydah’*. That is, the total number of ships that should have been allowed entry throughout the original truce and its two extensions amounts to 54 ships. Furthermore, the second extension of the truce explicitly underscored the importance of ensuring both the availability and regular flow of fuel through the ports of Al-Hudaydah, as per Grundberg’s statement.

Although the fuel derivative ships originate from ports in the UAE, which leads the coalition of aggression alongside Saudi Arabia⁽²⁰⁸⁾, the detention of these ships persisted throughout the truce period and its extensions. This continued even after the ships had obtained permits from the United Nations and undergone inspection and verification by the UN Inspection and Verification Mechanism (UNIVM), which confirmed that they were free of any weapons shipments or prohibited materials in accordance with Security Council Resolution 2140, issued in 2014 against certain individuals.

There was a clear contradiction in the United Nations’ handling of the issue concerning the entry of fuel derivative ships, accompanied by justifications that revealed confusion and mutual blame-shifting between the coalition countries of aggression and their mercenaries, with each side placing responsibility for the obstruction on the other. In a statement issued on 7 September 2022 and published by various news outlets and websites, Rashad Al-Alimi (head of the so-called *‘Presidential Leadership Council’*⁽²⁰⁹⁾) claimed that the government had taken no action to prevent the arrival of these ships and commercial shipments to their designated destination, according to the truce agreement⁽²¹⁰⁾. However, both coalition countries and the United Nations asserted that the party responsible for the blockade on the Yemeni people—the one responsible for granting or denying the entry of fuel ships—was what they referred to as the *‘Yemeni government’* led by Rashad Al-Alimi. This claim was further reinforced by the United States’ welcome of the decision to facilitate the entry of fuel ships into the port of Al-Hudaydah⁽²¹¹⁾ and was repeatedly affirmed by the UN Special Envoy through the *‘Timeline on the Progress of the Truce Implementation’* issued by his office⁽²¹²⁾.

208 These tables, issued by the Yemen Petroleum Company, detail the number of fuel ships detained as of 9 September 2022: http://www.ypcye.com/Show_News.php?id=2550

209 In the early hours of Thursday, 7 April 2022, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi—the president whose mandate had expired—announced from Riyadh the formation of a Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council, to which he transferred all his powers, along with those of his deputy. This move constituted a violation of the Yemeni Constitution, international laws and norms, and relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.

<https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220407-yemen-s-president-transfers-power-to-new-leadership-council>

210 <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/259293>

211 <https://alsharaeanews.com/2022/09/09/61971/>

212 <https://osesgy.unmissions.org/timeline-progress-truce-implementation>

These actions demonstrate the United Nations' inability to enforce its own resolutions and its subjugation to the will of the coalition countries of aggression, with neither the organisation nor its representatives in Yemen taking a clear stance to condemn these violations.

In a statement released on 2 September 2022, the Yemen Petroleum Company held the United States responsible for the continued blockade and the prevention of ships from entering the port of Al-Hudaydah. The statement reads, '*The coalition of aggression, led by the United States, continues to pirate all fuel ships without exception, detaining them for varying periods totalling 314 days since the announcement of the temporary truce agreement, in addition to delays in Djibouti that exceeded a combined total of 152 days.*' This delay resulted in financial penalties on the shipments, amounting to USD 11 million⁽²¹³⁾.

The coalition countries of aggression did not fulfil their obligation to ensure the smooth entry of fuel ships into Al-Hudaydah ports. Of the 54 fuel ships stipulated in the terms of the truce, only 51 were granted entry after extended periods of detention and deliberate obstruction.

²¹³ http://www.ypcye.com/Show_News.php?id=2526

Third: Lifting the Siege on Sana'a International Airport

The third clause of the agreement stipulated, *'Two commercial flights per week in and out of Sana'a Airport during the two-month Truce to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Arab Republic of Egypt'*. This means that the total number of commercial flights during the original truce and its first and second extensions should reach 48 flights. In his statement marking the truce's second extension, the UN Special Envoy, Grundberg, emphasised the need to expand the number of travel destinations served by flights to and from Sana'a Airport.

According to the terms of the truce, it was agreed that two commercial flights per week would operate between Sana'a and both Cairo and Amman, and vice versa. However, the first flight from Amman to Sana'a International Airport did not arrive until 16 May 2022, exactly 44 days after the truce had been announced. Throughout the duration of the truce and its subsequent extensions, the coalition of aggression repeatedly delayed flights, disrupted their scheduling, and failed to comply with the agreement's provisions regarding the operation of flights to and from Cairo Airport.

According to the 'Timeline on the Progress of the Truce Implementation' monitored by the Office of the UN Special Envoy⁽²¹⁴⁾, 51 flights operated to and from Sana'a International Airport during the truce periods, out of a scheduled 48 flights; however, a significant number experienced prolonged delays.

214 <https://osesgy.unmissions.org/timeline-progress-truce-implementation>

Fourth: Opening Roads and Access Points

The fourth clause of the agreement stipulated, *‘Once the Truce comes into effect, the SE will invite the parties to a meeting to agree on opening roads in Taiz and other governorates to facilitate the movement of civilian men, women, and children, benefiting from the atmosphere of the Truce.’*

Amid the expanding scope of confrontations as a result of the ongoing aggression against Yemen, confrontation points have reached many cities, such as Hajjah, Al-Jawf, Ma’rib, Taiz, and Al-Hudaydah. These governorates have not only endured the devastation of war and conflict, but their residents have also suffered from the closure of access points to and from these areas. They were also denied the right to move freely and easily. This closure has left civilians facing fear, exhaustion, and hardship, forcing them to travel long, indirect routes when leaving or entering their areas. In some cases, travellers have even been killed by mercenaries and armed bandits operating at military and security checkpoints run by the coalition forces and their mercenaries.

Furthermore, the closure of roads and access points has further exacerbated the humanitarian catastrophe, as it has disrupted the transport of food supplies and petroleum derivatives. The prices of these essential goods have risen in the affected areas due to the difficulties tankers and trucks face in reaching them, often having to take long and rough alternative routes. Additionally, they are at risk of being looted or robbed by bandits along the way.

The issue of reopening roads, which all parties committed to under the truce agreement, remains one of the most challenging matters. Nothing has been achieved on this front at any stage of the truce, simply because the United Nations—the sponsor of the agreement—has been unable to compel the coalition countries of aggression and their mercenaries to implement it or comply with it.

At the invitation of the UN envoy, representatives from both parties were appointed to discuss the mechanism for reopening roads and the key priorities related to this file. The Jordanian capital, Amman, was chosen as the venue for the consultative meetings on this mechanism. In May 2022, the UN envoy put forwards a proposal to reopen a number of roads in Taiz and other governorates, including an implementation mechanism and safety guarantees for civilian travellers, based on discussions held with both sides.

On 6 June 2022, the UN envoy presented another proposal to representatives from both parties, described as a revised version, calling for the reopening of several roads, including a main route in Taiz, as well as others in different governorates. As stated by the envoy, the aim was to alleviate civilian suffering and

facilitate the delivery of goods. The Sana'a delegation submitted some remarks on the proposal, affirming its readiness to open the roads, provided that the first phase begins immediately by reopening two routes in Taiz Governorate. The first route includes the reopening of the Salh, Ab'ar, Al-Surmain, Al-Dimna, Al-Hawban, and the road to Sana'a, and the second includes Lahj, Aden-Al-Shurayjah, Karsh, Al-Rahida, Al-Hawban, and the road to Sana'a. Subject to the completion of the first phase by reopening these routes, the committees would then resume discussions under UN auspices⁽²¹⁵⁾.

On 3 July 2022, the UN envoy presented another revised proposal, whose first phase involved reopening four roads in Taiz. The second phase proposed that the parties commit to reopening main roads in Taiz and several other governorates, including Ma'rib, Al-Bayda, Al-Jawf, Al-Hudaydah, and Al-Dhale'.

Amid the obstinacy of the parties affiliated with the coalition countries of aggression and their mercenaries, who failed to implement any of the proposals put forward by the UN envoy and even refused to attend several negotiation rounds scheduled by the envoy, the Sana'a delegation announced a unilateral initiative in July 2022 to reopen roads and alleviate the burden on citizens, particularly in Taiz Governorate. The announcement included reopening the 50-60 road, which local authorities in the governorate began to open in cooperation with the military forces stationed there⁽²¹⁶⁾. However, this effort was met with clear violations, as coalition mercenaries opened fire on the committees and equipment involved in reopening the road. They also targeted civilian buses that had started to use the road⁽²¹⁷⁾.

What is particularly striking is that the United Nations did not praise the unilateral initiative at all, nor did it condemn the actions of the coalition's mercenaries, who rejected the road reopening and launched attacks against it. Instead, the UN, through its envoy, justified these actions by stating that the reopening of roads requires coordination and ongoing communication to ensure safe and sustainable civilian passage.

215 <https://www.almayadeen.net/news/politics/%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%BA%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%82-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B2-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89>

216 <https://www.almayadeen.net/news/politics/%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%AD-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B2-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A1%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B5%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%A7>

217 <https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/yemeni-sources:-aggression-continues-to-block-taiz-50-60-road>


- The Reality of the Siege on Taiz

The UN envoy and the coalition's media often falsely claim that Taiz Governorate is under siege and appeal to the Sana'a government to lift this so-called siege. In reality, large parts of Taiz are controlled by mercenary factions affiliated with the coalition of aggression, including Al-Qaeda militias, the Islah party, the Transitional Council, and Tariq Saleh's militias⁽²¹⁸⁾. Moreover, the governorate has sea access via Al-Mokha and the Bab Al-Mandab, as well as land routes to the south through Lahj Governorate. The only genuinely closed-off area is limited to the northern part of Taiz, which constitutes a frontline and zone of military clashes. Residents in this area suffer significantly due to their inability to move freely within the governorate, forced instead to take long, rugged routes filled with military checkpoints operated by the coalition of aggression and its mercenaries⁽²¹⁹⁾.

In reality, the besieged areas are not limited to Taiz Governorate; rather, all the northern regions under the Sana'a administration are genuinely under siege by the coalition countries of aggression. These regions suffer severely on a humanitarian level due to the lack of access to petroleum derivatives and food supplies, as well as the closure of their airports and ports.

218 A report, written in the Arabic language, titled '*Taiz: A Hotbed of Irregular Militias*', published by the Sana'a Centre for Strategic Studies in September 2021, outlines the military formations loyal to the Islah Party in the southern rural parts of Taiz, as well as the counter-mobilisation efforts by the Southern Transitional Council. It explains how the area between Taiz and Lahj has become a new flashpoint that could potentially draw in additional forces and factions based in Taiz and along the Red Sea coast.

219 <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1076792183025082>



This map lays bare the truth behind the so-called siege of Taiz Governorate, showing exactly which areas are under the control of coalition forces and their mercenaries.

Fifth: Steps Towards Ending the War

Clause five of the agreement states, *'Engagement of the parties with the SE on proposals for next steps towards ending the war.'*

Although it is evident that this clause is closely linked to the preceding provisions of the truce agreement, the United Nations has failed to take meaningful steps to make use of the truce as an opportunity to alleviate and ultimately end the humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen. Instead, just days before the truce expired, the UN rushed to convene new meetings in an attempt to secure another extension—just as it had done with the first and second extensions—without compelling the parties to the aggression to fulfil their commitments, particularly those made during the second expanded extension, which was announced by UN Envoy, Grundberg, and included a commitment to develop a mechanism for paying the suspended salaries.

The world, the UN Security Council, and the United Nations continue to turn a blind eye to the peace initiatives consistently proposed by Al-Sayyid Abdul Malik Al-Houthi, the leader of the 21 September 2014 Revolution⁽²²⁰⁾. Since the onset of the aggression in 2015, he has persistently reiterated his call in numerous speeches for an end to the senseless war on Yemen. He also emphasised the importance of using the humanitarian truce as an opportunity to work towards a comprehensive cessation of aggression. In his speech on 23 August 2022, he reaffirmed this position, stating, *'Firstly, I would like to offer a word of advice to the coalition of aggression: Take advantage of this truce to end your aggression, to cease your war against this country, and to lift your blockade. Persisting in aggression, conspiracies against our nation and our people, and continued targeting will only entangle you further in a serious dilemma with harmful consequences and grave repercussions. This is because Allah (the Almighty) is the Sovereign of the heavens and the earth, and He is the Avenger of the oppressed against tyrants and arrogant oppressors. In fact, the scale of injustice you are inflicting upon this country and its people is horribly immense and all-encompassing, and its consequences upon you will be severe'*⁽²²¹⁾.

These calls have also been repeatedly echoed by the Supreme Political Council⁽²²²⁾, represented by President Mahdi Al-Mashat⁽²²³⁾, particularly in his speech on the occasion of Unity Day, 22 May 2022, in which he stated, *'We affirm that we are not against extending the truce; however, we cannot accept any extension that allows the suffering of our people to persist. Therefore, I call for genuine and encouraging cooperation*

220 <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3156804.htm>

221 <https://www.ansarollah.com.ye/archives/542265>

222 <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news448067.htm>

223 https://mofa.gov.ye/?page_id=1056

that leads to tangible improvements in humanitarian and economic conditions in any future ceasefire, and for prioritising further discussions on humanitarian and economic solutions, necessitated by the urgent need to alleviate the suffering of the besieged Yemeni people. Such steps would positively reflect on the overall peace process in Yemen⁽²²⁴⁾.

The failure to implement the first four clauses of the original truce agreement and its extensions has naturally affected the final clause, resulting in no permanent agreement to end the aggression and blockade against Yemen.

²²⁴ <https://26sep.net/index.php/newspaper/26septfirst/37110-32>



Recommendations

First: For the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the General Assembly:

1. Issue an immediate resolution calling for an end to the aggression against Yemen, the lifting of the unjust blockade, and the reopening of airports and seaports for both commercial and medical travel.
2. Rectify the criteria used for decision-making concerning Yemen, re-list Saudi Arabia and its coalition on the blacklist of violators of children's rights, take the necessary measures to uphold victims' rights and ensure their compensation, prosecute the perpetrators of these crimes, and guarantee that they do not evade accountability.
3. Submit a proposal to reconsider the powers of the UN Security Council and to abolish the veto system, in accordance with the principle of equality among nations.
4. Condemn the aggression against Yemen, require the coalition countries of aggression to issue formal apologies for their crimes, and initiate efforts for reparations and reconstruction.
5. Refer the case of the aggression against Yemen to the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court.
6. Compel the coalition countries to swiftly implement the provisions of the Stockholm Agreement regarding captives and to bring an end to the ongoing suffering inflicted upon them by coalition forces and their mercenaries, particularly in the case of women.
7. Oblige the United Nations Security Council to impose sanctions and invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter against the countries involved in the aggression against Yemen.
8. Promptly establish an independent international fact-finding committee to investigate all crimes committed by the coalition countries against civilians, including the grave crimes they continue to perpetrate, particularly against women and children.
9. Enter into a genuine partnership with the existing state institutions in areas under the Sana'a Government, as well as with local human rights organisations, in a manner that ensures the implementation of effective programmes and activities to protect needy groups, particularly women and children.

Second: For the Leaders of the Member States of the United Nations:

1. Condemn the ongoing crime of aggression against the Yemeni people and intervene to stop it.
2. Work towards ending the blockade and opening air, sea, and land ports for unrestricted commercial movement.
3. Cease the sale of arms to countries participating in the aggression against Yemen.

Third: For the Supreme Political Council and the Yemeni Government (the Government of Change and Construction):

1. Establish a national investigative committee to examine allegations of human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law
2. Establish a special committee to investigate all military operations alleged by the UN Security Council and the Human Rights Council committees to be in breach of international humanitarian law.
3. Form a legal team comprising Yemeni and non-Yemeni lawyers specialised in international law, in collaboration with international law firms and local and international human rights organisations, to file cases against the coalition countries and the UN Security Council, demand accountability for all officials involved in the aggression against Yemen, secure redress and compensation for the victims, and call for the reconstruction of the country.
4. Mandate the Public Prosecution and relevant authorities to initiate investigations and take the necessary measures to complete the criminal case files concerning all crimes and violations committed against the Yemeni people.
5. Require the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights to adjudicate all crimes and violations committed by the coalition of aggression against Yemen and to issue rulings in accordance with national law and in line with the principles of international law and international humanitarian law, in preparation for referring the cases to the international judiciary.

Fourth: For the World's Free People, Including Leaders, Activists, and Human Rights Organisations and Bodies:

1. Continue to put pressure on the United Nations General Assembly, as well as the presidency and members of the Security Council, to stop the aggression against Yemen and lift the blockade.
2. Call for the rectification of the status of the Security Council by amending the Charter of the United Nations with regard to its powers, including the abolition of the veto system.
3. Join the official and unofficial efforts to file cases against the coalition countries of aggression and the UN Security Council to demand accountability for the officials involved in the aggression against Yemen.

Fifth: For Local Civil Society Organisations:

1. Consolidate efforts and strengthen coordination in order to improve performance and fulfil national and humanitarian responsibilities in monitoring and documenting crimes that violate the rights of the Yemeni people.
2. Work towards implementing projects with sustainable effects and to provide psychological and social support to various segments of society, particularly women and children.
3. Consistently issue human rights and humanitarian reports that accurately reflect the true state of the humanitarian situation in Yemen.

The End of the Report
Our success comes only through Allah.

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And When
Yemen Is Questioned!



Buthaina Al-Raimi, the sole survivor after her entire family was killed in coalition airstrikes on a residential building in the Attan neighbourhood in Sana'a of Sana'a, the capital – 25 August 2017
Photographer: Karim Zarei

In its second edition, **And When Yemen Is Questioned!** is a report that represents a summary of the efforts of Yemen Centre for Human Rights since the beginning of an aggressive coalition against Yemen launched by more than (21) countries, led by Saudi Arabia. The report documents, with figures and evidence, the humanitarian situation resulting from these crimes during (10) years for the period from March 2015 to March 2025.



And When Yemen Is Questioned!

Second Edition

1448 - 2026